3,406 research outputs found
Unsupervised Anomaly-based Malware Detection using Hardware Features
Recent works have shown promise in using microarchitectural execution
patterns to detect malware programs. These detectors belong to a class of
detectors known as signature-based detectors as they catch malware by comparing
a program's execution pattern (signature) to execution patterns of known
malware programs. In this work, we propose a new class of detectors -
anomaly-based hardware malware detectors - that do not require signatures for
malware detection, and thus can catch a wider range of malware including
potentially novel ones. We use unsupervised machine learning to build profiles
of normal program execution based on data from performance counters, and use
these profiles to detect significant deviations in program behavior that occur
as a result of malware exploitation. We show that real-world exploitation of
popular programs such as IE and Adobe PDF Reader on a Windows/x86 platform can
be detected with nearly perfect certainty. We also examine the limits and
challenges in implementing this approach in face of a sophisticated adversary
attempting to evade anomaly-based detection. The proposed detector is
complementary to previously proposed signature-based detectors and can be used
together to improve security.Comment: 1 page, Latex; added description for feature selection in Section 4,
results unchange
Applications of Machine Learning to Threat Intelligence, Intrusion Detection and Malware
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are emerging technologies with applications to many fields. This paper is a survey of use cases of ML for threat intelligence, intrusion detection, and malware analysis and detection. Threat intelligence, especially attack attribution, can benefit from the use of ML classification. False positives from rule-based intrusion detection systems can be reduced with the use of ML models. Malware analysis and classification can be made easier by developing ML frameworks to distill similarities between the malicious programs. Adversarial machine learning will also be discussed, because while ML can be used to solve problems or reduce analyst workload, it also introduces new attack surfaces
Reviewer Integration and Performance Measurement for Malware Detection
We present and evaluate a large-scale malware detection system integrating
machine learning with expert reviewers, treating reviewers as a limited
labeling resource. We demonstrate that even in small numbers, reviewers can
vastly improve the system's ability to keep pace with evolving threats. We
conduct our evaluation on a sample of VirusTotal submissions spanning 2.5 years
and containing 1.1 million binaries with 778GB of raw feature data. Without
reviewer assistance, we achieve 72% detection at a 0.5% false positive rate,
performing comparable to the best vendors on VirusTotal. Given a budget of 80
accurate reviews daily, we improve detection to 89% and are able to detect 42%
of malicious binaries undetected upon initial submission to VirusTotal.
Additionally, we identify a previously unnoticed temporal inconsistency in the
labeling of training datasets. We compare the impact of training labels
obtained at the same time training data is first seen with training labels
obtained months later. We find that using training labels obtained well after
samples appear, and thus unavailable in practice for current training data,
inflates measured detection by almost 20 percentage points. We release our
cluster-based implementation, as well as a list of all hashes in our evaluation
and 3% of our entire dataset.Comment: 20 papers, 11 figures, accepted at the 13th Conference on Detection
of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA 2016
Dynamic Analysis of Executables to Detect and Characterize Malware
It is needed to ensure the integrity of systems that process sensitive
information and control many aspects of everyday life. We examine the use of
machine learning algorithms to detect malware using the system calls generated
by executables-alleviating attempts at obfuscation as the behavior is monitored
rather than the bytes of an executable. We examine several machine learning
techniques for detecting malware including random forests, deep learning
techniques, and liquid state machines. The experiments examine the effects of
concept drift on each algorithm to understand how well the algorithms
generalize to novel malware samples by testing them on data that was collected
after the training data. The results suggest that each of the examined machine
learning algorithms is a viable solution to detect malware-achieving between
90% and 95% class-averaged accuracy (CAA). In real-world scenarios, the
performance evaluation on an operational network may not match the performance
achieved in training. Namely, the CAA may be about the same, but the values for
precision and recall over the malware can change significantly. We structure
experiments to highlight these caveats and offer insights into expected
performance in operational environments. In addition, we use the induced models
to gain a better understanding about what differentiates the malware samples
from the goodware, which can further be used as a forensics tool to understand
what the malware (or goodware) was doing to provide directions for
investigation and remediation.Comment: 9 pages, 6 Tables, 4 Figure
Adversarial Detection of Flash Malware: Limitations and Open Issues
During the past four years, Flash malware has become one of the most
insidious threats to detect, with almost 600 critical vulnerabilities targeting
Adobe Flash disclosed in the wild. Research has shown that machine learning can
be successfully used to detect Flash malware by leveraging static analysis to
extract information from the structure of the file or its bytecode. However,
the robustness of Flash malware detectors against well-crafted evasion attempts
- also known as adversarial examples - has never been investigated. In this
paper, we propose a security evaluation of a novel, representative Flash
detector that embeds a combination of the prominent, static features employed
by state-of-the-art tools. In particular, we discuss how to craft adversarial
Flash malware examples, showing that it suffices to manipulate the
corresponding source malware samples slightly to evade detection. We then
empirically demonstrate that popular defense techniques proposed to mitigate
evasion attempts, including re-training on adversarial examples, may not always
be sufficient to ensure robustness. We argue that this occurs when the feature
vectors extracted from adversarial examples become indistinguishable from those
of benign data, meaning that the given feature representation is intrinsically
vulnerable. In this respect, we are the first to formally define and
quantitatively characterize this vulnerability, highlighting when an attack can
be countered by solely improving the security of the learning algorithm, or
when it requires also considering additional features. We conclude the paper by
suggesting alternative research directions to improve the security of
learning-based Flash malware detectors
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