Supply chain collaboration

In the past, research in operations management focused on single-firm analysis. Its goal was to provide managers in practice with suitable tools to improve the performance of their firm by calculating optimal inventory quantities, among others. Nowadays, business decisions are dominated by the globalization of markets and increased competition among firms. Further, more and more products reach the customer through supply chains that are composed of independent firms. Following these trends, research in operations management has shifted its focus from single-firm analysis to multi-firm analysis, in particular to improving the efficiency and performance of supply chains under decentralized control. The main characteristics of such chains are that the firms in the chain are independent actors who try to optimize their individual objectives, and that the decisions taken by a firm do also affect the performance of the other parties in the supply chain. These interactions among firms’ decisions ask for alignment and coordination of actions. Therefore, game theory, the study of situations of cooperation or conflict among heterogenous actors, is very well suited to deal with these interactions. This has been recognized by researchers in the field, since there are an ever increasing number of papers that applies tools, methods and models from game theory to supply chain problems

The Multi-Location Transshipment Problem with Positive Replenishment Lead Times

Transshipments, monitored movements of material at the same echelon of a supply chain, represent an effective pooling mechanism. With a single exception, research on transshipments overlooks replenishment lead times. The only approach for two-location inventory systems with non-negligible lead times could not be generalized to a multi-location setting, and the proposed heuristic method cannot guarantee to provide optimal solutions. This paper uses simulation optimization by combining an LP/network flow formulation with infinitesimal perturbation analysis to examine the multi-location transshipment problem with positive replenishment lead times, and demonstrates the computation of the optimal base stock quantities through sample path optimization. From a methodological perspective, this paper deploys an elegant duality-based gradient computation method to improve computational efficiency. In test problems, our algorithm was also able to achieve better objective values than an existing algorithm.Transshipment;Infinitesimal Perturbation Analysis (IPA);Simulation Optimization

Coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chains considering retailer innovation inputs

In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers' innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer's product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains

Coordinating Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Price Mechanism With Production Cost Disruption

This paper studies a two-stage dual-channel supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one traditional retailer. The manufacturer has its own online channel when he sells the product to the offline retailer. There exists a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the offline retailer, in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. The manufacturer abandons the pricing right in the online channel and adopts the marketing strategy which the online retail price is equal to the offline one. When the supply chain is in a static (undisrupted) condition, it can obtain Pareto improvement and eventually be coordinated by a two-part-tariff contract with a one-time transfer payment. When disruptions make the manufacturer’s unit production cost change, we can obtain the retail price, the production quantity and the total supply chain profit under different disruption levels in the centralized supply chain. Then, we find that there are some certain robustness both in the manufacturer’s production quantity and in the offline retail price. When the supply chain is decentralized, we can coordinate the supply chain by changing the wholesale price according to different disruption levels. Finally, some numerical examples are presented to illustrate the results