Neutral candidates in approval and disapproval vote

In this article, the question is to select the “best” candidates within a set of candidates when voters cast approval-disapproval ternary ballots. That is, three options are offered to voters: casting a vote “in favor”, a “neutral” vote or a vote “against” each candidate. We first review desirable properties that a rule aggregating approval-disapproval ternary ballots should satisfy. We check whether the rules that have been proposed in the literature satisfy them. Then, we provide comparable axiomatizations of three rules: one is the lexicographical extension of the Approval rule for binary ballots; the second is the lexicographical extension of the Disapproval rule for binary ballots; and the third rule eliminates candidates with more opponents and fewer supporters than other candidates.The support of the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad under project ECO2015-67519-P, and of the Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura from the Basque Government (Research Group IT568-13) is gratefully acknowledged

Voting and expressing dissatisfaction: an experiment during the 2017 French Presidential election

This paper reports an experiment realised with 850 electors during the 2017 French presidential election. It tested a ballot di¤erent from the official one. Instead of voting for a unique candidate, participants were asked to cast one vote on each candidate. The vote could be "in favor", "neutral" or "against". The theoretical advantages of such a ballot are discussed and tested empirically.The support of the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad under project ECO2015-67519-P, and of the Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura from the Basque Government (Research Group IT568-13) is also gratefully acknowledged

Neutral candidates in approval and disapproval vote

In this article, the question is to select the “best” candidates within a set of candidates when voters cast approval-disapproval ternary ballots. That is, three options are offered to voters: casting a vote “in favor”, a “neutral” vote or a vote “against” each candidate. We first review desirable properties that a rule aggregating approval-disapproval ternary ballots should satisfy. We check whether the rules that have been proposed in the literature satisfy them. Then, we provide comparable axiomatizations of three rules: one is the lexicographical extension of the Approval rule for binary ballots; the second is the lexicographical extension of the Disapproval rule for binary ballots; and the third rule eliminates candidates with more opponents and fewer supporters than other candidates.The support of the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad under project ECO2015-67519-P, and of the Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura from the Basque Government (Research Group IT568-13) is gratefully acknowledged

Voting and expressing dissatisfaction: an experiment during the 2017 French Presidential election

This paper reports an experiment realised with 850 electors during the 2017 French presidential election. It tested a ballot di¤erent from the official one. Instead of voting for a unique candidate, participants were asked to cast one vote on each candidate. The vote could be "in favor", "neutral" or "against". The theoretical advantages of such a ballot are discussed and tested empirically.The support of the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad under project ECO2015-67519-P, and of the Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura from the Basque Government (Research Group IT568-13) is also gratefully acknowledged

Insulating Incumbent Judges from the Vicissitudes of the Political Arena: Retention Elections as a Viable Alternative

This Note proposes legislation that would cure many deficiencies in the present system of judicial tenure in New York. First, the Note examines the present retention system for trial court judges in New York State in light of the strict standards of judicial ethics the CJC imposes on sitting judges. Part II analyzes several problems in the current reelection process, focusing on the complex predicament a judicial incumbent faces as a result of having to return to the political arena. Part III then explores three possible alternatives to the present reelection system.\u27 Finally, the Note recommends that the New York State Legislature amend the state constitution and implement a method of retention that would allow a sitting judge to remain in office with the approval of the voters without being subject to a primary or general election

The Expressive Case against Plurality Rule

The U.S. election in November 2016 raised and amplified doubts about first-past-the-post (“plurality rule”) electoral systems. Arguments against plurality rule and for alternatives like preferential voting tend to be consequentialist: it is argued that systems like preferential voting produce different, better outcomes. After briefly noting why the consequentialist case against plurality rule is more complex and contentious than it first appears, I offer an expressive alternative: plurality rule produces actual or apparent dilemmas for voters in ways that are morally objectionable, and avoidable under preferential voting systems. This expressive case against plurality rule is both simpler and more ecumenical than its consequentialist counterpart, and it provides strong reasons to prefer alternatives to plurality rule. Moreover, it suggests a distinct way of evaluating different alternatives like preferential voting

Supreme Court as Superweapon: A Response to Epps & Sitaraman

Is the Supreme Court\u27s legitimacy in crisis? Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman argue that it is. In their Feature, How to Save the Supreme Court, they suggest legally radical reforms to restore a politically moderate Court. Unfortunately, their proposals might destroy the Court\u27s legitimacy in order to save it. And their case that there is any crisis may fail to persuade a reader with different legal or political priors. If the Supreme Court needs saving, it will be saving from itself, and from too broad a conception of its own legal omnipotence. A Court that seems unbound by legal principle is too powerful a weapon to leave lying around in a democracy; we should start thinking about disarmament

Assessing the Impeachment of President Bill Clinton from a Post 9/11 Perspective

The impeachment of President Clinton was more a circus than a serious effort to remove the President of the United States. The reason is simple: Few people--in the Congress or the country--wanted to remove him or believed the impeachment effort would actually result in his removal. Instead, it was a partisan political effort to embarrass Clinton and send a message of disapproval. Congress was attaching a scarlet letter. But this was an indulgence that posed considerable danger that few in Congress considered. In particular, few tried to assess the potential impact this use of the process would have on the President\u27s ability to govern and be Commander in Chief. This article will argue that such a frivolous use of the impeachment process is inappropriate and dangerous, especially in a post 9/11 world. The framers of the Constitution had it right; impeachment is a drastic remedy to be invoked only as last resort. This article will compare the Clinton impeachment with the two prior efforts to impeach a president: Andrew Johnson in the 1860\u27s and Richard Nixon in the 1970\u27s. In that comparison, it will note that, unlike the Clinton impeachment, those were serious efforts to remove a president from office, not merely attach a scarlet letter. Finally, it will assess what factors allowed this misuse of the impeachment process and how we can avoid it in the future. It will suggest that the exuberance of the 1990s, the apparent absence of outside enemies at the time, and the security of seats in the House of Representatives (so-called safe legislative seats ) contributed to this nonchalant--and dangerous--attitude toward impeachment. September 11, 2001 changed some of those factors, but not all

Show Me the Money: The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and the Quest for Effective Executive Compensation Reform

This Note discusses past attempts to combat growing levels of executive compensation, analyzes the role of both shareholders and directors in the compensation-setting process, and discusses conflicting views concerning shareholder-director power, the disclosure mechanism, and the pay-ratio metric. Finally, this Note balances these views by proposing alterations to the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule that preserve the long-standing corporate structure, while also offering shareholders an accountability mechanism to enhance the Rule’s intended results