Confronting the challenges of whale avoidance by large vessels to reduce collision risk: A quantitative approach

Disturbance of wildlife by human transportation infrastructure is ubiquitous. This type of human-wildlife conflict has the potential to negatively impact wildlife population growth rates, especially for at-risk species like large whales. While many whale populations are rebounding as a result of a moratorium on commercial whaling, increasing ship traffic constitutes a significant threat to whale conservation efforts in the form of ship-whale collisions (“ship strikes”). Ship strike avoidance is difficult because vessel operators can only see whales when they are breaking the surface of the water, or “available for detection,” and even then, they will only see them a fraction of the time (the “perception process”). We investigated the ability of ship operators to detect and actively avoid whales by quantifying two processes: the ability of vessel operators to ascertain the direction of travel of whales (Chapter 2), and the varying detection challenges faced by vessel operators as whales move through the “strike zone” (Chapter 3). In Chapter 2, we modeled the ability of vessel operators to congruously determine whale direction of travel as a function of ship-to-whale distance and the number of surfacings in a bout. We found that the probability of making a congruous DT assignment increased as surfacing bout length increased and as ship-to-whale distance decreased. We also modeled the time it took vessel operators to make a DT assignment after the first sighting of a whale, and found that the probability of making a DT assignment was around 0.5 after three minutes had passed. In Chapter 3, we modeled the probabilities of whales entering and exiting the upper portion of the water column where they are at risk of ship strike (the “strike zone”), as well as the availability probability. We found that whales are present and undetected in the strike zone far more frequently than they are available for detection, which has important consequences for ship strike avoidance protocols and regulations

Supporting Intelligent and Trustworthy Maritime Path Planning Decisions

The risk of maritime collisions and groundings has dramatically increased in the past five years despite technological advancements such as GPS-based navigation tools and electronic charts which may add to, instead of reduce, workload. We propose that an automated path planning tool for littoral navigation can reduce workload and improve overall system efficiency, particularly under time pressure. To this end, a Maritime Automated Path Planner (MAPP) was developed, incorporating information requirements developed from a cognitive task analysis, with special emphasis on designing for trust. Human-in-the-loop experimental results showed that MAPP was successful in reducing the time required to generate an optimized path, as well as reducing path lengths. The results also showed that while users gave the tool high acceptance ratings, they rated the MAPP as average for trust, which we propose is the appropriate level of trust for such a system.This work was sponsored by Rite Solutions Inc., Assett Inc., Mikel Inc., and the Office of Naval Research. We would also like to thank Northeast Maritime Institute, the MIT NROTC detachment, the crew of the USS New Hampshire, and the anonymous reviewers whose comments significantly improved the paper

Towards an understanding of the consequences of technology-driven decision support for maritime navigation

The maritime industry is undergoing a transformation driven by digitalization and connectivity. There is speculation that in the next two decades the maritime industry will witness changes far exceeding those experienced over the past 100 years. While change is inevitable in the maritime domain, technological developments do not guarantee navigational safety, efficiency, or improved seaway traffic management. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted the Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) concept to define autonomy on a scale from Degrees 1 through 4.\ua0 Investigations into the impact of MASS on various aspects of the maritime sociotechnical system is currently ongoing by academic and industry stakeholders. However, the early adoption of MASS (Degree 1), which is classified as a crewed ship with decision support, remains largely unexplored. Decision support systems are intended to support operator decision-making and improve operator performance. In practice they can cause unintended changes throughout other elements of the maritime sociotechnical system. In the maritime industry, the human is seldom put first in technology design which paradoxically introduces human-automation challenges related to technology acceptance, use, trust, reliance, and risk. The co-existence of humans and automation, as it pertains to navigation and navigational assistance, is explored throughout this thesis. The aims of this thesis are (1) to understand how decision support will impact navigation and navigational assistance from the operator’s perspective and (2) to explore a framework to help reduce the gaps between the design and use of decision support technologies. This thesis advocates for a human-centric approach to automation design and development while exploring the broader impacts upon the maritime sociotechnical system. This work considers three different projects and four individual data collection efforts during 2017-2022. This research took place in Gothenburg, Sweden, and Warsash, UK and includes data from 65 Bridge Officers (navigators) and 16 Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operators. Two testbeds were used to conduct the research in several full mission bridge simulators, and a virtual reality environment. A mixed methods approach, with a heavier focus on qualitative data, was adopted to understand the research problem. Methodological tools included literature reviews, observations, questionnaires, ship maneuvering data, collective interviews, think-aloud protocol, and consultation with subject matter experts. The data analysis included thematic analysis, subject matter expert consultation, and descriptive statistics.\ua0The results show that operators perceive that decision support will impact their work, but not necessarily as expected. The operators’ positive and negative perceptions are discussed within the frameworks of human-automation interaction, decision-making, and systems thinking. The results point towards gaps in work as it is intended to be done and work as it is done in the user’s context. A user-driven design framework is proposed which allows for a systematic, flexible, and iterative design process capable of testing new technologies while involving all stakeholders. These results have led to the identification of several research gaps in relation to the overall preparedness of the shipping industry to manage the evolution toward smarter ships. This thesis will discuss these findings and advocate for human-centered automation within the quickly evolving maritime industry

Constrained Autonomy for a Better Human–Automation Interface

The concept of autonomous or uncrewed ships is not new. Japan investigated remote control of ships in the “Highly reliable intelligent ship” project from 1982 to 1988 (Hasegawa 2004). The rocket launching platform L/P Odyssey, classified as a mobile offshore unit (MOU), was remotely controlled during the launch phase. Thus, it operated as a de facto uncrewed ship in international waters from 1999 to 2014 (Tass 2018). The first large-scale study on uncrewed and autonomous merchant ships was the EU project MUNIN, running from 2012 to 2015 (Rødseth & Burmeister 2012). Since then, there has been a steady increase in new investigations and concept studies. M/S Yara Birkeland is probably the best known and is at the time of writing planned to operate autonomously and uncrewed from 2022 (Yara 2018). A major benefit of ship autonomy is that the ship can be uncrewed, although uncrewed operation can also be achieved through remote control as for L/P Odyssey. Uncrewed ships save capital cost when removing the living quarters and life support systems from the ship; it can save crew cost and it allows new and innovative designs of the ship (Rødseth 2018).publishedVersio