Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

Im Gegensatz zu Hobb’schen Argumentationen ist die Bereitstellung von Governance nicht notwendigerweise an starke Staatlichkeit gebunden: Empirische Belege zeigen, dass verschiedene (nicht-staatliche) Akteure Governance- Leistungen trotz zumindest begrenzter Staatlichkeit bereitstellen – entgegen vieler Stimmen in zeitgenössischen Diskursen zu schwacher und gescheiterter Staatlichkeit. Der Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, wie die Fälle erklärt werden können, wo Governance erfolgreich bereitgestellt wird obwohl der Staat entweder keine Governance-Leistungen erbringt oder erbringen kann. Im Rahmen des Transfers von Forschungsergebnissen der Politischen Soziologie in die Analyse von „Governance ohne Staat“ geht der Aufsatz von der Annahme aus, dass Art und Weise wie Gesellschaften sich organisieren maßgeblich von deren sozialstruktureller Bedingtheit abhängen. Diese spezifiziert der Aufsatz mithilfe des Sozialkapitaltheorie. Auf dem Weg zu einer Politischen Soziologie der „Governance ohne Staat“, stellt der Aufsatz die Beziehung zwischen Sozialkapital, vor allem in seiner Ausprägung als interpersonelles Vertrauen, und sozialer Handlungskoordination als Grundlage von Governance her. In diesem Kontext wird die Bereitstellung von Governance als Spiel kollektiven Handelns verstanden („Governance Game“), in dem das Verhalten sozial-eingebetteter (kollektiver) Akteure (und insbesondere ihre Kooperationsentscheidungen) maßgeblich von dem Umfang ihres Sozialkapitals abhängen. Das zentrale Argument des Aufsatzes ist, dass spezifische Typen von Sozialkapital bestimmte Modi der sozialen Handlungskoordination in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit ermöglichen und entsprechend erklären. Im Rahmen eines explorativen Zugangs werden konzeptuelle und theoretische Begründungen vorgebracht, die bei der Erklärung der Varianz und der Prozesse von Governance außerhalb der OECD-Welt neue Perspektiven eröffnen.Unlike what Hobbesian theories argue, the provision of governance is not necessarily undermined by a lack of statehood. Empirical findings show that – contrary to many voices in current debates on weak, failing, or failed states – various (non-state) actors provide governance even when statehood is limited. This paper addresses the puzzle of how to account for cases where governance exists although the state cannot or does not provide it. Transferring insights from political sociology to the analysis of such “gov- ernance without the state,” the paper holds that the way societies manage their affairs critically depends on social conditions, which are captured here following social capital theory. Working toward a political sociology of “governance without a state,” this paper links social capital, resulting in interpersonal trust, to social coordination underlying the provision of governance. In this context, governance is interpreted as a collective action game (“governance game”), in which socially embedded (collective) actors are seen as players whose behavior (in particular their decisions to cooperate) depends critically on their social capital endowments. The main argument is that specific types of social capital endowments facilitate – and, thus, explain – specific modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood. Explorative in nature, con- ceptual and theoretical arguments will be developed that offer new perspectives to explain the variance and mechanisms of governance outside the OECD world

On the social conditions of governance : social capital and governance in areas of limited statehood

Unlike what Hobbesian theories argue, the provision of governance is not necessarily undermined by a lack of statehood. Empirical findings show that – contrary to many voices in current debates on weak, failing, or failed states – various (non-state) actors provide governance even when statehood is limited. This paper addresses the puzzle of how to account for cases where governance exists although the state cannot or does not provide it. Transferring insights from political sociology to the analysis of such “governance without the state,” the paper holds that the way societies manage their affairs critically depends on social conditions, which are captured here following social capital theory. Working toward a political sociology of “governance without a state,” this paper links social capital, resulting in interpersonal trust, to social coordination underlying the provision of governance. In this context, governance is interpreted as a collective action game (“governance game”), in which socially embedded (collective) actors are seen as players whose behavior (in particular their decisions to cooperate) depends critically on their social capital endowments. The main argument is that specific types of social capital endowments facilitate – and, thus, explain – specific modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood. Explorative in nature, conceptual and theoretical arguments will be developed that offer new perspectives to explain the variance and mechanisms of governance outside the OECD world

Can islands of effectiveness thrive in difficult governance settings ? the political economy of local-level collaborative governance

