Value of Expertise For Forecasting Decisions in Conflicts

In important conflicts, people typically rely on experts' judgments to predict the decisions that adversaries will make. We compared the accuracy of 106 expert and 169 novice forecasts for eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts using unaided judgment were little better than those of novices, and neither were much better than simply guessing. The forecasts of experts with more experience were no more accurate than those with less. Speculating that consideration of the relative frequency of decisions might improve accuracy, we obtained 89 forecasts from novices instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations and to ascribe frequencies to decisions. Their forecasts were no more accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the most likely decision. We conclude that expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will make in conflicts. Their use might lead decision makers to overlook other, more useful, approaches.Bad faith, Framing, Hindsight bias, Methods, Politics.

Value of expertise for forecasting decisions in conflicts

In important conflicts, people typically rely on experts’ judgments to predict the decisions that adversaries will make. We compared the accuracy of 106 expert and 169 novice forecasts for eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts using unaided judgment were little better than those of novices, and neither were much better than simply guessing. The forecasts of experts with more experience were no more accurate than those with less. Speculating that consideration of the relative frequency of decisions might improve accuracy, we obtained 89 forecasts from novices instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations and to ascribe frequencies to decisions. Their forecasts were no more accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the most likely decision. We conclude that expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will make in conflicts. Their use might lead decision makers to overlook other, more useful, approaches

Collaborative yet independent: Information practices in the physical sciences

In many ways, the physical sciences are at the forefront of using digital tools and methods to work with information and data. However, the fields and disciplines that make up the physical sciences are by no means uniform, and physical scientists find, use, and disseminate information in a variety of ways. This report examines information practices in the physical sciences across seven cases, and demonstrates the richly varied ways in which physical scientists work, collaborate, and share information and data. This report details seven case studies in the physical sciences. For each case, qualitative interviews and focus groups were used to understand the domain. Quantitative data gathered from a survey of participants highlights different information strategies employed across the cases, and identifies important software used for research. Finally, conclusions from across the cases are drawn, and recommendations are made. This report is the third in a series commissioned by the Research Information Network (RIN), each looking at information practices in a specific domain (life sciences, humanities, and physical sciences). The aim is to understand how researchers within a range of disciplines find and use information, and in particular how that has changed with the introduction of new technologies

The Ombudsman: Value of Expertise for Forecasting Decisions in Conflicts

In important conflicts such as wars and labor-management disputes, people typically rely on the judgment of experts to predict the decisions that will be made. We compared the accuracy of 106 forecasts by experts and 169 forecasts by novices about eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts who used their unaided judgment were little better than those of novices. Moreover, neither group\u27s forecasts were much more accurate than simply guessing. The forecasts of experienced experts were no more accurate than the forecasts of those with less experience. The experts were nevertheless confident in the accuracy of their forecasts. Speculating that consideration of the relative frequency of decisions across similar conflicts might improve accuracy, we obtained 89 sets of frequencies from novices instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations. Forecasts based on the frequencies were no more accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the single most likely decision. We conclude that expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will make in conflicts. When decision makers ask experts for their opinions, they are likely to overlook other, more useful, approaches

Open Water: Affirmative Action, Mismatch Theory and Swarming Predators: A Response to Richard Sander

