Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons: LightSquared and the Missing Spectrum Rights

The endemic underuse of radio spectrum constitutes a tragedy of the regulatory commons. Like other common interest tragedies, the outcome results from a legal or market structure that prevents economic actors from executing socially efficient bargains. In wireless markets, innovative applications often provoke claims by incumbent radio users that the new traffic will interfere with existing services. Sometimes these concerns are mitigated via market transactions, a la “Coasian bargaining.” Other times, however, solutions cannot be found even when social gains dominate the cost of spillovers. In the recent “LightSquared debacle,” such spectrum allocation failure played out. GPS interests that access frequencies adjacent to the band hosting LightSquared’s new nationwide mobile network complained that the wireless entrant would harm the operation of locational devices. Based on these complaints, regulators then killed LightSquared’s planned 4G network. Conservative estimates placed the prospective 4G consumer gains at least an order of magnitude above GPS losses. “Win win” bargains were theoretically available, fixing GPS vulnerabilities while welcoming the highly valuable wireless innovation. Yet transaction costs—largely caused by policy choices to issue limited and highly fragmented spectrum usage rights (here in the GPS band)—proved prohibitive. This episode provides a template for understanding market and non-market failure in radio spectrum allocation

Tradable Rights to Emit Air Pollution

The use of cap-and-trade to regulate air pollution promises to achieve environmental goals at lower cost than traditional prescriptive approaches. Cap-and-trade has been applied to various air pollutants including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds in the United States and carbon dioxide in the European Union. This corresponds to what is likely to become the most expensive environmental undertaking in history—the effort to reduce the heating of the planet. However, the efficacy of a cap-and-trade policy for carbon dioxide depends in large part on the design of the program. In addition to the level of the cap, the most important decision facing policymakers will be the initial allocation of emissions allowances. The method used to allocate tradable emissions allowances will have significant influence on the distributional impact and efficiency of the program.cap-and-trade, emission allowances, allocation, auction, grandfathering, climate change, global warming, carbon dioxide

Legislators v. Regulators: The Case of Low Power FM Radio

The recent Federal Communications Commission rule making for low power FM radio has been widely reported as an instance where Congress sharply rebuked the Commission for enacting rules too favorable to entrants. Because rival policy optima are quantifiable in this case, the preferences of consumers, Congress and the Commission can be directly compared. While differences in policy preferences of Congress and the regulatory agency were visible to interest groups, they appear extremely modest when compared to the open entry (welfare maximizing) policy alternative. A financial event study reveals that incumbent broadcast station equity values were neither threatened by the Commission's low power FM rules, nor materially enhanced by their reversal in Congress. This lends empirical support to the Congressional Dominance view of regulation, and illustrates the margins on which blame- and credit-shifting strategies are utilized by policy makers.

Managing the radio spectrum : framework for reform in developing countries

Bringing management of the radio spectrum closer to markets is long overdue. The radio spectrum is a major component of the infrastructure that underpins the information society. Spectrum management, however, has not kept up with major changes in technology, business practice, and economic policy that have taken place worldwide during the last two decades. For many years traditional government administration of the spectrum worked reasonably well, but more recently it has led to growing technical and economic inefficiencies as well as obstacles to technological innovation. Two alternative approaches to spectrum management are being tried in several countries, one driven by the market (tradable spectrum rights) and another driven by technology innovation (spectrum commons). This paper discusses the basic features, advantages and limitations, scope of application, and requirements for implementation of these three approaches. The paper then discusses how these approaches can be made to work under conditions that typically prevail in developing countries, including weak rule of law, limited markets, and constrained fiscal space. Although spectrum reform strategies for individual countries must be developed case by case, several broadly applicable strategic options are outlined. The paper proposes a phased approach to addressing spectrum reform in a country. It ends by discussing aspects of institutional design, managing the transition, and addressing high-level changes such as the transition to digital television, the path to third-generation mobile services, launching of wireless fixed broadband services, and releasing military spectrum. The paper is extensively annotated and referenced.E-Business,Roads&Highways,Telecommunications Infrastructure,Climate Change,ICT Policy and Strategies

Spectrum Allocation, Spectrum Commons and Public Goods: the Role of the Market

The reallocation of radio spectrum to valuable new and emerging technologies and services is essential to achieving the next wave of productivity and consumer benefits driven by ICT. Currently spectrum is not allocated to the most valuable uses, particularly the large amount of spectrum held for government use, and command and control management cannot respond fully or quickly in reallocating spectrum. To achieve a more economically efficient allocation and the greatest overall benefit market mechanisms including trading and spectrum pricing must be introduced. Complementary reforms in areas other than spectrum management will be required, and the appropriate boundary between market and non-market allocation mechanisms need to be established. Setting clear principles regarding the market/non-market boundary will help in resisting the inevitable rent seeking by incumbents and potential entrants during the transition to market mechanisms. Countries that do not face up to these challenges and move quickly will see their citizens disadvantaged as spectrum becomes a key economic resource.spectrum policy, auctions, trading, spectrum pricing, digital switchover, real options, public sector use, licence exempt use, infrastructure, Competition Policy

Priorities for the Finnish Presidency, July-December 2006. CEPS Working Document, No. 248, 12 July 2006

[From the Introduction]. "Thinking ahead for Europe’ is our motto. In this reader we have collected our thoughts and recent writings on what should be done in the near future to get Europe moving again. We offer these ideas to the Finnish Presidency of the EU as food for thought at the start of its six-month term. These views are based on the research experience of our multinational staff, who have the privilege of working in complete independence

Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems

The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.\ud \ud In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum

From Sensing to Predictions and Database Technique: A Review of TV White Space Information Acquisition in Cognitive Radio Networks

Strategies to acquire white space information is the single most significant functionality in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) and as such, it has gone some evolution to enhance information accuracy. The evolution trends are spectrum sensing, prediction algorithm and recently, geo-location database technique. Previously, spectrum sensing was the main technique for detecting the presence/absence of a primary user (PU) signal in a given radio frequency (RF) spectrum. However, this expectation could not materialized as a result of numerous technical challenges ranging from hardware imperfections to RF signal impairments. To convey the evolutionary trends in the development of white space information, we present a survey of the contemporary advancements in PU detection with emphasis on the practical deployment of CRNs i.e. Television white space (TVWS) networks. It is found that geo-location database is the most reliable technique to acquire TVWS information although, it is financially driven. Finally, using financially driven database model, this study compared the data-rate and spectral efficiency of FCC and Ofcom TV channelization. It was discovered that Ofcom TV channelization outperforms FCC TV channelization as a result of having higher spectrum bandwidth. We proposed the adoption of an all-inclusive TVWS information acquisition model as the future research direction for TVWS information acquisition techniques