The current situation of EU’s food chain

The sharp fluctuations in agricultural commodity and food prices at a time of great uncertainty about the economic outlook illustrate the need to improve the functioning of the European food supply chain with a view to enhancing its efficiency and competitiveness. Better regulation and ensuring a vigorous and coherent enforcement of competition and consumer protection rules will contribute to limiting price increases for the benefit of European consumers, in particular lower income households. Moreover, it will also help overcome the present fragmentation of the food supply chain and remove artificial entry barriers for producers, which will help European consumers benefit from the widest possible choice of quality food products. Additionally, this could help rebalancing the bargaining power in the food supply chain. Global demand and supply developments have been one of the main determinants of the rapid increase in food prices observed. Nevertheless, problems in the functioning of the food supply chain, either in terms of the degree of competition or concerning regulation may have played an important role as well. In the present economic conditions, it is therefore particularly important to analyse how to improve the functioning of the food supply chain and, in particular, to better understand the transmission mechanisms linking commodity prices with producer and consumer prices. This would help identify appropriate measures in support of the consumer's purchasing power and the competitiveness of the sectors involved. The food supply chain connects three economically important sectors: the agricultural sector, the food processing industry and the distribution sectors. These sectors account for 6% of EU value added and 12% of EU employment. As the food processing industry and the distribution sectors have many interactions with other sectors, market malfunctioning along the food supply chain can have significant repercussions. The slow productivity growth in these sectors in comparison with the US indicates that there is room for efficiency improvements.food chain, demand and supply, retirements, consumer, foodstuff’s price, Agricultural and Food Policy,

UK domestic energy contracts, the 28 day rule, and experience in Sweden

In the UK, domestic customers must be able to terminate energy contracts at 28 days� notice. This has been seen as a transitional protection for customers and for competition. This paper reviews the arguments for and against the 28 day rule, and examines the extent to which UK suppliers have offered fixed-price fixed-term contracts. It also looks at experience in Sweden, where there is no such restriction and where there is greater use of fixed-price fixed-term contracts. The paper concludes that there is no longer a need for the 28 day rule to protect customers, and that it is more likely to restrict than to protect competition

Intermediation in Future Energy Markets: Innovative Product Design and Pricing

In order to mitigate the impacts of climate change, the international community envisages significant investments in electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES). The integration of this decentralized and fluctuating type electricity generation poses several challenges to planning, operation, and economics of power systems. The established energy systems were originally designed for a centralized electricity generation that follows the uncontrolled but well predictable demand. However, for large shares of RES, relying only on the flexibility of the generation side would be economically inefficient. Furthermore, the environmental benefits of using RES would be depleted by additional carbon emissions from ramping highly flexible fossil-fueled power plants. An appealing alternative to facilitate the efficient integration of large shares of RES is to exploit the so far mainly passive demand side as an additional source of flexibility. The established centralized approaches can hardly handle the fine-grained and decentralized nature of demand side flexibility. Therefore, the intermediation between centralized control and decentralized demand will play a major role in future energy markets, which constitutes the overarching topic of this dissertation. Typically electricity generation from RES is capital-intensive but has near zero marginal costs. On this account, novel services need to be offered in order to transmit the right economic signals. To this end, the concept of the differentiable good electricity is refined in this dissertation. Embedded into the so-called energy service, characteristics such as temporal and spatial price differentiation or the risk of interruption can be specified to differentiate the so far homogeneous good. Based on the morphological design theory a framework for the notion of energy services is established and subsequently implemented as a decision support system. This supports a systematic and structured product development process to design innovative energy services. Such an innovative energy service is, e.g., the charging of electric vehicles in car parks, where prices are differentiated by job completion deadline. This allows the car park operator to control the aggregated load of all charging jobs to follow local RES generation. Based on this energy service the downstream activity of an intermediary is formally modeled as an optimization problem and evaluated by means of an empirical simulation experiment. The results provide insights on pricing policy and the value of demand side flexibility with regard to both the integration of local RES generation and operative profit optimization. In order to illustrate another innovative energy service the presented model is extended by the upstream activity of the intermediary. Household consumers are offered monetary incentives if they allow the intermediary to control their appliances. The results indicate the cost saving potential from demand side flexibility for the intermediary\u27s procurement of electricity. Beyond that, this model formulation constitutes the foundation for further examinations, e.g., to study the strategic behavior of intermediaries on real-time electricity markets that are prone to market power abuse due to low market liquidity