Organized equity markets in Germany

The German financial system is the archetype of a bank-dominated system. This implies that organized equity markets are, in some sense, underdeveloped. The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe the German equity markets and, second, to analyze whether it is underdeveloped in any meaningful sense. In the descriptive part we provide a detailed account of the microstructure of the German equity markets, putting special emphasis on recent developments. When comparing the German market with its peers, we find that it is indeed underdeveloped with respect to market capitalization. In terms of liquidity, on the other hand, the German equity market is not generally underdeveloped. It does, however, lack a liquid market for block trading. Klassifikation: G 51 . Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press

The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use and Controversy

Over the last decade, there has been a dramatic shift in how securities are traded in the capital markets. Utilizing supercomputers and complex algorithms that pick up on breaking news, company/stock/economic information and price and volume movements, many institutions now make trades in a matter of microseconds, through a practice known as high frequency trading. Today, high frequency traders have virtually phased out the dinosaur floor-traders and average investors of the past. With the recent attempted robbery of one of these high frequency trading platforms from Goldman Sachs this past summer, this rise of the machines has become front page news, generating vast controversy and discourse over this largely secretive and ultra-lucrative practice. Because of this phenomenon, those of us on Main Street are faced with a variety of questions: What exactly is high frequency trading? How does it work? How long has this been going on for? Should it be banned or curtailed? What is the end-game, and how will this shape the future of securities trading and its regulation? This iBrief explores the answers to these questions

Impersonal efficiency and the dangers of a fully automated securities exchange

This report identifies impersonal efficiency as a driver of market automation during the past four decades, and speculates about the future problems it might pose. The ideology of impersonal efficiency is rooted in a mistrust of financial intermediaries such as floor brokers and specialists. Impersonal efficiency has guided the development of market automation towards transparency and impersonality, at the expense of human trading floors. The result has been an erosion of the informal norms and human judgment that characterize less anonymous markets. We call impersonal efficiency an ideology because we do not think that impersonal markets are always superior to markets built on social ties. This report traces the historical origins of this ideology, considers the problems it has already created in the recent Flash Crash of 2010, and asks what potential risks it might pose in the future

News, liquidity dynamics and intraday jumps: evidence from the HUF/EUR market

We study intraday jumps on a pure limit order FX market by linking them to news announcements and liquidity shocks. First, we show that jumps are frequent and contribute greatly to the return volatility. Nearly half of the jumps can be linked with scheduled and unscheduled news announcements. Furthermore, we show that jumps are information based, whether they are linked with news announcements or not. Prior to jumps, liquidity does not deviate from its normal level, nor do liquidity shocks offer any predictive power for jump occurrence. Jumps emerge not as a result of unusually low liquidity but rather as a result of an unusually high demand for immediacy concentrated on one side of the book. During and after the jump, a dynamic order placement process emerges: some participants endogenously become liquidity providers and absorb the increased demand for immediacy. We detect an interesting asymmetry and find the liquidity providers to be more reluctant to add liquidity when confronted with a news announcement around the jump. Further evidence shows that participants submit more limit orders relative to market orders after a jump. Consequently, the informational role of order flow becomes less pronounced in the thick order book after the jump