Anvil or Onion? Determinism as a Layered Concept

Stephen Kellert (1993) has argued that Laplacean determinism in classical physics is actually a layered concept, where various properties or layers composing this form of determinism can be peeled away. Here, I argue that a layered conception of determinism is inappropriate and that we should think in terms of different deterministic models applicable to different kinds of systems. The upshot of this analysis is that the notion of state is more closely tied to the kind of system being investigated than is usually considered in discussions of determinism. So when investigating determinism corresponding changes to the appropriate notion of state–and, perhaps, the state space itself–also need to be considered

Defining determinism

The article puts forward a branching - style framework for the analysis of determinism and indeterminism of scientific theories, starting from the core idea that an indeterministic system is one whose present allows for more than one alternative possible future. We describe how a definition of determinism stated in terms of branching models supplements and improves current treatments of determinism of theories of physics. In these treatments, we identify three main approaches: one based on the study of (differential) equations, one based on mappings between temporal realizations, and one based on branching models. We first give an overview of these approaches and show that current orthodoxy advocates a combination of the mapping- and the equations - based approaches. After giving a detailed formal explication of a branching - based definition of determinism, we consider three concrete applications and end with a formal comparison of the branching- and the mapping-based approach. We conclude that the branching - based definition of determinism most usefully combines formal clarity, connection with an underlying philosophical notion of determinism, and relevance for the practical assessment of theories

Toward a Demarcation of Forms of Determinism

In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms

Rhetorical Determinism

Economists included knowledge their models to improve their explanatory accuracy. A major step was to describe the production of knowledge as well as its exploitation as an internal part of economic models. Politicians prefer to talk about a new kind of economy so they can sustain the myth of progress. Rather than explain economies using a new model they try to leave economic history intact while describing the future using the new and different model. Once the knowledge economy became a progressive new entity and embedded in political rhetoric at the highest level, institutions competing for resources have to adopt the vocabulary and redefine themselves as knowledge organisations. As more and more professions, firms and organisations described their activities in terms of the new knowledge economy, so performatively the knowledge economy became part of political reality. Knowledge is metaphysical. If it has any kind of existence then it is embodied and projected through the skills of the knowers. Since technology connects with all human activity, the reformulation of institutions and priorities demands changes to descriptions of what technology is. Knowledge is at one end of a spectrum. Whim is at the other end. It makes little difference to economic models what the algebraic terms are called. Talk of the knowledge economy is therefore simply a way of saying our cultures and therefore our technologies are dynamic

Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences

This article shows how the social sciences, particularly human geography, rejected hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century largely on the deontological basis that it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom been recognized in the social sciences. Thus many current social science and human geography views on determinism and social justice are antiquated, ignoring numerous common and well-respected arguments within philosophy that hard determinism can be reconciled with a just society. We support this argument by briefly tracing the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social sciences and the deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. The purpose of the article is to resituate social science and human geography debates on determinism and social justice within a modern ethical framework

“Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”

In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism (TD) Ted Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the consequences of determinism.” The critical question he aims to answer is what follows if determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompatible with the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility. It is Honderich’s aim to provide a solution to “the problem of the consequences of determinism” and a key element of this is his articulation and defence of an alternative response to the implications of determinism that collapses the familiar Compatibilist/Incompatibilist dichotomy. Honderich offers us a third way – the response of “Affirmation” (HFY 125-6). Although his account of Affirmation has application and relevance to issues and features beyond freedom and responsibility, my primary concern in this essay will be to examine Honderich’s theory of “Affirmation” as it concerns the free will problem

An Inchoate Universe: James's Probabilistic Underdeterminism

In this paper, I challenge the traditional narrative that William James’s arguments against determinism were primarily motivated by his personal struggles with depression. I argue that James presents an alternative argument against determinism that is motivated by his commitment to sound scientific practice. James argues that determinism illegitimately extrapolates from observations of past events to predictions about future events without acknowledging the distinct metaphysical difference between them. This occupation with futurity suggests that James’s true target is better understood as logical determinism rather than causal determinism. This has consequences for James’s proposed alternative, which I call his probabilistic underdeterminism, a conception of the universe that is built on chance, choice, and a local teleology. All of this forms part of a broader criticism of the scientific practices of his day based on their widespread failure to acknowledge the distorting effects of observation on that which is observed

Denotational, Causal, and Operational Determinism in Event Structures

Determinism is a theoretically and practically important concept in labelled transition systems and trees. We study its generalisation to event structures. It turns out that the result depends on what characterising property of tree determinism one sets out to generalise. We present three distinct notions of event structure determinism, and show that none of them shares all the pleasant properties of the one concept for trees