10 research outputs found
3- and 5-Isogenies of Supersingular Edwards Curves
An analysis is made of the properties and conditions for the existence of 3-
and 5-isogenies of complete and quadratic supersingular Edwards curves. For the
encapsulation of keys based on the SIDH algorithm, it is proposed to use
isogeny of minimal odd degrees 3 and 5, which allows bypassing the problem of
singular points of the 2nd and 4th orders, characteristic of 2-isogenies. A
review of the main properties of the classes of complete, quadratic, and
twisted Edwards curves over a simple field is given. Equations for the isogeny
of odd degrees are reduced to a form adapted to curves in the form of
Weierstrass. To do this, use the modified law of addition of curve points in
the generalized Edwards form, which preserves the horizontal symmetry of the
curve return points. Examples of the calculation of 3- and 5-isogenies of
complete Edwards supersingular curves over small simple fields are given, and
the properties of the isogeny composition for their calculation with
large-order kernels are discussed. Equations are obtained for upper complexity
estimates for computing isogeny of odd degrees 3 and 5 in the classes of
complete and quadratic Edwards curves in projective coordinates; algorithms are
constructed for calculating 3- and 5-isogenies of Edwards curves with
complexity 6M + 4S and 12M + 5S, respectively. The conditions for the existence
of supersingular complete and quadratic Edwards curves of order 4x3mx5n and
8x3mx5n are found. Some parameters of the cryptosystem are determined when
implementing the SIDH algorithm at the level of quantum security of 128 bits
Implementation of the CSIDH Algorithm Model on Supersingular Twisted and Quadratic Edwards Curves
The properties of twisted and quadratic supersingular Edwards curves forming pairs of quadratic torsion with the order p + 1 over the simple field Fp are considered. A modification of the CSIDH algorithm using the isogenies of these curves in replacement of the extended arithmeticβs of the isogenies of curves in the Montgomery form is presented. The isogeny parameters of the CSIDH algorithm model are calculated and tabulated on the basis of the theorems proved in the previous work. The example of Aliceβs and Bobβs calculations according to the non-interactive Diffy-Hellman circuit, illustrating the separation of their secrets, is considered. The use of the known projective (W:Z)-coordinates for the given classes of curves provides the fastest execution of the CSIDH algorithm to-date
Estimation of the computational cost of the CSIDH algorithm on supersingular twisted and quadratic Edwards curves
Π ΠΎΠ·Π³Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡΠΎ Π²Π»Π°ΡΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ
ΡΠ° ΠΊΠ²Π°Π΄ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°, ΡΠΎ ΡΡΠ²ΠΎΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠΈ ΠΊΠ²Π°Π΄ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΡΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½Ρ Π· ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΄ΠΊΠΎΠΌ Π½Π°Π΄ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΠ»Π΅ΠΌ. ΠΠ°Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡΠΊΠ°ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ CSIDH, ΠΏΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π½Π° ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΡ ΡΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π·Π°ΠΌΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈΡΡΠΉΠ½ΠΎΡ Π°ΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠΈ ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
Ρ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΡ ΠΠΎΠ½ΡΠ³ΠΎΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ. Π ΠΎΠ·ΡΠ°Ρ
ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΡΠ° ΡΠ°Π±ΡΠ»ΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈ ΡΠΈΡ
Π΄Π²ΠΎΡ
ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠ² ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° ΠΏΡΠΈ , Π½Π° ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΡΡ
ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π½Π°Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΊΠ»Π°Π΄ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ·Π°ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ CSIDH ΡΠΊ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΠΈ Π½Π΅ ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ»Ρ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΡ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
Ρ Π²ΡΠ΄ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΈΡ
ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΡΠ² ΠΠ»ΡΡΠΈ Ρ ΠΠΎΠ±Π°. ΠΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π½ΠΎ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² ΡΠ΅ΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅ΠΊ ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΎΠΎΡΠ²Π΅ΡΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΊΠ²Π°Π΄-ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈ ΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π΅Ρ ΡΠ΅Π²Π΅ΡΡΠ½ΡΠΉ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅Ρ Π½Π° ΠΏΠ΅-ΡΠΈΠΎΠ΄Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΡΡΠ΅Π½ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΎΡΠ΄ΠΈΠ½Π°Ρ ΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΠΊ, ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·ΡΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π½Π΅ΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ΅ΠΏΠ΅Π½Π΅ΠΉ, ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π½Π° Π΅Π³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΊΠΎΠΎΡ-Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°Ρ
