60,961 research outputs found

    COVID-19 information metrics for response leadership's decision making

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    Updated Sept. 1, 2020Information sharing among international and national stakeholders during the ongoing COVID-19 response is critical for a coordinated response. Emergency Management Systems Integration (EMSI) is the process of bringing together the public health programs, emergency management systems, and best practices into one cohesive system to enhance the prevention, detection and response to public health events. EMSI supports the coordination of information flow and resource sharing among the disaster management authorities, multisectoral ministries and external partners responding to COVID-19. This involves integrating and streamlining existing \u2014 often disparate \u2014 public health systems in such a way that focuses on increasing the effectiveness of a public health preparedness and response program before, during, and after a public health event to ensure optimal response decision-making and strategy.This document aims to provide critical COVID-19 information metrics by technical area that response leaders in non-U.S. settings can request to aid in informing COVID-19 response decisions. This document includes a set of core metrics within 10 technical areas for response leaders to help monitor response progress and guide decision making. This list was drawn from World Health Organization (WHO) and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) COVID-19 guidance documents with consultation from the CDC Operations and International Task Force subject matter experts in the corresponding technical areas.1-12 This document is not meant to be exhaustive but to identify those information metrics that are critical to inform response leadership. Countries\u2019 response leadership may consider and request more metrics than what is listed in this document within their public health systems. Additionally, other metrics may be considered depending on a country\u2019s specific transmission context (incidence, mortality, geographic spread, etc.).Introduction -- Country-level coordination, monitoring, and planning -- Epidemiology and surveillance -- Case management -- Infection prevention and control (IPC) -- Laboratory -- Communications, social mobilization, and behavioral science -- Border Health -- Management, operations, and logistics -- Health and safety -- Security -- References2020E:\cpapFiles\WebServer\COVIDglobal-leadership-emergency-response2020sep01.pdfhttps://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/global-covid-19/leadership-emergency-response.htmlhttps://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/global-covid-19/EMSI-Guidance-for-Response-Leadership.pdf847

    Coordination Under Uncertain Conditions: An Analysis of the Fukushima Catastrophe

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    This paper analyzes the impacts of the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, which were amplified by a failure of coordination across the plant, corporate, industrial, and regulatory levels, resulting in a nuclear catastrophe, comparable in cost to Chernobyl. It derives generic lessons for industrial structure and regulatory frame of the electric power industry by identifying the two shortcomings of a horizontal coordination mechanism: instability under large shock and the lack of “defense in depth.”fukushima catastrophe; nuclear power; earthquake and tsunami

    Organizations under Large Uncertainty: An Analysis of the Fukushima Catastrophe

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    This paper analyzes the impacts of the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, which were amplified by a failure of coordination across the plant, corporate, industrial, and regulatory levels, resulting in a nuclear catastrophe comparable in cost to Chernobyl. It derives generic lessons for industrial structure and regulatory frame for the electric power industry by identifying the two shortcomings of a horizontal coordination mechanism: instability under large shocks and the lack of defense in depth.The suggested policy response is to harness the power of Ă’open-interface-rule-based modularity by creating an independent nuclear safety commission and an independent system operator owning the transmission grid module in Japan. We propose a transitory price mechanism that can restrain price volatility while providing investment incentives.horizontal coordination, modularity, nuclear power, regional monopoly, electricity regulation, safety regulation, public ownership, independent system operator

    Early warning: a people-centred approach to early warning systems and the 'last mile'

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    The people-centred approach to early warning focuses on how communities can understand threats and avoid them. Disasters are partly caused by external hazards, but they also stem simply from vulnerability: people being in the wrong place without adequate protection. Perhaps the most well-known risk assessment method of recent years is the “vulnerability and capacity assessment”, developed by the Red Cross Red Crescent. There is a consensus that information must extend to communities so as to facilitate their adoption of protective actions. The linking of early warning and early action with development aspirations is what motivates people to engage. Factors as diverse as knowledge, power, culture, environment, lifestyle and personality often determine whether people heed warnings. Engaging people outside any warning system is called the “last mile” – a term that expresses the sentiment that warnings often do not reach those who need them most. Addressing vulnerability in disaster reduction is often similar to promoting development, but in the developed world “top-down” approaches to risk assessment and early warning dominate
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