[Symposium Remarks by UNH Professor of History David Bachrach, April 12, 2016 ]

Magna Carta did not emerge de novo in its fully fledged state in the late spring of 1215. The list of baronial demands, made on behalf of the kingdom as a whole, were born out of grievances that, in some cases, dated back more than a century. University of New Hampshire Professor of History David Bachrach discusses several key clauses of the Magna Carta as well as why this document was a touchstone for major political change

Rent Regulations under the Police Power

Conditions resulting from the widespread housing shortage caused by the cessation of building during the war have given rise to legislation which must seem startling indeed to much of the legal talent surviving from a generation ago. The outstanding example is to be found in the New York laws which so far have succeeded admirably in eluding the constitutional pitfalls relied upon to nullify them. Three provisions have borne the brunt of the attack. The first prevents the recovery of an unreasonable rent in an action at law, and places the burden of showing reasonableness upon the landlord. Another suspends for two years the landlord\u27s right to maintain summary proceedings for dispossession except in four instances.2 These are: (a) where the tenant is objectionable, (b)\u27 *here the landlord, bing a natural person, desires the premises for his own personal use, (c) where the landlord desires to construct a new building on the site of the old one, and (d) where the building has been sold to a co~perativf apartment company. A third provision suspends the right to maintain ejectment in the same manner.8 In general, these provisions have been sustained,4 but the last was declared invalid by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of the First Department, in Guttag v. Shatzkin5 chiefly on the ground that it impaired the obligation of existing contracts in that it was the final enactment of the legislature culminating in the removal of every remedy, excepting in the particular instances stated, of an owner for the recovery of the possession of real property occupied by tenants whose terms had expired and who were under contract obligations expressed in the leases or implied by law to vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof to their landlord

The Panhandlers’ Dialogue: Are Restrictions on Panhandling Content-Neutral Under the First Amendment?

One of the defining characteristics of the U.S. Constitution is its guarantee of certain enumerated rights, including the right to free speech. The First Amendment guards against governmental regulations that infringe on the right to free speech. In recent years, local governments across the nation have enacted local laws and ordinances that regulate or prohibit panhandling in certain areas. In Norton v. City of Springfield, the Seventh Circuit reviewed and upheld one such ordinance prohibiting panhandling in the downtown historic areas. The Springfield ordinance defined panhandling as an oral request for immediate donation of money. The downtown historic district at issue was a small portion of the City of Springfield but comprised the city’s principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. In reviewing this ordinance, the Seventh Circuit found that the ordinance was content-neutral and constitutional under the First Amendment. When governmental regulations restrict speech, such as the ordinance in Norton, the speech restriction is classified as either a content-based or content-neutral restriction. Content-based restrictions are those that regulate speech because of its message, idea, or content. Content-neutral restrictions are those that regulate speech without reference to the message, idea, or content of the speech. Content-based speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny review, which means that the restriction must serve a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Content-neutral speech restrictions, on the other hand, are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which means that the restriction must serve a significant governmental interest and still leave alternative channels of communicating the speech. In addition, if the speech restriction takes place in a traditional public forum, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to achieve the purported governmental interest. When the Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance in Norton was a content-neutral speech restriction, the Seventh Circuit departed from the majority of the federal circuits that have addressed this very issue. Because the Supreme Court has yet to address panhandling restrictions, this article first analyzes the framework that has been established in cases involving restrictions on solicitations in general. This article then discusses the decisions of the federal circuit courts on panhandling restrictions. Then, this article explains how the Seventh Circuit came to find that Springfield ordinance on panhandling was a valid content-neutral restriction. Finally, this article argues that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly classified the Springfield ordinance as a content-neutral speech restriction and, as a result, incorrectly held that it was a valid, content-neutral speech restriction

The Panhandlers’ Dialogue: Are Restrictions on Panhandling Content-Neutral Under the First Amendment?

One of the defining characteristics of the U.S. Constitution is its guarantee of certain enumerated rights, including the right to free speech. The First Amendment guards against governmental regulations that infringe on the right to free speech. In recent years, local governments across the nation have enacted local laws and ordinances that regulate or prohibit panhandling in certain areas. In Norton v. City of Springfield, the Seventh Circuit reviewed and upheld one such ordinance prohibiting panhandling in the downtown historic areas. The Springfield ordinance defined panhandling as an oral request for immediate donation of money. The downtown historic district at issue was a small portion of the City of Springfield but comprised the city’s principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. In reviewing this ordinance, the Seventh Circuit found that the ordinance was content-neutral and constitutional under the First Amendment. When governmental regulations restrict speech, such as the ordinance in Norton, the speech restriction is classified as either a content-based or content-neutral restriction. Content-based restrictions are those that regulate speech because of its message, idea, or content. Content-neutral restrictions are those that regulate speech without reference to the message, idea, or content of the speech. Content-based speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny review, which means that the restriction must serve a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Content-neutral speech restrictions, on the other hand, are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which means that the restriction must serve a significant governmental interest and still leave alternative channels of communicating the speech. In addition, if the speech restriction takes place in a traditional public forum, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to achieve the purported governmental interest. When the Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance in Norton was a content-neutral speech restriction, the Seventh Circuit departed from the majority of the federal circuits that have addressed this very issue. Because the Supreme Court has yet to address panhandling restrictions, this article first analyzes the framework that has been established in cases involving restrictions on solicitations in general. This article then discusses the decisions of the federal circuit courts on panhandling restrictions. Then, this article explains how the Seventh Circuit came to find that Springfield ordinance on panhandling was a valid content-neutral restriction. Finally, this article argues that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly classified the Springfield ordinance as a content-neutral speech restriction and, as a result, incorrectly held that it was a valid, content-neutral speech restriction