816,827 research outputs found
Can Rats Reason?
Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example,
that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann,
2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about
future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in
propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these
capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah,
2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. I evaluate the case for rat rationality by
analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive
inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors
need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted
for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or
associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not
necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet
insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an
experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats
Ethics and Practical Reason
In this review of essays on the topic of practical reason, the neo-Humeanism of philosophers such as James Drier, according to whom reasons are instrumental, is shown to be susceptible to the objections of Kantian philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard: the fact that you desire to X can never entail that you ought to X. Kantianism, however, comes under attack from neo-Aristotelian philosophers such as Berys Gaut, who argues that it is a mistake to identify goodness with being the object of free rational choice
Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found
Delusional beliefs and reason giving
Delusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be
empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a
philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states
Sufficient reason and reason enough
I offer an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its relevancy
for the scientific endeavour. I submit that the world is not, and cannot be,
rational - only some brained beings are. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is
not a necessary truth nor a physical law. It is just a guiding metanomological
hypothesis justified a posteriori by its success in helping us to unveil the
mechanisms that operate in Nature.Comment: 8 pages. Accepted for publication in Foundations of Scienc
21st Century Ergonomic Education, From Little e to Big E
Despite intense efforts, contemporary educational systems are not enabling
individuals to function optimally in modern society. The main reason is that
reformers are trying to improve systems that are not designed to take advantage
of the centuries of history of the development of today's societies. Nor do
they recognize the implications of the millions of years of history of life on
earth in which humans are the latest edition of learning organisms. The
contemporary educational paradigm of "education for all" is based on a 17th
century model of "printing minds" for passing on static knowledge. This
characterizes most of K-12 education. In contrast, 21st Century education
demands a new paradigm, which we call Ergonomic Education. This is an education
system that is designed to fit the students of any age instead of forcing the
students to fit the education system. It takes into account in a fundamental
way what students want to learn -- the concept "wanting to learn" refers to the
innate ability and desire to learn that is characteristic of humans. The
Ergonomic Education paradigm shifts to education based on coaching students as
human beings who are hungry for productive learning throughout their lives from
their very earliest days.Comment: plain latex, 13 pages, 1 tabl
Legal coercion, respect & reason-responsive agency
Legal coercion seems morally problematic because it is susceptible to the Hegelian objection that it fails to respect individuals in a way that is ‘due to them as men’. But in what sense does legal coercion fail to do so? And what are the grounds for this requirement to respect? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. It argues that (a) legal coercion fails to respect individuals as reason-responsive agents; and (b) individuals ought to be respected as such in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus it is in this sense that legal coercion fails to treat individuals with the kind of respect ‘due to them as men’.The Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2012-032); AHRC (AH/H015655/1
Humans do not reason from contradictory premises. The psychological aspects of paraconsistency.
The creation of paraconsistent logics have expanded the boundaries of formal logic by introducing coherent systems that tolerate contradictions without triviality. Thanks to their novel approach and rigorous formalization they have already found many applications in computer science, linguistics and mathematics. As a natural next step, some philosophers have also tried to answer the question if human everyday reasoning could be accurately modelled with paraconsistent logics. The purpose of this article is to argue against the notion that human reasoning is paraconsistent. Numerous findings in the area of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience go against the hypothesis that humans tolerate contradictions in their inferences. Humans experience severe stress and confusion when confronted with contradictions (i.e., the so-called cognitive dissonance). Experiments on the ways in which humans process contradictions point out that the first thing humans do is remove or modify one of the contradictory statements. From an evolutionary perspective, contradiction is useless and even more dangerous than lack of information because it takes up resources to process. Furthermore, it appears that when logicians, anthropologists or psychologists provide examples of contradictions in human culture and behaviour, their examples very rarely take the form of: (p and ¬p). Instead, they are often conditional statements, probabilistic judgments, metaphors or seemingly incompatible beliefs. At different points in time humans are definitely able to hold contradictory beliefs, but within one reasoning leading to a particular behaviour, contradiction is never tolerated
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