20 research outputs found
Derandomization of auctions
We study the role of randomization in seller optimal (i.e., profit maximization) auctions. Bayesian optimal auctions (e.g., Myerson, 1981) assume that the valuations of the agents are random draws from a distribution and prior-free optimal auctions either are randomized (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2006) or assume the valuations are randomized (e.g., Segal, 2003). Is randomization fundamental to profit maximization in auctions? Our main result is a general approach to derandomize single-item multi-unit unit-demand auctions while approximately preserving their performance (i.e., revenue). Our general technique is constructive but not computationally tractable. We complement the general result with the explicit and computationally-simple derandomization of a particular auction. Our results are obtained through analogy to hat puzzles that are interesting in their own right
Computing optimal strategies for a cooperative hat game
We consider a `hat problem' in which each player has a randomly placed stack
of black and white hats on their heads, visible to the other player, but not
the wearer. Each player must guess a hat position on their head with the goal
of both players guessing a white hat. We address the question of finding the
optimal strategy, i.e., the one with the highest probability of winning, for
this game. We provide an overview of prior work on this question, and describe
several strategies that give the best known lower bound on the probability of
winning. Upper bounds are also considered here
Optimal Competitive Auctions
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in
unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic
problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it
requires no probabilistic assumptions on buyers' valuations and employs the
framework of competitive analysis. Our objective is to optimize the worst-case
performance of an auction, measured by the ratio between a given benchmark and
revenue generated by the auction.
We establish a sufficient and necessary condition that characterizes
competitive ratios for all monotone benchmarks. The characterization identifies
the worst-case distribution of instances and reveals intrinsic relations
between competitive ratios and benchmarks in the competitive analysis. With the
characterization at hand, we show optimal competitive auctions for two natural
benchmarks.
The most well-studied benchmark measures the
envy-free optimal revenue where at least two buyers win. Goldberg et al. [13]
showed a sequence of lower bounds on the competitive ratio for each number of
buyers n. They conjectured that all these bounds are tight. We show that
optimal competitive auctions match these bounds. Thus, we confirm the
conjecture and settle a central open problem in the design of digital goods
auctions. As one more application we examine another economically meaningful
benchmark, which measures the optimal revenue across all limited-supply Vickrey
auctions. We identify the optimal competitive ratios to be
for each number of buyers n, that is as
approaches infinity
A tree formulation for signaling games
The paper has as a starting point the work of the philosopher Professor D. Lewis. We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. It is shown that there are a number of Bayesian equilibria. We explain which equilibrium is the most likely to prevail. Our explanation provides an essential step for understanding the formation of a language convention. The informational content of signals is discussed and it is shown that a correct action is not always the result of a truthful signal. We allow for this to be reflected in the payoff of the sender. Further, concepts and approaches from neighbouring disciplines, notably economics, suggest themselves immediately for interpreting the results of our analysis (rational expectations, self-fulfilling prophesies)