4 research outputs found
EM Attack Is Non-Invasive? - Design Methodology and Validity Verification of EM Attack Sensor
This paper presents a standard-cell-based semi-automatic design methodology of a new conceptual countermeasure against electromagnetic (EM) analysis and fault-injection attacks. The countermeasure namely EM attack sensor utilizes LC oscillators which detect variations in the EM field around a cryptographic LSI caused by a micro probe brought near the LSI. A dual-coil sensor architecture with an LUT-programming-based digital calibration can prevent a variety of microprobe-based EM attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional countermeasures. All components of the sensor core are semi-automatically designed by standard EDA tools with a fully-digital standard cell library and hence minimum design cost. This sensor can be therefore scaled together with the cryptographic LSI to be protected. The sensor prototype is designed based on the proposed methodology together with a 128bit-key composite AES processor in 0.18um CMOS with overheads of only 1.9% in area, 7.6% in power, and 0.2% in performance, respectively. The validity against a variety of EM attack scenarios has been verified successfully
Redshift: Manipulating Signal Propagation Delay via Continuous-Wave Lasers
We propose a new laser injection attack Redshift that manipulates signal propagation delay, allowing for precise control of oscillator frequencies and other behaviors in delay-sensitive circuits. The target circuits have a significant sensitivity to light, and a low-power continuous-wave laser, similar to a laser pointer, is sufficient for the attack. This is in contrast to previous fault injection attacks that use highpowered laser pulses to flip digital bits. This significantly reduces the cost of the attack and extends the range of possible attackers. Moreover, the attack potentially evades sensor-based countermeasures configured for conventional pulse lasers. To demonstrate Redshift, we target ring-oscillator and arbiter PUFs that are used in cryptographic applications. By precisely controlling signal propagation delays within these circuits, an attacker can control the output of a PUF to perform a state-recovery attack and reveal a secret key. We finally discuss the physical causality of the attack and potential countermeasures
Recommended from our members
An adaptive measurement protocol for fine-grained electromagnetic side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules
An adaptive measurement protocol is presented to increase effectiveness of fine-grained electromagnetic side-channel analysis (EM SCA) attacks that attempt to extract the information that is unintentionally leaked from physical implementations of cryptographic modules. Because measured fields vary with probe parameters as well as the data being encrypted, identifying the optimal configurations requires searching among a large number of possible configurations. The proposed protocol is a multi-step acquisition that corresponds to a greedy search in a 4-D configuration space consisting of probe’s on-chip coordinates, orientation, and number of signals acquired. This 4-D space can be extended to a 6-D space by repeating the protocol for different probe sizes and heights. This approach is presented as an alternative to current fine-grained EM SCA techniques that perform exhaustive full-chip scans to isolate information leaking locations. To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, the protocol is tested by performing EM SCA attacks for different configurations and identifying the best attack configuration for two realizations of the advanced encryption standard (AES), subject to the precision of the measurement equipment. It is found that the protocol requires ~20× to ~25× less acquisition time compared to an exhaustive search for the optimal attack configuration.Electrical and Computer Engineerin
Circuit-Variant Moving Target Defense for Side-Channel Attacks on Reconfigurable Hardware
With the emergence of side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, bits of a secret key may be derived by correlating key values with physical properties of cryptographic process execution. Power and Electromagnetic (EM) analysis attacks are based on the principle that current flow within a cryptographic device is key-dependent and therefore, the resulting power consumption and EM emanations during encryption and/or decryption can be correlated to secret key values. These side-channel attacks require several measurements of the target process in order to amplify the signal of interest, filter out noise, and derive the secret key through statistical analysis methods. Differential power and EM analysis attacks rely on correlating actual side-channel measurements to hypothetical models. This research proposes increasing resistance to differential power and EM analysis attacks through structural and spatial randomization of an implementation. By introducing randomly located circuit variants of encryption components, the proposed moving target defense aims to disrupt side-channel collection and correlation needed to successfully implement an attac