Organizational choices of banks and the effective supervision of transnational financial institutions : [Version: 19 Juli 2012]

This paper outlines relatively easy to implement reforms for the supervision of transnational banking-groups in the E.U. that should not be primarily based on legal form but on the actual risk structures of the pertinent financial institutions. The proposal also aims at paying close attention to the economics of public administration and international relations in allocating competences among national and supranational supervisory bodies. Before detailing the own proposition, this paper looks into the relationship between sovereign debt and banking crises that drive regulatory reactions to the financial turmoil in the Euro area. These initiatives inter alia affirm effective prudential supervision as a pivotal element of crisis prevention. In order to arrive at a more informed idea, which determinants apart from a perceived appetite for regulatory arbitrage drive banks’ organizational choices, this paper scrutinizes the merits of either a branch or subsidiary structure for the cross-border business of financial institutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy-makers perspective. The analysis shows that no one size fits all organizational structure is available and concludes that banks’ choices should generally not be second-guessed, particularly because they are subject to (some) market discipline. The analysis proceeds with describing and evaluating how competences in prudential supervision are currently allocated among national and supranational supervisory authorities. In order to assess the findings the appraisal adopts insights form the economics of public administration and international relations. It argues that the supervisory architecture has to be more aligned with bureaucrats’ incentives and that inefficient requirements to cooperate and share information should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread perception, shifting responsibility to a supranational authority cannot solve all the problems identified. Resting on these foundations, the last part of this paper finally sketches an alternative solution that dwells on far-reaching mutual recognition of national supervisory regimes and allocates competences in line with supervisors’ incentives and the risk inherent in crossborder banking groups

The launch of the euro

The introduction on January 1, 1999, of the euro--the single currency adopted by eleven of the fifteen countries of the European Union--marked the beginning of the final stage of Economic and Monetary Union and the start of a new era in Europe. The creation of a single currency and a single monetary policy has provided both extraordinary challenges and exceptional opportunities within Europe. This article reviews the organization, objectives, and targets of the euro area's new central bank and discusses some of the early challenges it has faced in setting and implementing monetary policy with the new common currency. It discusses the initial functioning of the payment system and the interbank market and reviews the effects to date of the single currency on European bond and equity markets, on the banking system, and in euro-area transactions.Euro ; European Monetary System (Organization) ; European currency unit

The EU Financial Supervision in the Aftermath of the 2008 Crisis: an Appraisal

We appraise the new EU supervisory architecture presented by the Commission in a package of five 'draft legislative acts'. Two would establish a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to undertake macro-prudential issues. Three would establish the system of European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): Banking, Securities and Insurance.. . The theoretical case for this package of 'draft legislative acts' has been made by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. The ' package ' has been examined by the ECOFIN of 2 December 2009, which agreed on a 'general approach'; it has introduced changes to the Commission's three draft legislative acts concerning the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). We examine the theoretical approach underlying the draft legislative acts, which is based on the State theory of money. We find it incomplete in the case of the ESRB because the mission of ECB in 'mitigating system risks within the financial system' cannot be attained without real powers and tools; it is in essence a Macro-economic phenomenon.. . We also arrive at another conclusion relating to the three proposals on the ESAs. The theoretical underpinning of the three is based on the premise of 'regulating for the sake of regulation'. Today's evolution of the EU cannot allow Authorities over-passing the Treaty competence. Nor could the ESAs attain their objective of 'setting the common rules for supervising national entities'. Thus the conception of the EU system of financial supervision is deficient, in need of repair.. . We propose an alternative approach to the new EU supervisory architecture consisting of three elements. First, we restate the case for the Central Banks in order to assume responsibility for the 'last resort of managing risk', and endowed with real power. Second, the role of the national central banks (NCBs) in 'micro-supervision' is substantial enhanced. Third, a structure for the budgetary burden is proposed by the establishment of the 'European Fund for Financial Stability' (EFFS)..Theory of money; European Supervisory Authorities, de Larosière report; financial supervision; money externalities; European Central Bank; National Central Banks; European Steering Committee of Vice-Governors of NCBs; credit rating agencies; European Fiscal Authority; European Fund for Financial Stability; financial transaction tax; natural monopoly

The regulatory and supervisory framework for fixed income markets in Europe

look at the development and regulation of fixed income securities markets in Europe. Fixed income securities markets in Europe have historically been characterized by a number of national markets that were interconnected by way of foreign exchange markets. They are presently undergoing major changes in size, infrastructure, and regulation. The authors describe the current state of the ongoing European regulatory and supervisory reform and the main drivers behind it. They conclude that European fixed income securities market regulation and infrastructure are not (yet) homogeneous. In some countries fixed income market regulation has been developed after intense political reflections on ways and means of promoting safe and efficient capital markets. In other countries, fixed incomemarket regulation is a product of learning-by-doing (such as ad hoc reflections based on negative market experiences and financial scandals). To illustrate the heterogeneity in the European fixed income markets, the authors include two examples: France as an example of a country from the euro area, and Denmark as an example of a country outside the euro area.Environmental Economics&Policies,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Insurance Law,National Governance

The (Near) Future of Central Bank Digital Currencies

The value of global cashless payments has been radically increasing worldwide. Despite cash being the most used payment instrument in the world, technological innovation and new consumer preferences are decisively transforming the way consumers pay and manage money. The COVID-19 pandemic may also have been an accelerator of the cashless mega-trend. Private players currently dominate the digital payment ecosystem, urging central banks to seek solutions to ensure public access to legal tender if cash is phased out. In this context, the idea of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is gaining momentum. Nevertheless, there is a need to better understand the implications in terms of risks, benefits and potential costs of CBDCs. From privacy concerns to macroeconomic effects, these implications blur the boundaries of the payment and financial systems, challenging the core functions of our economy and society

