9,276 research outputs found

    Distributed Big-Data Optimization via Block Communications

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    We study distributed multi-agent large-scale optimization problems, wherein the cost function is composed of a smooth possibly nonconvex sum-utility plus a DC (Difference-of-Convex) regularizer. We consider the scenario where the dimension of the optimization variables is so large that optimizing and/or transmitting the entire set of variables could cause unaffordable computation and communication overhead. To address this issue, we propose the first distributed algorithm whereby agents optimize and communicate only a portion of their local variables. The scheme hinges on successive convex approximation (SCA) to handle the nonconvexity of the objective function, coupled with a novel block-signal tracking scheme, aiming at locally estimating the average of the agents' gradients. Asymptotic convergence to stationary solutions of the nonconvex problem is established. Numerical results on a sparse regression problem show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and the impact of the block size on its practical convergence speed and communication cost

    Interdomain routing and games

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    We present a game-theoretic model that captures many of the intricacies of \emph{interdomain routing} in today's Internet. In this model, the strategic agents are source nodes located on a network, who aim to send traffic to a unique destination node. The interaction between the agents is dynamic and complex -- asynchronous, sequential, and based on partial information. Best-reply dynamics in this model capture crucial aspects of the only interdomain routing protocol de facto, namely the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). We study complexity and incentive-related issues in this model. Our main results are showing that in realistic and well-studied settings, BGP is incentive-compatible. I.e., not only does myopic behaviour of all players \emph{converge} to a ``stable'' routing outcome, but no player has motivation to unilaterally deviate from the protocol. Moreover, we show that even \emph{coalitions} of players of \emph{any} size cannot improve their routing outcomes by collaborating. Unlike the vast majority of works in mechanism design, our results do not require any monetary transfers (to or by the agents).Interdomain Routing; Network Games; BGP protocol;
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