Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law

This Article is about “big data” and antitrust law. Big data, for my purposes, refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of consumer data by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct but to economies of scale. This Article discusses three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require a reform of the antitrust laws. Some are described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v. American Express Co., should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law. I. Introduction II. Platforms III. Competition Issues ... A. Kill Zone Expropriation ... B. Acquisition of Nascent Rivals ... C. Denial of Access to Data IV. Antitrust Law V. Conclusio

Digital Platforms and Algorithmic Subjectivities

Algorithms are a form of productive power – so how may we conceptualise the newly merged terrains of social life, economy and self in a world of digital platforms? How do multiple self-quantifying practices interact with questions of class, race and gender? This edited collection considers algorithms at work – for what purposes encoded data about behaviour, attitudes, dispositions, relationships and preferences are deployed – and black box control, platform society theory and the formation of subjectivities. It details technological structures and lived experience of algorithms and the operation of platforms in areas such as crypto-finance, production, surveillance, welfare, activism in pandemic times. Finally, it asks if platform cooperativism, collaborative design and neomutualism offer new visions. Even as problems with labour and in society mount, subjectivities and counter subjectivities here produced appear as conscious participants of change and not so much the servants of algorithmic control and dominant platforms

Home care and digital platforms in Spain

The introduction of the Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y Atención a las Personas en Situación de Dependencia, LAPAD (Promotion of the Autonomy and Care of People in a Situation of Dependency Law, LAPAD) in 2006 represented a major step forward with its universal recognition of the right to care. However, cuts in funding in subsequent years have severely limited the law's potential, and the gap between demand and services offered continues to widen. This means today, the care of the elderly and dependent continues to be a responsibility largely borne by women in the family. They either have to employ someone else (another woman, often foreign) to do the job or do it themselves

Business Model Configurations for Digital Platform Success - Towards a Typology of Digital Platform Business Models

Competition between digital platforms is harder compared to non-platform businesses. Fierce platform competition reduces digital platforms’ chances of success. Research has identified many aspects of digital platforms and their surrounding ecosystem that influence the success of digital platforms. This research is comprehensive but not integrated. The business model as an activity system provides a lens to orchestrate various dimensions of digital platforms. We conduct a case survey of published case studies on digital platforms and analyze their business models using a multi-value qualitative comparative analysis. The resulting business model configurations reveal how surviving digital platforms combine different value propositions, value capture mechanisms, and value creation strategies. We identify four configurations of digital platform business models (matching, spreading, innovating, and dominating business models) leading to digital platform success (i.e., survival). In our future research, we will identify more detailed business model configurations using a larger case sample

Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms

We analyze digital markets where a monopolist platform uses data to match multiproduct sellers with heterogeneous consumers who can purchase both on and o§ the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their values. The revenueoptimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences e¢ ciently. In equilibrium, sellers o§er higher qualities at lower unit prices on than o§ the platform. Privacy-respecting data-governance rules such as organic search results or federated learning can lead to welfare gains for consumers

Taxonomy of Digital Platforms: A Platform Architecture Perspective

Digital platforms—technical core artefacts augmented by peripheral third-party derivatives—afford organizations to integrate resources in networked business ecosystems. Although digital platforms widely differ in their configurations, digital platforms’ dimensions and characteristics to disentangle different digital platform configurations are under-researched. To bridge this void, we employ Nickerson et al.’s method for taxonomy development to systematically derive a taxonomy of digital platforms. Specifically, we embrace a platform architecture perspective to capture the configuration of digital platform’s components. The resultant taxonomy facilitates a more pronounced understanding and grouping of digital platforms as configurations of certain dimensions and characteristics. Our findings suggest that digital platforms exhibit characteristics on at least four dimensions—namely, infrastructure, core, ecosystem, and service dimensions. Second, through instantiating the taxonomy, we find that digital platforms that exhibit similar characteristics share identical architectural profiles and, therefore, belong to one of three digital platform archetypes—namely, orchestration, amalgamation, and innovation platforms

Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law

This is a paper about “big data” and antitrust law. For my purposes, big data refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of data on those consumers by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct but to economies of scale. I discuss three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require a reform of the antitrust laws. Some are described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v. Amex, should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law