. ΠΠ°Π½ ΡΡΠ°Π²Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· ΡΡΠΎΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ° ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠΉ Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ W-ΠΊΠΎΠΎΡΠ΄ΠΈΠ½Π°Ρ Π€Π°ΡΠ°ΡΠ°Ρ
ΠΈ-Π₯ΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΠΉΠ½ΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΠΊΠΎΠΎΡΠ΄ΠΈΠ½Π°Ρ (X:Y:Z).The properties of twisted and quadratic supersingular Edwards curves that form pairs of quadratic torsion with order over a prime field are considered. A modification of the CSIDH algorithm based on the isogenies of these curves instead of the traditional arithmetic of curves in the Montgomery form is presented. The parameters of these two classes of supersingular Edwards curves are calculated and tabulated for , on the isogenies of which an example of the implementation of the CSIDH algorithm as a non-interactive secret sharing scheme based on the secret and public keys of Alice and Bob is given..It is shown that the sequence of parameters of chains of isogenies for quadratic and twisted supersingular Edwards curves, respectively, has a reverse character on the period of the sequence. A recurrent algorithm for calculating the coordinates of points that form the kernels of isogenies of odd degrees is proposed, and its implementation in various coordinate systems is considered. A comparative analysis of the cost of calculating the parameter of the isogenic curve using the Farashakhi-Hosseini -coordinates and classical projective coordinates is given(X:Y:Z)is given
Π Π°Π½Π΄ΠΎΠΌΡΠ·Π°ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ CSIDH Π½Π° ΠΊΠ²Π°Π΄ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ° ΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°
The properties of quadratic and twisted supersingular Edwards curves that form quadratic twist pairs with order over a prime field are considered. A modification of the CSIDH algorithm based on the isogenies of these curves is presented. The parameters of these two classes of supersingu-lar Edwards curves for are calculated and tabulated. An example of the implementation of the CSIDH algorithm as a non-interactive secret sharing scheme based on the secret and public keys of Alice and Bob is given. A new randomized CSIDH algorithm with random equiprobable selection of a curve from two classes at each step of the isogeny chain is proposed. This algorithm is proposed as an alternative to "constant time CSIDH". An estimate of the probability of a successful side channel at-tack in a randomized algorithm is given. It is noted that all calculations in the CSIDH algorithm neces-sary to calculate the common secret are reduced only to the calculation of the isogenic curve parameter and are performed by field operations, scalar multiplication and doubling the points of the isogeny kernel. In the new algorithm, it is proposed to abandon the calculation of the isogenic function of a random point , which significantly speeds up the algorithm.Π ΠΎΠ·Π³Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡΠΎ Π²Π»Π°ΡΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ²Π°Π΄ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
Ρ ΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°, ΡΠΊΡ ΡΡΠ²ΠΎΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ²Π°Π΄ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ½Ρ ΠΊΡΡΡΠ΅Π½Ρ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠΈ Π· ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΄ΠΊΠΎΠΌ Π½Π°Π΄ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΠ»Π΅ΠΌ . ΠΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡΠΊΠ°ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎ-ΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ CSIDH Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΡ ΡΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
. ΠΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅-ΡΡΠΈ ΡΠΈΡ
Π΄Π²ΠΎΡ
ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠ² ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
ΠΠ΄Π²Π°-ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠΎΠ·ΡΠ°Ρ
ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΡΠ° Π·Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½Ρ Π² ΡΠ°Π±Π»ΠΈΡΡ. ΠΠ°-Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΊΠ»Π°Π΄ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ·Π°ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ CSIDH ΡΠΊ Π½Π΅ΡΠ½-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΠΈ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΡΠ½Ρ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ΅-ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ° Π²ΡΠ΄ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΡΠ² ΠΠ»ΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ° ΠΠΎΠ±Π°. ΠΠ°ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΠΎ-Π½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΎ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠ°Π½Π΄ΠΎΠΌΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ CSIDH Π· Π²ΠΈ-ΠΏΠ°Π΄ΠΊΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠΌ ΡΡΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΉΠΌΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΠΌ Π²ΠΈΠ±ΠΎΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡ Π· Π΄Π²ΠΎΡ
ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠ² Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΠΌΡ ΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ Π»Π°Π½ΡΡΠ³Π° ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΡ. Π¦Π΅ΠΉ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎ-ΡΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡΡΡΡ ΡΠΊ Π°Π»ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠ²Π° "constant time CSIDH ". ΠΠ°Π½ΠΎ ΠΎΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡ ΠΉΠΌΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΡΠΏΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π³Π°Π»ΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ±ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Ρ Π·Π° ΡΠ°Π½Π΄ΠΎΠΌΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΌ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠΎΠΌ. ΠΠ°-Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ°ΡΡΡΡΡ, ΡΠΎ Π²ΡΡ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅Π½Π½Ρ Π² Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ CSIDH, Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΡΠ΄Π½Ρ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅Π½Π½Ρ Π·Π°Π³Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΡ, Π·Π²ΠΎ-Π΄ΡΡΡΡΡ Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅Π½Π½Ρ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ° ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡ ΠΊΡΠΈ-Π²ΠΎΡ ΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡΡΡΡ Π·Π° Π΄ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡ
ΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΉ, ΡΠΊΠ°Π»ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½Ρ ΡΠ° ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π²ΠΎΡΠ½Π½Ρ ΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΊ ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅-Π½ΡΡ. Π£ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΌΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡΡΡΡ Π²ΡΠ΄ΠΌΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΠΈΡΡ Π²ΡΠ΄ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅Π½Π½Ρ ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΡΡ Π²ΠΈΠΏΠ°Π΄ΠΊΠΎΠ²ΠΎΡ ΡΠΎΡΠΊΠΈ, ΡΠΎ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΈΡΠΊΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ±ΠΎΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ
Computing of Odd Degree Isogenies on Supersingular Twisted Edwards Curves
An overview of the properties of three classes of curves in generalized Edwards form Ea,d with two parameters is given. The known formulas for the odd degree isogenies on curves Ed with one parameter are generalized to all classes of curves in Edwards form, and Theorem 1 on the isogenic mapping of the points of these curves is proved. The analysis of the known effective method for computing isogenies in Farashahi-Hosseini w-coordinates, justified for the curve Ed, is given. Theorem 2 proves the applicability of this method to the class of twisted Edwards curves. Examples of 3- and 5-isogenies of twisted Edwards curves are given. Methods for bypassing the exceptional points of such curves in PQC cryptosystems like CSIDH are proposed
CSIKE-ENC Combined Encryption Scheme with Optimized Degrees of Isogeny Distribution
For the PQC CSIDH and CSIKE algorithms, the advantages of two classes of quadratic and twisted supersingular Edwards curves over complete Edwards curves are justified. These classes form pairs of quadratic twist curves with order p + 1 β‘ 0mod8 over the prime field Fp and double the space of all curves in the algorithms. The randomized algorithms CSIDH and CSIKE are presented. An analysis of the degrees lk isogenies distribution is given, and an optimal distribution within the given conditions is proposed with the degree lmax = 397 instead of lmax = 587 while maintaining the number K = 74 of all degrees. A probabilistic analysis of random odd order points R was carried out, probability estimates are obtained, and it is recommended to avoid isogenies with small values of the degrees lk in algorithms. The features of the CSIKE algorithm with one public key of Bob in the problem of encapsulation by Alice of the secret key ΞΊ, which Bob calculates at the stage of decapsulation with his secret key, are considered. A CSIKE-ENC scheme for combined encryption of the key ΞΊ and message M based on two asymmetric algorithms CSIDH and CSIKE with Aliceβs authentication and the well-known symmetric message encryption standard is proposed. The security aspects of the scheme are discussed
SIKE Round 2 Speed Record on ARM Cortex-M4
We present the first practical software implementation of Supersingular
Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) round 2, targeting NISTβs 1, 2, and 5 security
levels on 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontrollers. The proposed library introduces a
new speed record of SIKE protocol on the target platform. We achieved this record
by adopting several state-of-the-art engineering techniques as well as highly-optimized
hand-crafted assembly implementation of finite field arithmetic. In particular, we
