Fuzzy model of the computer integrated decision support and management system in mineral processing

During the research on the subject of computer integrated systems for decision making and management support in mineral processing based on fuzzy logic, realized at the Department of Applied Computing and System Engineering of the Faculty of Mining and Geology, University of Belgrade, for the needs of doctoral thesis of the first author, and wider demands of the mineral industry, the incompleteness of the developed and contemporary computer integrated systems fuzzy models was noticed. The paper presents an original model with the seven staged hierarchical monitoring-management structure, in which the shortcomings of the models utilized today were eliminated

Quasi-Einstein metrics on hypersurface families

We construct quasi-Einstein metrics on some hypersurface families. The hypersurfaces are circle bundles over the product of Fano, K\"ahler-Einstein manifolds. The quasi-Einstein metrics are related to various gradient K\"ahler-Ricci solitons constructed by Dancer and Wang and some Hermitian, non-K\"ahler, Einstein metrics constructed by Wang and Wang on the same manifolds.Comment: 11 pages, v2 expanded and references added. To appear in J. Geom. Phy

Variation of complex structures and the stability of K\"ahler-Ricci Solitons

We investigate the linear stability of K\"ahler-Ricci solitons for perturbations induced by varying the complex structure within a fixed K\"ahler class. We calculate stability for the known examples of K\"ahler-Ricci solitons.Comment: 13 pages v2 added reference to work of Y. Wan

Horwich on meaning and use

Paul Horwich claims that theories of meaning ought to accommodate the commonsense intuition that meanings play a part in explaining the use of words. Further, he argues that the view that best does so is that according to which the meaning of a word is constituted by a disposition to accept, in some circumstances, sentences in which it features. I argue that if meanings are construed thus, they will in fact fail to explain the use of words. I also argue that if we insist, as Horwich does, on the commonsense assumption that meanings are a species of entity, all versions of the view that meaning is constituted by our dispositions to use words will have to be rejected. I do not, however, claim that such theories ought to be rejected. My point is that they are incompatible with the requirements of commonsense. Further, I suggest that it is premature to impose such requirements on theories of meaning