1,424 research outputs found
Individual and global adaptation in networks
The structure of complex biological and socio-economic networks affects the selective pressures or behavioural incentives of components in that network, and reflexively, the evolution/behaviour of individuals in those networks changes the structure of such networks over time. Such âadaptive networksâ underlie how gene-regulation networks evolve, how ecological networks self-organise, and how networks of strategic agents co-create social organisations. Although such domains are different in the details, they can each be characterised as networks of self-interested agents where agents alter network connections in the direction that increases their individual utility. Recent work shows that such dynamics are equivalent to associative learning, well-understood in the context of neural networks. Associative learning in neural substrates is the result of mandated learning rules (e.g. Hebbian learning), but in networks of autonomous agents âassociative inductionâ occurs as a result of local individual incentives to alter connections. Using results from a number of recent studies, here we review the theoretical principles that can be transferred between disciplines as a result of this isomorphism, and the implications for the organisation of genetic, social and ecological networks
Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market
This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially lockedâin when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the ?rstâbest
Channel Selection for Network-assisted D2D Communication via No-Regret Bandit Learning with Calibrated Forecasting
We consider the distributed channel selection problem in the context of
device-to-device (D2D) communication as an underlay to a cellular network.
Underlaid D2D users communicate directly by utilizing the cellular spectrum but
their decisions are not governed by any centralized controller. Selfish D2D
users that compete for access to the resources construct a distributed system,
where the transmission performance depends on channel availability and quality.
This information, however, is difficult to acquire. Moreover, the adverse
effects of D2D users on cellular transmissions should be minimized. In order to
overcome these limitations, we propose a network-assisted distributed channel
selection approach in which D2D users are only allowed to use vacant cellular
channels. This scenario is modeled as a multi-player multi-armed bandit game
with side information, for which a distributed algorithmic solution is
proposed. The solution is a combination of no-regret learning and calibrated
forecasting, and can be applied to a broad class of multi-player stochastic
learning problems, in addition to the formulated channel selection problem.
Analytically, it is established that this approach not only yields vanishing
regret (in comparison to the global optimal solution), but also guarantees that
the empirical joint frequencies of the game converge to the set of correlated
equilibria.Comment: 31 pages (one column), 9 figure
EGOIST: Overlay Routing Using Selfish Neighbor Selection
A foundational issue underlying many overlay network applications ranging from routing to P2P file sharing is that of connectivity management, i.e., folding new arrivals into an existing overlay, and re-wiring to cope with changing network conditions. Previous work has considered the problem from two perspectives: devising practical heuristics for specific applications designed to work well in real deployments, and providing abstractions for the underlying problem that are analytically tractable, especially via game-theoretic analysis. In this paper, we unify these two thrusts by using insights gleaned from novel, realistic theoretic models in the design of Egoist â a prototype overlay routing system that we implemented, deployed, and evaluated on PlanetLab. Using measurements on PlanetLab and trace-based simulations, we demonstrate that Egoist's neighbor selection primitives significantly outperform existing heuristics on a variety of performance metrics, including delay, available bandwidth, and node utilization. Moreover, we demonstrate that Egoist is competitive with an optimal, but unscalable full-mesh approach, remains highly effective under significant churn, is robust to cheating, and incurs minimal overhead. Finally, we discuss some of the potential benefits Egoist may offer to applications.National Science Foundation (CISE/CSR 0720604, ENG/EFRI 0735974, CISE/CNS 0524477, CNS/NeTS 0520166, CNS/ITR 0205294; CISE/EIA RI 0202067; CAREER 04446522); European Commission (RIDS-011923
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Integer-Splittable Weighted Congestion Games
We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integerâsplittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and network routing, where agents have to allocate multiple tasks and can assign a number of tasks to a particular selected resource. Specifically, in an ISWCG, an agent has a certain total demand (aka weight) that it needs to satisfy, and can do so by requesting one or more integer units of each resource from an element of a given collection of feasible subsets. Each resource is associated with a unitâcost function of its level of congestion; as such, the cost to an agent for using a particular resource is the product of the resource unitâcost and the number of units the agent requests.While general ISWCGs do not admit PSNE [(Rosenthal, 1973b)], the restricted subclass of these games with linear unitâcost functions has been shown to possess a potential function [(Meyers, 2006)], and hence, PSNE. However, the linearity of costs may not be necessary for the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. Thus, in this paper we prove that PSNE always exist for a larger class of convex and monotonically increasing unitâcosts. On the other hand, our result is accompanied by a limiting assumption on the structure of agentsâ strategy sets: specifically, each agent is associated with its set of accessible resources, and can distribute its demand across any subset of these resources.Importantly, we show that neither monotonicity nor convexity on its own guarantees this result. Moreover, we give a counterexample with monotone and semiâconvex cost functions, thus distinguishing ISWCGs from the class of infinitelyâsplittable congestion games for which the conditions of monotonicity and semiâconvexity have been shown to be sufficient for PSNE existence [(Rosen, 1965)]. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the finite improvement path property (FIP) does not hold for convex increasing ISWCGs. Thus, in contrast to the case with linear costs, a potential function argument cannot be used to prove our result. Instead, we provide a procedure that converges to an equilibrium from an arbitrary initial strategy profile, and in doing so show that ISWCGs with convex increasing unitâcost functions are weakly acyclic
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