carefully redesign the previous optimized implementations of filed arithmetic on 32-bit
ARM Cortex-M4 platform and propose a set of novel techniques which are explicitly
suitable for SIKE/SIDH primes. Moreover, the proposed arithmetic implementations
are fully scalable to larger bit-length integers and can be adopted over different
security levels. The benchmark result on STM32F4 Discovery board equipped with
32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontrollers shows that the entire key encapsulation
over p434 takes about 326 million clock cycles (i.e. 1.94 seconds @168MHz). In
contrast to the previous optimized implementation of the isogeny-based key exchange
on low-power 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4, our performance evaluation shows feasibility
of using SIKE mechanism on the target platform. In comparison to the most of the
post-quantum candidates, SIKE requires an excessive number of arithmetic operations,
resulting in significantly slower timings. However, its small key size makes this scheme
as a promising candidate on low-end microcontrollers in the quantum era by ensuring
the lower energy consumption for key transmission than other schemes
ΠΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ²Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΈ Π·Π°Ρ ΠΈΡΠ΅Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΡΠ½Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠΌΠ»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π· Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠΌ ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΠΉ Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π ΠΎΠ±ΠΎΡΡ Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ½Π°Π½ΠΎ Π½Π° 82 Π°ΡΠΊΡΡΠ°Ρ
, Π²ΠΎΠ½Π° ΠΌΡΡΡΠΈΡΡ 1 Π΄ΠΎΠ΄Π°ΡΠΎΠΊ ΡΠ° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠΊ ΠΏΠΎΡΠΈΠ»Π°Π½Ρ Π½Π° Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π½Ρ Π΄ΠΆΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π»Π° Π· 21 Π½Π°ΠΉΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ²Π°Π½Ρ.
ΠΠ΅ΡΠΎΡ Π΄ΠΈΠΏΠ»ΠΎΠΌΠ½ΠΎΡ ΡΠΎΠ±ΠΎΡΠΈ Ρ Π΄ΠΎΡΠ»ΡΠ΄ΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ»ΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΡΡ Π΅ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΡ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ·Π°ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΡΠ½Ρ SIDH Π· Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠΌ Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΡ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°.
ΠΠ±βΡΠΊΡΠΎΠΌ Π΄ΠΎΡΠ»ΡΠ΄ΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½Ρ Ρ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΡΠ½Ρ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
SIDH.
ΠΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ Π΄ΠΎΡΠ»ΡΠ΄ΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½Ρ Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ»ΠΈΠ²ΡΡΡΡ Π΅ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΡ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ·Π°ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΡΠ½Ρ SIDH Π· Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠΌ Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΡ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°.
Π ΡΠΎΠ±ΠΎΡΡ Π·ΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΎΠ³Π»ΡΠ΄ ΠΎΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠ±Π»ΡΠΊΠ°ΡΡΠΉ ΠΏΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡΠ² Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
, Π·ΠΎΠΊΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ° ΡΠΎΠ·Π³Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡΠΎ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ SIDH ΡΠ° ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ»ΠΈΠ²ΡΡΡΡ ΠΉΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π΅ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ·Π°ΡΡΡ Π· Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠΌ Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΡ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°, ΡΠΎΠ·ΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅Π½Π° ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ·Π°ΡΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΡΡΠ² Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΡ SIDH Π· Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠΌ Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΡ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° ΠΌΠΎΠ²ΠΎΡ C++ ΡΠ° ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΡΠ· ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ»ΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΡΡ Π²ΠΈΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π½Π½Ρ ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° Π² ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ°Ρ
Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
Π΅Π»ΡΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡ
. Π Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Ρ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΡΠ·Ρ Π±ΡΠ»ΠΈ Π²ΠΈΡΠ²Π»Π΅Π½Ρ Π΄Π΅ΡΠΊΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌΠΈ, Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π±ΡΠ»ΠΈ Π·Π°ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΡΠ»ΡΡ
ΠΈ ΡΡ
ΡΠΎΠ·Π²βΡΠ·Π°Π½Π½Ρ.The thesis is presented in 82 pages. It contains 1 appendix and bibliography of 21 references.
