Convexity and Robustness of Dynamic Traffic Assignment and Freeway Network Control

We study the use of the System Optimum (SO) Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA) problem to design optimal traffic flow controls for freeway networks as modeled by the Cell Transmission Model, using variable speed limit, ramp metering, and routing. We consider two optimal control problems: the DTA problem, where turning ratios are part of the control inputs, and the Freeway Network Control (FNC), where turning ratios are instead assigned exogenous parameters. It is known that relaxation of the supply and demand constraints in the cell-based formulations of the DTA problem results in a linear program. However, solutions to the relaxed problem can be infeasible with respect to traffic dynamics. Previous work has shown that such solutions can be made feasible by proper choice of ramp metering and variable speed limit control for specific traffic networks. We extend this procedure to arbitrary networks and provide insight into the structure and robustness of the proposed optimal controllers. For a network consisting only of ordinary, merge, and diverge junctions, where the cells have linear demand functions and affine supply functions with identical slopes, and the cost is the total traffic volume, we show, using the maximum principle, that variable speed limits are not needed in order to achieve optimality in the FNC problem, and ramp metering is sufficient. We also prove bounds on perturbation of the controlled system trajectory in terms of perturbations in initial traffic volume and exogenous inflows. These bounds, which leverage monotonicity properties of the controlled trajectory, are shown to be in close agreement with numerical simulation results

Mean-Field-Type Games in Engineering

A mean-field-type game is a game in which the instantaneous payoffs and/or the state dynamics functions involve not only the state and the action profile but also the joint distributions of state-action pairs. This article presents some engineering applications of mean-field-type games including road traffic networks, multi-level building evacuation, millimeter wave wireless communications, distributed power networks, virus spread over networks, virtual machine resource management in cloud networks, synchronization of oscillators, energy-efficient buildings, online meeting and mobile crowdsensing.Comment: 84 pages, 24 figures, 183 references. to appear in AIMS 201

Continuum Equilibria and Global Optimization for Routing in Dense Static Ad Hoc Networks

We consider massively dense ad hoc networks and study their continuum limits as the node density increases and as the graph providing the available routes becomes a continuous area with location and congestion dependent costs. We study both the global optimal solution as well as the non-cooperative routing problem among a large population of users where each user seeks a path from its origin to its destination so as to minimize its individual cost. Finally, we seek for a (continuum version of the) Wardrop equilibrium. We first show how to derive meaningful cost models as a function of the scaling properties of the capacity of the network and of the density of nodes. We present various solution methodologies for the problem: (1) the viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, for the global optimization problem, (2) a method based on Green's Theorem for the least cost problem of an individual, and (3) a solution of the Wardrop equilibrium problem using a transformation into an equivalent global optimization problem

A Study of Truck Platooning Incentives Using a Congestion Game

We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. In addition to these terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their peers because they have platooning capabilities, which allow them to save fuel. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between car traffic and truck platooning incentives are investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm to validate parts of the modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to understand the influence of various factors, such as the drivers' value of time and the percentage of the trucks that are equipped with platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.Comment: Updated Introduction; Improved Literature Revie