1,635 research outputs found
Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions
Authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals communicating over a public network, and each holding public /private keys, to agree on a shared secret value. In this paper we study the natural extension of this cryptographic problem to a group of principals. We begin from existing formal security models and refine them to incorporate major missing details (e.g., strong-corruption and concurrent sessions). Within this model we define the execution of a protocol for authenticated dynamic group Diffie-Hellman and show that it is provably secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better security guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle model
A New PVSS Scheme with a Simple Encryption Function
A Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) scheme allows anyone to verify
the validity of the shares computed and distributed by a dealer. The idea of
PVSS was introduced by Stadler in [18] where he presented a PVSS scheme based
on Discrete Logarithm. Later, several PVSS schemes were proposed. In [2],
Behnad and Eghlidos present an interesting PVSS scheme with explicit membership
and disputation processes. In this paper, we present a new PVSS having the
advantage of being simpler while offering the same features.Comment: In Proceedings SCSS 2012, arXiv:1307.8029. This PVSS scheme was
proposed to be used to provide a distributed Timestamping schem
Still Wrong Use of Pairings in Cryptography
Several pairing-based cryptographic protocols are recently proposed with a
wide variety of new novel applications including the ones in emerging
technologies like cloud computing, internet of things (IoT), e-health systems
and wearable technologies. There have been however a wide range of incorrect
use of these primitives. The paper of Galbraith, Paterson, and Smart (2006)
pointed out most of the issues related to the incorrect use of pairing-based
cryptography. However, we noticed that some recently proposed applications
still do not use these primitives correctly. This leads to unrealizable,
insecure or too inefficient designs of pairing-based protocols. We observed
that one reason is not being aware of the recent advancements on solving the
discrete logarithm problems in some groups. The main purpose of this article is
to give an understandable, informative, and the most up-to-date criteria for
the correct use of pairing-based cryptography. We thereby deliberately avoid
most of the technical details and rather give special emphasis on the
importance of the correct use of bilinear maps by realizing secure
cryptographic protocols. We list a collection of some recent papers having
wrong security assumptions or realizability/efficiency issues. Finally, we give
a compact and an up-to-date recipe of the correct use of pairings.Comment: 25 page
Authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange: theory and practice
Authenticated two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals A and B, communicating over a public network, and each holding a pair of matching public/private keys to agree on a session key. Protocols designed to deal with this problem ensure A (B resp.)that no other principals aside from B (A resp.) can learn any information about this value. These protocols additionally often ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed the shared secret value. A natural extension to the above cryptographic protocol problem is to consider a pool of principals agreeing on a session key. Over the years several papers have extended the two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange to the multi-party setting but no formal treatments were carried out till recently. In light of recent developments in the formalization of the authenticated two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange we have in this thesis laid out the authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange on firmer foundations
A New Cryptosystem Based On Hidden Order Groups
Let be a cyclic multiplicative group of order . It is known that the
Diffie-Hellman problem is random self-reducible in with respect to a
fixed generator if is known. That is, given and
having oracle access to a `Diffie-Hellman Problem' solver with fixed generator
, it is possible to compute in polynomial time (see
theorem 3.2). On the other hand, it is not known if such a reduction exists
when is unknown (see conjuncture 3.1). We exploit this ``gap'' to
construct a cryptosystem based on hidden order groups and present a practical
implementation of a novel cryptographic primitive called an \emph{Oracle Strong
Associative One-Way Function} (O-SAOWF). O-SAOWFs have applications in
multiparty protocols. We demonstrate this by presenting a key agreement
protocol for dynamic ad-hoc groups.Comment: removed examples for multiparty key agreement and join protocols,
since they are redundan
Exploring platform (semi)groups for non-commutative key-exchange protocols
In this work, my advisor Delaram Kahrobaei, our collaborator David Garber, and I explore polycyclic groups generated from number fields as platform for the AAG key-exchange protocol. This is done by implementing four different variations of the length-based attack, one of the major attacks for AAG, and submitting polycyclic groups to all four variations with a variety of tests. We note that this is the first time all four variations of the length-based attack are compared side by side. We conclude that high Hirsch length polycyclic groups generated from number fields are suitable for the AAG key-exchange protocol.
Delaram Kahrobaei and I also carry out a similar strategy with the Heisenberg groups, testing them as platform for AAG with the length-based attack. We conclude that the Heisenberg groups, with the right parameters are resistant against the length-based attack.
Another work in collaboration with Delaram Kahrobaei and Vladimir Shpilrain is to propose a new platform semigroup for the HKKS key-exchange protocol, that of matrices over a Galois field. We discuss the security of HKKS under this platform and advantages in computation cost. Our implementation of the HKKS key-exchange protocol with matrices over a Galois field yields fast run time
KALwEN: a new practical and interoperable key management scheme for body sensor networks
Key management is the pillar of a security architecture. Body sensor networks (BSNs) pose several challenges–some inherited from wireless sensor networks (WSNs), some unique to themselves–that require a new key management scheme to be tailor-made. The challenge is taken on, and the result is KALwEN, a new parameterized key management scheme that combines the best-suited cryptographic techniques in a seamless framework. KALwEN is user-friendly in the sense that it requires no expert knowledge of a user, and instead only requires a user to follow a simple set of instructions when bootstrapping or extending a network. One of KALwEN's key features is that it allows sensor devices from different manufacturers, which expectedly do not have any pre-shared secret, to establish secure communications with each other. KALwEN is decentralized, such that it does not rely on the availability of a local processing unit (LPU). KALwEN supports secure global broadcast, local broadcast, and local (neighbor-to-neighbor) unicast, while preserving past key secrecy and future key secrecy (FKS). The fact that the cryptographic protocols of KALwEN have been formally verified also makes a convincing case. With both formal verification and experimental evaluation, our results should appeal to theorists and practitioners alike
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