Missing pieces in the patchwork of EU financial stability regime? The case of central counterparties

This article builds on a recent case (Case T-496/11, UK v. ECB (Location policy)), in which the General Court determined that the ECB does not have competence to regulate so-called Central Counterparties (CCPs), and annulled an ECB policy which sought to restrict access to the euro area of certain non-euro area CCPs. It is argued that the Court’s central finding, though possibly correct, is problematic from the perspective of financial stability, especially considering the growing systemic importance of CCPs. Second, the Court’s finding is symptomatic of certain drawbacks inherent in the patchy architecture of the evolving EU financial stability regime, which is excessively focused on banks. Finally, the case acts as a warning of likely future situations where the exercise of EU level competences and forms of direct administration related to the objective of financial stability can result in an outright conflict with basic free movement rights

Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation

This paper examines the extent to which economic crises facilitate the development of more effective regional institutions and whether such institutions can shield regions from crises. It compares six regional economic crises over the last four decades and the institution building—or decay—that followed. The analysis concludes that five conditions are especially important in generating a constructive regional response: (i) a significant degree of regional economic interdependence; (ii) an independent secretariat or intergovernmental body charged with cooperation; (iii) webs of interlocking economic agreements; and, as elements of the multilateral context, (iv) conflict with the relevant international organization (such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF]); and (v) the support of the United States. The paper then reviews three episodes of crises in Europe, concluding that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has deflected balance of payments and currency crises but not crises of other types, such as sovereign debt crises. Asian regionalism would be well served by heads of government taking the lead and delegating tasks to intergovernmental networks and secretariats, central banks and finance ministries retaining substantial collective autonomy in their fields of responsibility, and the use of concentric circles to accommodate countries with different levels of commitment to regionalism.Economic crises; financial crises; regional institutions; Asian regionalism; regional integration

Design, Structure and Implementation of a Modern Deposit Insurance Scheme

One of the important consequences to be drawn from the course of the financial crisis up to now is the insight that more attention must be paid in the future to the factors of liquidity, liquidity management and liquidity protection. That holds true for the protection of the stability of an individual bank as it does for that of a whole national or even international financial system. The liquidity problems of a bank can certainly have a variety of causes. However, as an examination of the history of bank insolvencies and financial crises shows, an accelerated withdrawal of bank deposits by unsecured customers nearly always leads in the end to the collapse of an institution and, as an ultimate consequence, to a national or even international banking crisis. This insight has also brought the deposit insurance institutions in many countries around the world to the attention of political, regulatory and banking management discussions. The rapid, politically necessary, factually often not well founded, guarantee promises made by many governments have shown those responsible that in Europe the need for a fundamental revision of the present deposit insurance schemes must be urgently addressed. In most industrialized countries of the OECD, as well as in a range of other states, working groups are studying the necessary revisions and adjustments of the relevant institutions to meet the new economic and political conditions. Even if solutions of this sort continue to be arranged differently from one country to another on the basis of differing regulatory, historical and structural circumstances, a consensus is emerging over the important basic questions of deposit insurance system design and architecture. As a result of the worldwide financial crisis most European countries massively increased their coverage limits for their national deposit insurance schemes in the fall of 2008. Where no deposit insurance existed, it was introduced. Existing systems were critically scrutinized. In most countries the maximum insurance coverage was raised and the eligible deposit base was extended. Some individual states have even promised an unlimited deposit protection (in some cases with a time restriction). Under the pressure of an increasing number of bank failures these promises were made without revising the existing deposit insurance schemes themselves. In the course of 2009, both the individual European states and the EU itself then set about scrutinizing their existing protection schemes and mechanisms and revising the existing national deposit insurance schemes. It is accepted throughout the world that well designed deposit insurance is an important element in a national safety net for maintaining and extending the stability of the financial system. The design and structure, but also the implementation, of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) of this sort throws up numerous institutional, procedural and instrumental questions. Such operative and strategic issues must be answered against the background of the overall national circumstances and in line with the country specific realities of the respective financial intermediate system. However, there is a series of topics that can be assessed and solved independently of such individual circumstances. This is even more the case since the worldwide revision of the deposit insurance schemes offers the opportunity to create the conditions for a future harmonization of national deposit insurance schemes at least within Europe. An assimilation of this sort is, in turn, the basis for future EU-wide or perhaps even European depositor protection, which, like any broadly based guarantee, would certainly be more efficient than a multitude of national solutions. This publication intends to make a contribution to the ongoing discussion of the complex questions connected with the further development of European deposit insurance schemes. Both complementing and extending the broad range of theoretical literature available, it focuses on some key design questions of modern deposit insurance schemes, on the discussion of their basic structural elements and on the appropriate consequences for the stakeholders in deposit insurance. We focus on: - the derivation of the most important requirements of a modern European deposit insurance, and the - discussion of specific organizational aspects and fundamental institutional requirements as well as of solutions for selected system building blocks. The first chapter analyzes the institutional framework of deposit insurance schemes and its various aspects of cost/benefit considerations. The second chapter discusses the fundamentals of modern deposit insurance. The third chapter examines selected strategic and instrumental questions concerning the organization and implementation of deposit insurance schemes. The fourth chapter focuses on some questions related to the international harmonization and coordination of the design of deposit insurance schemes. In all sections we address some lessons learned from the recent financial turmoil. The fifth chapter finally addresses some conclusions and sketches some policy implications for designing and implementing a modern deposit insurance scheme.Deposit insurance, risk-based premium, risk-adjusted pricing, premium calculator, system risk, fund size, funding, guarantee promises, depositor categories, eligible deposits, covered deposits, membership, expected loss, pan-european deposit insurance system, moral hazard, resolution regime, payout