The target of the thesis is to study the feasibility of effective practical implementation of the SIDH quantum-resistant key exchange algorithm using elliptic curves in Edwards form.
The object is quantum-resistant key exchange algorithm SIDH.
The subject is possibility of effective practical realization of the SIDH algorithm using elliptic curves in Edwards form.
The paper reviews recent publications on the topic of quantum -resistant cryptographic algorithms based on the isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves in particular, the SIDH algorithm and the possibility of its effective implementation using elliptic curves in Edwards form are considered. The implementation of components of the SIDH algorithm using elliptic curves in Edwards form was developed. An analysis of the possibility of using Edwards curves in quantum- resistant algorithms based on isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves was conducted. During the analysis some problems were identified for which solutions were proposed.ΠΠΈΠΏΠ»ΠΎΠΌΠ½Π°Ρ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½Π΅Π½Π° Π½Π° 82 Π»ΠΈΡΡΠ°Ρ
, ΠΎΠ½Π° ΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΈΡ 1 ΠΏΡΠΈΠ»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈ ΡΠΏΠΈΡΠΎΠΊ ΡΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠΊ Π½Π° ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠΈ Ρ 21 Π½Π°ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΉ.
Π¦Π΅Π»ΡΡ Π΄ΠΈΠΏΠ»ΠΎΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π° SIDH Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠ»Π»ΠΈΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ΅ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°.
ΠΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π° Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ»Π»ΠΈΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
SIDH.
ΠΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π° SIDH Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠ»Π»ΠΈΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ΅ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°.
Π ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΄Π΅Π»Π°Π½ ΠΎΠ±Π·ΠΎΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄Π½ΠΈΡ
ΠΏΡΠ±Π»ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΉ ΠΏΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ»Π»ΠΈΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
, Π² ΡΠ°ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π½ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ SIDH ΠΈ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π΅Π³ΠΎ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠ»Π»ΠΈΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ΅ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ°, ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ°Π½Π° ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° SIDH Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠ»Π»ΠΈΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
Π² ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ΅ ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° Π½Π° ΡΠ·ΡΠΊΠ΅ C++ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΠ΄Π²Π°ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° Π² ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡ
Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ°Ρ
Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ³Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΡ
ΡΠ»Π»ΠΈΠΏΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
. Π Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π΅ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° Π±ΡΠ»ΠΈ ΠΎΠ±Π½Π°ΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½Ρ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌΡ, Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ
Π±ΡΠ»ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Ρ ΠΏΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ
Efficient Isogeny Computations on Twisted Edwards Curves
The isogeny-based cryptosystem is the most recent category in the field of postquantum cryptography. However, it is widely studied due to short key sizes and compatibility with the current elliptic curve primitives. The main building blocks when implementing the isogeny-based cryptosystem are isogeny computations and point operations. From isogeny construction perspective, since the cryptosystem moves along the isogeny graph, isogeny formula cannot be optimized for specific coefficients of elliptic curves. Therefore, Montgomery curves are used in the literature, due to the efficient point operation on an arbitrary elliptic curve. In this paper, we propose formulas for computing 3 and 4 isogenies on twisted Edwards curves. Additionally, we further optimize our isogeny formulas on Edwards curves and compare the computational cost of Montgomery curves. We also present the implementation results of our isogeny computations and demonstrate that isogenies on Edwards curves are as efficient as those on Montgomery curves