3,386 research outputs found
Security of GPS/INS based On-road Location Tracking Systems
Location information is critical to a wide-variety of navigation and tracking
applications. Today, GPS is the de-facto outdoor localization system but has
been shown to be vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks. Inertial Navigation
Systems (INS) are emerging as a popular complementary system, especially in
road transportation systems as they enable improved navigation and tracking as
well as offer resilience to wireless signals spoofing, and jamming attacks. In
this paper, we evaluate the security guarantees of INS-aided GPS tracking and
navigation for road transportation systems. We consider an adversary required
to travel from a source location to a destination, and monitored by a INS-aided
GPS system. The goal of the adversary is to travel to alternate locations
without being detected. We developed and evaluated algorithms that achieve such
goal, providing the adversary significant latitude. Our algorithms build a
graph model for a given road network and enable us to derive potential
destinations an attacker can reach without raising alarms even with the
INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation system. The algorithms render the
gyroscope and accelerometer sensors useless as they generate road trajectories
indistinguishable from plausible paths (both in terms of turn angles and roads
curvature). We also designed, built, and demonstrated that the magnetometer can
be actively spoofed using a combination of carefully controlled coils. We
implemented and evaluated the impact of the attack using both real-world and
simulated driving traces in more than 10 cities located around the world. Our
evaluations show that it is possible for an attacker to reach destinations that
are as far as 30 km away from the true destination without being detected. We
also show that it is possible for the adversary to reach almost 60-80% of
possible points within the target region in some cities
Satellite Navigation for the Age of Autonomy
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) brought navigation to the masses.
Coupled with smartphones, the blue dot in the palm of our hands has forever
changed the way we interact with the world. Looking forward, cyber-physical
systems such as self-driving cars and aerial mobility are pushing the limits of
what localization technologies including GNSS can provide. This autonomous
revolution requires a solution that supports safety-critical operation,
centimeter positioning, and cyber-security for millions of users. To meet these
demands, we propose a navigation service from Low Earth Orbiting (LEO)
satellites which deliver precision in-part through faster motion, higher power
signals for added robustness to interference, constellation autonomous
integrity monitoring for integrity, and encryption / authentication for
resistance to spoofing attacks. This paradigm is enabled by the 'New Space'
movement, where highly capable satellites and components are now built on
assembly lines and launch costs have decreased by more than tenfold. Such a
ubiquitous positioning service enables a consistent and secure standard where
trustworthy information can be validated and shared, extending the electronic
horizon from sensor line of sight to an entire city. This enables the
situational awareness needed for true safe operation to support autonomy at
scale.Comment: 11 pages, 8 figures, 2020 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation
Symposium (PLANS
An Integrated Framework for Sensing Radio Frequency Spectrum Attacks on Medical Delivery Drones
Drone susceptibility to jamming or spoofing attacks of GPS, RF, Wi-Fi, and
operator signals presents a danger to future medical delivery systems. A
detection framework capable of sensing attacks on drones could provide the
capability for active responses. The identification of interference attacks has
applicability in medical delivery, disaster zone relief, and FAA enforcement
against illegal jamming activities. A gap exists in the literature for solo or
swarm-based drones to identify radio frequency spectrum attacks. Any
non-delivery specific function, such as attack sensing, added to a drone
involves a weight increase and additional complexity; therefore, the value must
exceed the disadvantages. Medical delivery, high-value cargo, and disaster zone
applications could present a value proposition which overcomes the additional
costs. The paper examines types of attacks against drones and describes a
framework for designing an attack detection system with active response
capabilities for improving the reliability of delivery and other medical
applications.Comment: 7 pages, 1 figures, 5 table
Galileo and EGNOS as an asset for UTM safety and security
GAUSS (Galileo-EGNOS as an Asset for UTM Safety and Security) is a H2020 project1 that aims at designing and developing high performance positioning systems for drones within the U-Space framework focusing on UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) VLL (Very Low Level) operations. The key element within GAUSS is the integration and exploitation of Galileo and EGNOS exceptional features in terms of accuracy, integrity and security, which will be key assets for the safety of current and future drone operations. More concretely, high accuracy, authentication, precise timing (among others) are key GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) enablers of future integrated drone operations under UTM (UAS Traffic Management) operations, which in Europe will be deployed under U-Space [1].
The U-Space concept helps control, manage and integrate all UAS in the VLL airspace to ensure the security and efficiency of UAS operations. GAUSS will enable not only safe, timely and efficient operations but also coordination among a higher number of RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft System) in the air with the appropriate levels of security, as it will improve anti-jamming and anti-spoofing capabilities through a multi-frequency and multi-constellation approach and Galileo authentication operations.
The GAUSS system will be validated with two field trials in two different UTM real scenarios (in-land and sea) with the operation of a minimum of four UTM coordinated UAS from different types (fixed and rotary wing), manoeuvrability and EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) operational categories. The outcome of the project will consist of Galileo-EGNOS based technological solutions to enhance safety and security levels in both, current UAS and future UTM operations. Increased levels of efficiency, reliability, safety, and security in UAS operations are key enabling features to foster the EU UAS regulation, market development and full acceptance by the society.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Authentication of Satellite Navigation Signals by Wiretap Coding and Artificial Noise
In order to combat the spoofing of global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
signals we propose a novel approach for satellite signal authentication based
on information-theoretic security. In particular we superimpose to the
navigation signal an authentication signal containing a secret message
corrupted by artificial noise (AN), still transmitted by the satellite. We
impose the following properties: a) the authentication signal is synchronous
with the navigation signal, b) the authentication signal is orthogonal to the
navigation signal and c) the secret message is undecodable by the attacker due
to the presence of the AN. The legitimate receiver synchronizes with the
navigation signal and stores the samples of the authentication signal with the
same synchronization. After the transmission of the authentication signal,
through a separate public asynchronous authenticated channel (e.g., a secure
Internet connection) additional information is made public allowing the
receiver to a) decode the secret message, thus overcoming the effects of AN,
and b) verify the secret message. We assess the performance of the proposed
scheme by the analysis of both the secrecy capacity of the authentication
message and the attack success probability, under various attack scenarios. A
comparison with existing approaches shows the effectiveness of the proposed
scheme
Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Implementation, Performance, and Research Challenges
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are on the verge of practical
deployment. Nonetheless, their security and privacy protection is one of the
problems that have been addressed only recently. In order to show the
feasibility of secure VC, certain implementations are required. In [1] we
discuss the design of a VC security system that has emerged as a result of the
European SeVeCom project. In this second paper, we discuss various issues
related to the implementation and deployment aspects of secure VC systems.
Moreover, we provide an outlook on open security research issues that will
arise as VC systems develop from today's simple prototypes to full-fledged
systems
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