Directed search and job rotation

In this note, we consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined, and match quality is initially unknown. A large firm benefits from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome mismatch loss. As a result, in the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, large firms have higher labor productivity and lower separation rate. In contrast to the standard directed search model with multi-vacancy firms, this model can generate a positive correlation between firm size and wage without introducing any exogenous productivity shock or imposing non-concave production function assumption.Directed Search, Job Rotation, Firm Size and Wage, Firm Size and Labor Productivity

Directed search and job rotation

In this note, we consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined, and match quality is initially unknown. A large firm benefits from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome mismatch loss. As a result, in the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, large firms have higher labor productivity and lower separation rate. In contrast to the standard directed search model with multi-vacancy firms, this model can generate a positive correlation between firm size and wage without introducing any exogenous productivity shock or imposing non-concave production function assumption

Worker selection, hiring, and vacancies

This paper incorporates worker selection into a random matching model with multi-worker firms. Unlike the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model, the extended model is compatible with cross-sectional behavior of vacancy yields, which rise with employment growth and worker turnover, but fall with establishment size. Using calibrated versions of the standard and worker selection models, I show that accounting for these patterns has quantitatively important policy implications. I also compare the worker selection and the directed search models. While both models account for these patterns equally well, they differ with regard to labor market policy. (JEL E24, J23, J63, J64) </jats:p

Firm and Industrial Dynamics Over the Business Cycles

This dissertation consists of three essays. In Chapter 1, we proposes a dynamic multi-sector production network model in which firms receive news on the future product-specific demand of a representative household. Since production takes time and firms in the production sectors are connected via input-output links, news on the future final demand of an individual product changes firms\u27 forecasts of their future sales, creating economy-wide effects named as forecast shocks. Forecast shocks are transferred upwards through the supplier-customer connections in the network, from the buyer of an input good to the producer. The model explains the asymmetry in the transmission of individual shocks in the network and how shocks to the expectations generate real, persistent effects. The equilibrium is analytically solved and calibrated to the U.S. economy. Quantitative analysis then follows to examine the model performance. In Chapter 2, we incorporate a firm\u27s project choice decision into a firm dynamics model with business cycle features to explain this empirical finding both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, all projects available have the same expected flow return and differ from one another only in the riskiness level. The endogenous option of exiting the market and limited funding for new investment jointly play an important role in motivating firms\u27 risk-taking behavior. The model predicts that relatively small firms are more likely to take risk and that the cross-sectional productivity dispersion, measured as the variance/standard deviation of firm-level profitability, is larger in recessions. In Chapter 3, we consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined, and match quality is initially unknown. In a large firm, job rotation allows the firm to at least partially ameliorate losses from mismatches of workers to jobs. As a result, in the unique equilibrium, large firms have higher labor productivity and lower separation rate. In contrast to the standard directed search model with multi-vacancy firms, this model can generate a positive correlation between firm size and wage without introducing exogenous productivity shocks or a non-concave production function

Directed Search without Wage Commitment and the Role of Labor Market Institutions

An urn-ball matching model of directed search is analyzed in which the usual assumption of commitment to posted wages is dropped. One-on-one matches lead to a Nash bargained wage but when multiple applicants arrive competition drives the workers down to their continuation value. A minimum wage can act as a commitment device when (as in the USA) willful underpayment carries a stiffer penalty than "inadvertetn underpayment. The theory sheds new light on why firms appear to voluntarily bind themselves into paying higher wages than they would otherwise pay. Robustness to various sources of heterogeneity is considered

Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

The introduction of firm size into labor search models raises the question how wages are set when average and marginal product differ. We develop and analyze an alternative to the existing bargaining framework: Firms compete for labor by publicly posting long–term contracts. In such a competitive search setting, firms achieve faster growth not only by posting more vacancies, but also by offering higher lifetime wages that attract more workers which allows to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with empirical regularities. The model also captures several other observations about firm size, job flows, and pay. In contrast to bargaining models, efficiency obtains on all margins of job creation and destruction, both with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The planner solution allows a tractable characterization which is useful for computational applications.labor market search, multi-worker firms, job creation and job destruction

Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

The introduction of firm size into labor search models raises the question how wages are set when average and marginal product differ. We develop and analyze an alternative to the existing bargaining framework: Firms compete for labor by publicly posting long-term contracts. In such a competitive search setting, firms achieve faster growth not only by posting more vacancies, but also by offering higher lifetime wages that attract more workers which allows to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with empirical regularities.The model also captures several other observations about firm size, job flows, and pay. In contrast to bargaining models, efficiency obtains on all margins of job creation and destruction, both with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The planner solution allows a tractable characterization which is useful for computational applications.Labour market search, multi-worker firms, job creation and job destruction

Choosy search and the mismatch of talents

This paper proposes a multi-sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector-specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector-specific mean productivity among the pools of job-seekers. Consequently, workers prospect too many market segments, and there is room for public policy even when the so-called Hosios condition holds.Composition effects; Heterogeneity; Segmented markets; Efficiency

Applications and Interviews. A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search

Much of the job search literature assumes bilateral meetings between workers and firms. This ignores the frictions that arise when meetings are actually multilateral. I analyze the magnitude of these frictions by presenting an equilibrium job search model with an endogenous number of contacts. Workers contact firms by applying to vacancies, whereas firms contact applicants by interviewing them. Sending applications and interviewing applicants are costly activities but increase the probability to match. In equilibrium, contract dispersion arises and workers spread their applications over the different contract types. Estimation of the model on the Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects data set provides values for the cost of an application, the cost of an interview, and the value of non-market time. Frictions on the worker and the firm side are estimated to each cause approximately half of the 4.7% output loss compared to a Walrasian world. I show that in the estimated equilibrium welfare is improved if unemployed workers increase their search intensity.Directed Search, Recruitment, Stable Matching, Labor Market Frictions, Structural Estimation, Efficiency, Policy Analysis