12,741 research outputs found
FlipDyn with Control: Resource Takeover Games with Dynamics
We present the FlipDyn, a dynamic game in which two opponents (a defender and
an adversary) choose strategies to optimally takeover a resource that involves
a dynamical system. At any time instant, each player can take over the resource
and thereby control the dynamical system after incurring a state-dependent and
a control-dependent costs. The resulting model becomes a hybrid dynamical
system where the discrete state (FlipDyn state) determines which player is in
control of the resource. Our objective is to compute the Nash equilibria of
this dynamic zero-sum game. Our contributions are four-fold. First, for any
non-negative costs, we present analytical expressions for the saddle-point
value of the FlipDyn game, along with the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE)
takeover strategies. Second, for continuous state, linear dynamical systems
with quadratic costs, we establish sufficient conditions under which the game
admits a NE in the space of linear state-feedback policies. Third, for scalar
dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive the NE takeover strategies
and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state of the dynamical
system. Fourth and finally, for higher dimensional linear dynamical systems
with quadratic costs, we derive approximate NE takeover strategies and control
policies which enable the computation of bounds on the value functions of the
game in each takeover state. We illustrate our findings through a numerical
study involving the control of a linear dynamical system in the presence of an
adversary.Comment: 17 Pages, 2 figures. Under review at IEEE TA
The Core-Periphery Model with Forward-Looking Expectations
The 'core-periphery model' is vitiated by its assumption of static expectations. That is, migration (inter-regional or intersectoral) is the key to agglomeration, but migrants base their decision on current wage differences alone--even though migration predictably alters wages and workers are (implicitly) infinitely lived. The assumption was necessary for analytic tractability. The model can have multiple stable equilibria, so allowing forward-looking expectations would have forced consideration of the very difficult perhaps even intractable issues of global stability in non-linear dynamic systems. This paper's main contribution is to present a set of solution techniques partly analytic and partly numerical that allow us to consider forward-looking expectations. These techniques reveal a startling result. If quadratic migration costs are sufficiently high, allowing forward-looking behaviour has no impact on the main results, so static expectations are truly an assumption of convenience. If migration costs are lower, however, forward-looking behaviour creates history-vs-expectations considerations. In this case self-fulfilling prophecy.
Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria
This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game
problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have
misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the
extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional
sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash
equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary
scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all
equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash
equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On
the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For
multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may
be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian
source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the
encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also
includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine
Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For
the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium
when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when
affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems
and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in
strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure
Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information
We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their
types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types
evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur
quadratic instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) game with asymmetric information. We show that under certain conditions,
players' strategies that are linear in their private types, together with
Gaussian beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game.
Furthermore, it is shown that this is a signaling equilibrium due to the fact
that future beliefs on players' types are affected by the equilibrium
strategies. We provide a backward-forward algorithm to find the PBE. Each step
of the backward algorithm reduces to solving an algebraic matrix equation for
every possible realization of the state estimate covariance matrix. The forward
algorithm consists of Kalman filter recursions, where state estimate covariance
matrices depend on equilibrium strategies
Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation
We study a discrete time dynamic game of price competition with spatially differentiated products and price adjustment costs. We characterise the Markov perfect and the open-loop equilibrium of our game. We find that in the steady state Markov perfect equilibrium, given the presence of adjustment costs, equilibrium prices are always higher than prices at the repeated static Nash solution, even though, adjustment costs are not paid in steady state. This is due to intertemporal strategic complementarity in the strategies of the firms and from the fact that the cost of adjusting prices adds credibility to high price equilibrium strategies. On the other hand, the stationary open-loop equilibrium coincides always with the static solution. Furthermore, in contrast to continuous time games, we show that the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium converges to the static Nash equilibrium when adjustment costs tend to zero. Moreover, we obtain the same convergence result when adjustment costs tend to infinity.Price adjustment costs, Difference game, Markov perfect equilibrium, Open-loop equilibrium
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