Winners and losers from utility privatization in Argentina : lessons from a general equilibrium model

The authors assess the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the privatization that Argentina began in 1989 in gas, electricity, telecommunications, and water and sanitation. Using a computable general equilibrium model, they track the effects of the changes observed between 1993, the first year by which all the major privatizations had taken place, and 1995, the most recent year for which data are available. In an innovative use of the model, they also assess the importance of the regulator in determining the distribution of gains and losses from utility privatization among sectors and income groups. They conclude that when regulators are effective, the annual gains from the private operation of utilities are about $3.3 billion, or 1.25 percent of GDP, and that all income classes benefit. Ineffective regulation cuts the gains from the reform by$1 billion or 0.35 percent of GDP. This cut in gains represents an implicit tax of 16 percent on the average consumer, paid directly to the owner of the utility rather than to the government. For the poorest income classes, thisimplicit tax is about 20 percent, meaning that good regulation is in the interest of the poor. The authors also show that the privatization of utilities cannot be blamed for the significant increase in unemployment observed in Argentina since 1993. Effective regulation can lead to a decline in unemployment, and ineffective regulation leads to only a small increase in unemployment. But the gains from utility privatization were not sufficient to offset the negative efficiency and distributional impact on the economy of the Tequila effect, which increased unemployment dramatically by limiting access to credit for users and producers alike.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Health Economics&Finance

Winners and Losers from Utility Privatization in Argentina. Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model

The economics rates of return for utility privatization projects in Argentina are very high, wheter or not distributional weights are considered. But there is a very high shadow price for regulatory activity, which tends to be ignored in most privatization exercises. And how serious a government is about the fair distribution of gains from reform is reflected in how serious it is about regulation.General Equilibrium Model; economics rates; utility privatization; regulatory activity

Benchmarking Electricity Liberalisation in Europe

In this paper, we discuss the choice and use of benchmarks in each of five areas relevant to an assessment of the progress of EU electricity sector liberalisation. These areas are market design, market power, EU enlargement, regulation, and sustainability. Our aim is to discuss the most important benchmarks for each area, and to do so in the context of that area. Where a benchmark can be used as a signal that things are going well (or badly) we will discuss the values associated with a good (or bad) signal. This paper forms part of the final report of the EU funded Sustainable Energy Specific Support Assessment project (SESSA, see www.sessa.eu.com)

An assessment of the potential returns of energy certificates for the UK household sector

Purpose – This article seeks to investigate the interconnections between the expectations of the impact of energy certificates issued within the UK domestic building sector through the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) and the actual number and financial implications of the energy saving measures (ESMs) achieved. Design/methodology/approach – The methodology uses two previously published surveys and compares these with a third independent survey by the authors focusing upon the discrepancies between planned action and implemented action, introducing the term human factor element (hfe). Findings – The article concludes that annual carbon savings arising from implementation of the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) may be as low as 73.4?ktC over the five year term of the Kyoto Protocol even though 44 per cent of energy saving measure costs of £200 million are recouped within the same time period and savings will continue for up to 40 years. Achieving annual savings of only 14.7?ktC by 2010, such a figure represents a mere 0.3 per cent of the annual domestic 4.8?MtC savings announced by the government in its 2006 Climate Change Programme. Practical implications – Since the principal determinant in the uptake of ESMs is initial cost, it is considered that the EPBD is likely to remain an under-performing instrument in the promotion of energy sufficiency until such time as other complementary provisions are introduced. Originality/value – Sheds light upon the likely financial impact upon energy efficiency in domestic buildings by energy certificates

Electricity liberalization.

Electricity was an obvious candidate in the renewed drive to complete a European Single Market in the Delors years. Despite the energy sector being the first candidate for European integration in 1951, electricity consumption remained, in the mid-1980s, tied to a regional monopoly supplier, resulting in the opinion of the Commission in inflated prices and a lack of innovation. As a key factor in production costs in manufacturing industry, and a contributory factor to every household bill, the electricity supply industry, wholly untouched by market logic, presented a ripe apple for a (then) confident European Commission keen to progress the frontiers of project Europe, and to demonstrate tangible results in European integration by the promise of lower prices arising from the introduction of competition

Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe

The absence of one broadly accepted design template for liberalised electricity markets induces regulatory competition and institutional diversity. Focussing on continental Europe and the USA, this analysis explores how agents and structures accelerate or impede the move to one standard market design in the electricity sector. It reveals that market design convergence in Europe is driven by the 'Florence Consensus,' a tripartite coalition between the European Commission fostering European integration and the internal market, informal regulatory networks between grid operators, standardisation authorities and regulators, who have been coordinating their actions in the 'Florence Forum,' and epistemic communities exemplified in the Florence School of Regulation. In contrast, the United States' Federal Energy Regulatory Commission lacks support among politicians, many states' public utility commissions, the neo-liberal intelligentsia and even industrial lobbying groups to effectively push for a standardised market design. However, design convergence in the USA may be induced by the gradual expansion of multi-state markets operated by regional transmission organisations.Electricity, Deregulation, Regulatory Competition, Policy Diffusion