The Effort to Decrease Maternal and Child Mortality Rates Through Cultural Transformation

Maternal and infant mortality in Ende is still high, but research related a social science is rare. The cultural aspect and medical factors such as the lack of primary health care services are also play a role. This study aims are to identifying and formulate the local cultural transformation as a way to solve maternal and infant mortality. This ethnographic research was conducted in 2013. The study carried not only interviews, but also observation towards reproductive-age women, heads of family, traditional birth attendants, doctors, midwives, local leaders, adat leaders, pastors and sisters, local government officials, and head of health district at Ende. Data is analysed phenomenologically. The strong belief to adat and local tradition has implication to people's attitude towards traditional birth attendants. Traditional birth attendants hold superior position in the community. They also have strong influence due to their ability to massage, correctly guess infant's sex, reposition infant in the womb, and stop bleeding during labor. Maternal and/or infant mortality has nothing to do with traditional birth attendants because local people believe that such case happens as a result of hex or black magic called ru'u. Anemia, bleeding, food taboo, and incorrect diet pattern worsen the overall condition of pregnant women. Cultural transformation is done by alternating TBAs practices in massaging pregnant women. TBAs are encouraged to massage pregnant women's back instead of stomach since pregnant women often have to deal with low back pain during pregnancy

Effort, loyalty and idealism

The purpose of this pioneering study in the field of family business is to measure the degree of commitment to the family business among family members who do not actually work in the firm. After analyzing the characteristics of these people, we identify four very different groups. The existence of these four groups suggests that there is a "natural evolution" in relations between families and their businesses. Based on the behavior of the people in each of the four groups, we aim to identify the factors that can significantly affect the degree of commitment of family members.family business; non-active members; family commitment; unity;

Regulation of Farming Activities: An Evolutionary Approach

Farming activity is modeled under an intervention policy regime, combining the environmental requirements of the Council Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC) and the compensatory provisions of the second pillar of the Common Agricul- tural Policy. The optimizing behavioural rule along with the evolutionary rule is employed in order to model the individual farmer's decision making, regard- ing compliance or not with regulatory provisions. The impact of these di�erent behavioral rules on the selection of monitoring effort and thus on the compli- ance incentives of a population of farmers is examined. Analysis indicated that if monitoring effort is chosen arbitrarily or optimally based on the accustomed full rationality assumption then the population adopts a monomorphic behav- ior in the long-run, involving either full or noncompliance with the Directive's provisions. A polymorphic behavior involving partial compliance of the pop- ulation also arises if the dynamic model of optimal monitoring is constrained by replicator dynamics which represent the imitation rules. It is evident, thus, that the number and the type of the equilibrium steady-states is affected by the assumption regarding the behavioral rule adopted by regulated agents. Fi- nally, the dynamics of the population of compliant farmers is also assessed under accumulation of monitoring capital indicating identical properties.Nitrates Directive, agri-environmental programs, monitoring effford, monitoring capital, rationality, optimal behavioral rule, replicator dynamics, imitation

Contract Incentives and Effort

In a prevailing employment contract, the agent receives a proportional split of commissions. Alternatively, the agent receives a contract paying 100% of revenue above a fixed payment to the firm. In this contract the firm has a prior payment position, similar to a landlord or lender. The coexistence of these equity-only and debt-equity type contracts allows testing incentives for productivity and effort for U.S. real estate licensees. Hourly wages and productivity are increasing in the agent's split, up to and including 100%. Effort as measured by hours worked also positively affected by the split. The contract incentives motivate productivity and induce effort without requiring monitoring.

Voluntary Teaming and Effort

In a series of experimental effort games each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for cooperation to each player, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that when participants are not given the option of private remuneration they cooperate significantly less. Dans cette étude expérimentale, chaque paire de participants doit choisir entre une forme de rémunération d'équipe ou privée pour leurs efforts consentis. Même si le choix de la forme privée de rémunération est pour au moins un des deux joueurs une stratégie d'équilibre parfait en sous-jeu, nous observons que la rémunération d'équipe est fréquemment choisie par les deux joueurs. La rémunération d'équipe permet un profit élevé de collaboration pour chaque joueur, mais elle incite également au resquillage sur le niveau d'effort de l'autre participant. Fruit de cette collaboration, nous observons que les participants affichent des profits plus élevés relativement au choix de la structure privée de rémunération. Finalement, lorsque les participants sont soumis à la rémunération d'équipe, ils coopèrent moins que lorsque cette option est volontairement choisie.team effort, workforce management, experimental economics, effort d'équipe, gestion des ressources humaines, économie expérimentale

Mathematician's call for interdisciplinary research effort

The article addresses the necessity of increasing the role of mathematics in the psychological intervention in problem gambling, including cognitive therapies. It also calls for interdisciplinary research with the direct contribution of mathematics. The current contributions and limitations of the role of mathematics are analysed with an eye toward the professional profiles of the researchers. An enhanced collaboration between these two disciplines is suggested and predicted

Effort and synergies in network formation

The aim of this paper is to understand the interactions between productive effort and the creation of synergies that are the sources of technological collaboration agreements, agglomeration, social stratification, etc. We model this interaction in a way that allows us to characterize how agents devote resources to both activities. This permits a fullfledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous investment efforts and to derive unambiguous comparative statics results. In spite of its parsimony that ensures tractability, the model retains enough richness to replicate a (relatively) broad range of empirical regularities displayed by social and economic networks, and is directly estimable to recover is structural parameters

Tracking Chart 2009 Team Effort, Thailand

Outlines the specific problems that were found by monitors and the action taken by Team Effort in response to an FLA audit of a factory in Thailand