Many low-income countries contend with a governance syndrome characterized by a difficult combination of seeming openness, weak institutions, and strong inter-elite contestation for power and resources. In such countries, neither broad-based policy nor public management reforms are likely to be feasible. But are broad-based approaches necessary? Theory and evidence suggest that in such settings progress could be driven by"islands of effectiveness"-- narrowly-focused initiatives that combine high-quality institutional arrangements at the micro-level, plus supportive, narrowly-targeted policy reforms. This paper explores whether and how local-level collaborative governance can provide a platform for these islands of effectiveness. Drawing on the analytical framework developed by the Nobel-prize winning social scientist Elinor Ostrom, the paper reviews the underpinnings of successful collaborative governance. It introduces a simple model for exploring the interactions between collaborative governance and political economy. The model highlights the conditions under which coordination is capable of countering threats from predators seeking to capture the returns from collaborative governance for themselves. The relative strength in the broader environment of two opposing networks emerges as key --"threat networks"to which predators have access, and countervailing"trumping networks"on which protagonists of effective collaborative governance can draw. The paper illustrates the potential practical relevance of the approach with three heuristic examples: the governance of schools, fisheries, and road construction and maintenance. It concludes by laying out an agenda for further empirical research, and suggesting what might be the implications of the approach for future operational practice.Governance Indicators,National Governance,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance

Law\u27s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition

Securities markets are commonly assumed to spring forth at the intersection of an adequate supply of, and a healthy demand for, investment capital. In recent years, however, seemingly failed market transitions - the failure of new markets to emerge and of existing markets to evolve - have called this assumption into question. From the developed economies of Germany and Japan to the developing countries of central and eastern Europe, securities markets have exhibited some inability to take root. The failure of U.S. securities markets, and particularly the New York Stock Exchange, to make greater use of computerized trading, communications, and processing technologies, meanwhile, seems to suggest market resistance to technological modernization. In light of this pattern, one must wonder: How are strong markets created and maintained, and what might be law\u27s role in this process?This Article attempts to articulate a model for understanding the needs of efficient market transition and the resulting role of law in that process. Specifically, it suggests a cueing function for law in market transition. Grounded in largely ignored lessons of game theory and microeconomic analysis of so-called network effects, cueing theory identifies the coordination of market participants\u27 expectations as law\u27s central role in market transition. Building on recent legal literature on private regulation, social norms, and the expressive function of law, this theory suggests that in securities market transition - whether it be market creation in central and eastern Europe or market restructuring in the United States - law primarily serves to convene, encourage, inform, and facilitate.A cueing role for law constitutes an important extension of traditional conceptions of what law does, particularly in securities regulation, but in other areas as well. Regulatory cues are neither coercive nor outcome determinative and involve a close intertwining of public and private regulation. The exceptional character of law in this context, and the recent growth in areas where regulatory cues might have fruitful application, may explain why such a role has not previously been analyzed. Yet in securities markets and other industries exhibiting network economies - from electricity transmission and interstate transportation to telecommunications and the Internet - a cueing function for law may be central to efficient transition. It may explain much of why law matters in the modern economy

Linking local experiments to global standards: how project networks promote global institution-building

Global regulations, such as social and environmental standards, often result from project-based multi-stakeholder initiatives. Many initiatives fail because key stakeholders cannot be mobilized, or partners are incapable of establishing common ground. We show that local development projects aimed at testing and implementing new practices at the local level and strategically coordinated project networks linking local projects and project partners together across national boundaries can facilitate global institution-building. Based on a longitudinal case study of the emergence of the Common Code for the Coffee Community, we develop a process model of global standard development and discuss in particular the importance of global project networks as intermediary organizational forms. We inform research on global standard development and institution-building, and project-based learning and coordination across national boundaries

The emergence of information systems: a communication-based theory

An information system is more than just the information technology; it is the system that emerges from the complex interactions and relationships between the information technology and the organization. However, what impact information technology has on an organization and how organizational structures and organizational change influence information technology remains an open question. We propose a theory to explain how communication structures emerge and adapt to environmental changes. We operationalize the interplay of information technology and organization as language communities whose members use and develop domain-specific languages for communication. Our theory is anchored in the philosophy of language. In developing it as an emergent perspective, we argue that information systems are self-organizing and that control of this ability is disseminated throughout the system itself, to the members of the language community. Information technology influences the dynamics of this adaptation process as a fundamental constraint leading to perturbations for the information system. We demonstrate how this view is separated from the entanglement in practice perspective and show that this understanding has far-reaching consequences for developing, managing, and examining information systems