Open Water offers a sharp normative critique of Richard Sander\u27s Stanford Law Review study (57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004)) that claims to prove empirically that affirmative action positively injures African American law students. Sander\u27s law review article and conclusions are troublesome for a range of reasons and my critique unfolds as follows: First, Sander promulgates an objectionable form of racial paternalism in his anti-affirmative action study; Second, Sander casts himself in the fateful and historically disturbing role of the Great White Father ; Third, Sander seemingly manipulated the mass media in drawing attention to his study and purported findings, particularly the use of his real life role as the father of a biracial son and his claim that he came to his difficult conclusions as a sympathetic and reluctant white liberal; and Fourth, Sander fails to consider, in any recognizable sense, crucial issues that impact his conclusions such as the clear benefits of diversity in the law school classroom and the significant work that law school admissions committees\u27 undertake in evaluating applicants aside from straight LSAT and GPA considerations. Most distressing is that while Sander\u27s study sheds light upon troubling statistics that he did not create (not new, just now more publicized) that expose the serious United States education problem of the racial testing gap between white students and minority students and the bar examination passage gap between black and white students, he does not undertake a fundamental examination of the root causes of these problems. These are very serious evils indeed - disturbing issues that many in the legal academy should be (and are) working hard to understand and resolve. Sander however takes the easy road looking for a scapegoat upon which he can pin the entirety of the racial testing gap predicament, rather than undertaking a careful and thoughtful examination of the sources of the problem. Sander chooses his scapegoat (affirmative action) and then attaches the resolution of these problems on eliminating that scapegoat. My article criticizes Sander for each of these reasons, and then offers a much different path toward resolution

How Scenarios Became Corporate Strategies: Alternative Futures and Uncertainty in Strategic Management

How Scenarios Became Corporate Strategies tracks the transformation of scenario planning, a non-calculative technique for imagining alternative futures, from postwar American thermonuclear defence projects to corporate planning efforts beginning in the late 1960s. Drawing on archival research, the dissertation tells a history of how different corporate strategists in the second half of the twentieth century attempted to engage with future uncertainties by drawing heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory rational and intuitive techniques together in their developments of corporate scenario planning. By tracing the heterogeneity of methodologies and intellectual influences in three case studies from corporate scenario planning efforts in the United States and Britain, the dissertation demonstrates how critical and countercultural philosophies that emphasized irrational human capacities like imagination, consciousness, and intuitionoften assumed to be antithetical to the rule-bound, quantitative rationalities of corporate planning effortsbecame crucial tools, rather than enemies, of corporate strategy under uncertainty after 1960. The central argument of the dissertation is that corporate scenario planning projects were non-calculative speculative attempts to augment the calculative techniques of traditional mid-century strategic decision-making with diverse human reasoning tools in order to explore and understand future uncertainties. Consequently, these projects were intertwined with an array of sometimes contradictory genealogies, from technical postwar military planning practices to countercultural intellectual resources that questioned the technological imperatives of modern life. Yet, by the mid-1980s, corporate scenario planning efforts transformed from contemplative strategies for exploring uncertainties into a method associated with the capacities of thought leaders. It was through the rising thought leadership industry of the late-twentieth-century that scenarios gained legitimacy, enabling multinational corporations to rely upon the charismatic authority of scenario practitioners in the face of unknowable futures. In making this argument, the dissertation revises assumptions in the history of postwar science and technology and science studies that pivot on the importance of impersonal, calculative strategies and technical capacities in uncertain conditions

Election Data Visualisation

Visualisations of election data produced by the mass media, other organisations and even individuals are becoming increasingly available across a wide variety of platforms and in many different forms. As more data become available digitally and as improvements to computer hardware and software are made, these visualisations have become more ambitious in scope and more user-friendly. Research has shown that visualising data is an extremely powerful method of communicating information to specialists and non-specialists alike. This amounts to a democratisation of access to political and electoral data. To some extent political science lags behind the progress that has been made in the field of data visualisation. Much of the academic output remains committed to the paper format and much of the data presentation is in the form of simple text and tables. In the digital and information age there is a danger that political science will fall behind. This thesis reports on a number of case studies where efforts were made to visualise election data in order to clarify its structure and to present its meaning. The first case study demonstrates the value of data visualisation to the research process itself, facilitating the understanding of effects produced by different ways of estimating missing data. A second study sought to use visualisation to explain complex aspects of voting systems to the wider public. Three further case studies demonstrate the value of collaboration between political scientists and others possessing a range of skills embracing data management, software engineering, broadcasting and graphic design. These studies also demonstrate some of the problems that are encountered when trying to distil complex data into a form that can be easily viewed and interpreted by non-expert users. More importantly, these studies suggest that when the skills balance is correct then visualisation is both viable and necessary for communicating information on elections