An Access Control Protocol for Wireless Sensor Network Using Double Trapdoor Chameleon Hash Function

Wireless sensor network (WSN), a type of communication system, is normally deployed into the unattended environment where the intended user can get access to the network. The sensor nodes collect data from this environment. If the data are valuable and confidential, then security measures are needed to protect them from the unauthorized access. This situation requires an access control protocol (ACP) in the design of sensor network because of sensor nodes which are vulnerable to various malicious attacks during the authentication and key establishment and the new node addition phase. In this paper, we propose a secured ACP for such WSN. This protocol is based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP) and double trapdoor chameleon hash function which secures the WSN from malicious attacks such as node masquerading attack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and forgery attacks. Proposed ACP has a special feature known as session key security. Also, the proposed ACP is more efficient as it requires only one modular multiplication during the initialization phase

A Computationally Efficient Online/Offline Signature Scheme for Underwater Wireless Sensor Networks

Underwater wireless sensor networks (UWSNs) have emerged as the most widely used wireless network infrastructure in many applications. Sensing nodes are frequently deployed in hostile aquatic environments in order to collect data on resources that are severely limited in terms of transmission time and bandwidth. Since underwater information is very sensitive and unique, the authentication of users is very important to access the data and information. UWSNs have unique communication and computation needs that are not met by the existing digital signature techniques. As a result, a lightweight signature scheme is required to meet the communication and computa‑ tion requirements. In this research, we present a Certificateless Online/Offline Signature (COOS) mechanism for UWSNs. The proposed scheme is based on the concept of a hyperelliptic curves cryptosystem, which offers the same degree of security as RSA, bilinear pairing, and elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) but with a smaller key size. In addition, the proposed scheme was proven secure in the random oracle model under the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. A se‑ curity analysis was also carried out, as well as comparisons with appropriate current online/offline signature schemes. The comparison demonstrated that the proposed scheme is superior to the exist‑ ing schemes in terms of both security and efficiency. Additionally, we also employed the fuzzy‑based Evaluation‑based Distance from Average Solutions (EDAS) technique to demonstrate the effective‑ ness of the proposed scheme.publishedVersio

Efficient generic on-line/off-line signatures without key exposure

The “hash-sign-switch” paradigm was firstly proposed by Shamir and Tauman with the aim to design an efficient on-line/off-line signature scheme. However, all existing on-line/off-line signature schemes based on Shamir-Tauman’s paradigm suffer from the key exposure problem of chameleon hashing. That is, if the signer applies the same hash value more than once to obtain two signatures on two different messages, the recipient can obtain a hash collision and use it to recover the signer’s trapdoor information. Therefore, the signer should pre-compute and store plenty of different chameleon hash values and the corresponding signatures on the hash values in the off-line phase, and send the collision and the signature for a certain hash value in the on-line phase. Hence, the computation and storage cost for the off-line phase and the communication cost for the on-line phase in Shamir-Tauman’s signature scheme are still a little more overload. In this paper, we first introduce a special double-trapdoor hash family based on the discrete logarithm assumption to solve this problem. We then apply the “hash-sign-switch” paradigm to propose a much more efficient generic on-line/off-line signature scheme. Additionally, we use a one-time trapdoor/hash key pair for each message signing, which prevents the recipient from recovering the trapdoor information of the signer and computing other collisions

Chameleon-Hashes with Dual Long-Term Trapdoors and Their Applications

A chameleon-hash behaves likes a standard collision-resistant hash function for outsiders. If, however, a trapdoor is known, arbitrary collisions can be found. Chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors (CHET; Camenisch et al., PKC ’17) allow prohibiting that the holder of the long-term trapdoor can find collisions by introducing a second, ephemeral, trapdoor. However, this ephemeral trapdoor is required to be chosen freshly for each hash. We extend these ideas and introduce the notion of chameleon-hashes with dual long-term trapdoors (CHDLTT). Here, the second trapdoor is not chosen freshly for each new hash; Rather, the hashing party can decide if it wants to generate a fresh second trapdoor or use an existing one. This primitive generalizes CHETs, extends their applicability and enables some appealing new use-cases, including three-party sanitizable signatures, group-level selectively revocable signatures and break-the-glass signatures. We present two provably secure constructions and an implementation which demonstrates that this extended primitive is efficient enough for use in practice