Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications

Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a mechanism include incentive compatibility, individual rationality, welfare maximisation, revenue maximisation (or cost minimisation), fairness of allocation, etc. It is known from mechanism design theory that only certain strict subsets of these properties can be simultaneously satisfied exactly by any given mechanism. Often, the mechanisms required by real-world applications may need a subset of these properties that are theoretically impossible to be simultaneously satisfied. In such cases, a prominent recent approach is to use a deep learning based approach to learn a mechanism that approximately satisfies the required properties by minimizing a suitably defined loss function. In this paper, we present, from relevant literature, technical details of using a deep learning approach for mechanism design and provide an overview of key results in this topic. We demonstrate the power of this approach for three illustrative case studies: (a) efficient energy management in a vehicular network (b) resource allocation in a mobile network (c) designing a volume discount procurement auction for agricultural inputs. Section 6 concludes the paper

Identifying influencers in a social network : the value of real referral data

Individuals influence each other through social interactions and marketers aim to leverage this interpersonal influence to attract new customers. It still remains a challenge to identify those customers in a social network that have the most influence on their social connections. A common approach to the influence maximization problem is to simulate influence cascades through the network based on the existence of links in the network using diffusion models. Our study contributes to the literature by evaluating these principles using real-life referral behaviour data. A new ranking metric, called Referral Rank, is introduced that builds on the game theoretic concept of the Shapley value for assigning each individual in the network a value that reflects the likelihood of referring new customers. We also explore whether these methods can be further improved by looking beyond the one-hop neighbourhood of the influencers. Experiments on a large telecommunication data set and referral data set demonstrate that using traditional simulation based methods to identify influencers in a social network can lead to suboptimal decisions as the results overestimate actual referral cascades. We also find that looking at the influence of the two-hop neighbours of the customers improves the influence spread and product adoption. Our findings suggest that companies can take two actions to improve their decision support system for identifying influential customers: (1) improve the data by incorporating data that reflects the actual referral behaviour of the customers or (2) extend the method by looking at the influence of the connections in the two-hop neighbourhood of the customers

Pricing of Games as a Service: An Analytical Model for Interactive Digital Services with Hedonistic Properties

This study explores optimal pricing strategies in games and other interactive digital goods under incomplete information, when bundling is an option. Drawing from research on the pricing of information goods, we propose a pattern of optimal pricing strategies in which hedonic characteristics affect the utility of interactive digital goods and services. This is a new approach to games, to treat them as a service to determine pricing strategies. Findings reveal that there is an optimal pricing solution for firms in the gaming industry. This finding holds both in bundling and non-bundling cases. Utilizing analytical modeling methodology, we propose pricing-inspired business strategies to the firms operating in the digital gaming industry. Our findings could also be applied to other hedonic interactive digital goods and services. Overall, this study contributes to the existing pricing theories in digital services and information goods