Emergence and resilience in multi-agent reinforcement learning

Our world represents an enormous multi-agent system (MAS), consisting of a plethora of agents that make decisions under uncertainty to achieve certain goals. The interaction of agents constantly affects our world in various ways, leading to the emergence of interesting phenomena like life forms and civilizations that can last for many years while withstanding various kinds of disturbances. Building artificial MAS that are able to adapt and survive similarly to natural MAS is a major goal in artificial intelligence as a wide range of potential real-world applications like autonomous driving, multi-robot warehouses, and cyber-physical production systems can be straightforwardly modeled as MAS. Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a promising approach to build such systems which has achieved remarkable progress in recent years. However, state-of-the-art MARL commonly assumes very idealized conditions to optimize performance in best-case scenarios while neglecting further aspects that are relevant to the real world. In this thesis, we address emergence and resilience in MARL which are important aspects to build artificial MAS that adapt and survive as effectively as natural MAS do. We first focus on emergent cooperation from local interaction of self-interested agents and introduce a peer incentivization approach based on mutual acknowledgments. We then propose to exploit emergent phenomena to further improve coordination in large cooperative MAS via decentralized planning or hierarchical value function factorization. To maintain multi-agent coordination in the presence of partial changes similar to classic distributed systems, we present adversarial methods to improve and evaluate resilience in MARL. Finally, we briefly cover a selection of further topics that are relevant to advance MARL towards real-world applicability.Unsere Welt stellt ein riesiges Multiagentensystem (MAS) dar, welches aus einer Vielzahl von Agenten besteht, die unter Unsicherheit Entscheidungen treffen müssen, um bestimmte Ziele zu erreichen. Die Interaktion der Agenten beeinflusst unsere Welt stets auf unterschiedliche Art und Weise, wodurch interessante emergente Phänomene wie beispielsweise Lebensformen und Zivilisationen entstehen, die über viele Jahre Bestand haben und dabei unterschiedliche Arten von Störungen überwinden können. Die Entwicklung von künstlichen MAS, die ähnlich anpassungs- und überlebensfähig wie natürliche MAS sind, ist eines der Hauptziele in der künstlichen Intelligenz, da viele potentielle Anwendungen wie zum Beispiel das autonome Fahren, die multi-robotergesteuerte Verwaltung von Lagerhallen oder der Betrieb von cyber-phyischen Produktionssystemen, direkt als MAS formuliert werden können. Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) ist ein vielversprechender Ansatz, mit dem in den letzten Jahren bemerkenswerte Fortschritte erzielt wurden, um solche Systeme zu entwickeln. Allerdings geht der Stand der Forschung aktuell von sehr idealisierten Annahmen aus, um die Effektivität ausschließlich für Szenarien im besten Fall zu optimieren. Dabei werden weiterführende Aspekte, die für die echte Welt relevant sind, größtenteils außer Acht gelassen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Aspekte Emergenz und Resilienz in MARL betrachtet, welche wichtig für die Entwicklung von anpassungs- und überlebensfähigen künstlichen MAS sind. Es wird zunächst die Entstehung von emergenter Kooperation durch lokale Interaktion von selbstinteressierten Agenten untersucht. Dazu wird ein Ansatz zur Peer-Incentivierung vorgestellt, welcher auf gegenseitiger Anerkennung basiert. Anschließend werden Ansätze zur Nutzung emergenter Phänomene für die Koordinationsverbesserung in großen kooperativen MAS präsentiert, die dezentrale Planungsverfahren oder hierarchische Faktorisierung von Evaluationsfunktionen nutzen. Zur Aufrechterhaltung der Multiagentenkoordination bei partiellen Veränderungen, ähnlich wie in klassischen verteilten Systemen, werden Methoden des Adversarial Learning vorgestellt, um die Resilienz in MARL zu verbessern und zu evaluieren. Abschließend wird kurz eine Auswahl von weiteren Themen behandelt, die für die Einsatzfähigkeit von MARL in der echten Welt relevant sind

The End of National Models in Employment Relations?

The erosion of a number of national systems of employment relations, and the evidence from large scale workplace surveys has brought attention to the considerable diversity of employment systems within major economies. This essay applies the theory of evolutionary games to explain the diffusion of different employment systems within national economies, and how they interact with established sectoral and national level institutions. This also helps to explain potential tipping points in their expansion and retreat. Evidence to support the argument is taken from the British and French workplace employment relations surveys and the European Working Conditions Survey.Labor-Management Relations, Labor Contracting

ROUTINE AS DEVIATION

We draw on evidence scattered across thick descriptions of organizations to outline an alternative model of routine. Instead of defining routine as a process of compliance with prescribed rules and procedures we define it as a process of deviation from the prescribed elements of organizations, resulting from the mutual constitution of repetitive work and improvisation. This view of routine underscores its adaptive nature and suggests that flexibility can be achieved not only by nimble and openly innovative organizations but also by large and organizations engaging in ‘closet’ innovation.