Geometric vulnerability of democratic institutions against lobbying: a sociophysics approach

An alternative voting scheme is proposed to fill the democratic gap between a president elected democratically via universal suffrage (deterministic outcome, the actual majority decides), and a president elected by one person randomly selected from the population (probabilistic outcome depending on respective supports). Moving from one voting agent to a group of r randomly selected voting agents reduces the probabilistic character of the outcome. Building r such groups, each one electing its president, to constitute a group of the groups with the r local presidents electing a higher-level president, does reduce further the outcome probabilistic aspect. Repeating the process n times leads to a n-level bottom-up pyramidal structure. The hierarchy top president is still elected with a probability but the distance from a deterministic outcome reduces quickly with increasing n. At a critical value n_{c,r} the outcome turns deterministic recovering the same result a universal suffrage would yield. The scheme yields several social advantages like the distribution of local power to the competing minority making the structure more resilient, yet preserving the presidency allocation to the actual majority. An area is produced around fifty percent for which the president is elected with an almost equiprobability slightly biased in favor of the actual majority. However, our results reveal the existence of a severe geometric vulnerability to lobbying. A tiny lobbying group is able to kill the democratic balance by seizing the presidency democratically. It is sufficient to complete a correlated distribution of a few agents at the hierarchy bottom. Moreover, at the present stage, identifying an actual killing distribution is not feasible, which sheds a disturbing light on the devastating effect geometric lobbying can have on democratic hierarchical institutions.Comment: 52 pages, 22 figures, to appear in Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Science

Conceptualizing Democracy as Preparation for Teaching for Democracy

In this essay, a broad spectrum of the work of influential educational scholars was examined in order to identify crucial components of teaching for democracy. Synthesizing the literature with their experiences as middle level teachers and teacher educators, the authors determined those conceptions that would be most fruitful for moving in-service teachers to enact the more “muscular” concepts that foster civic participation and social justice. This collaboration resulted in the identification of four democratic practices as a foundation for designing a course on teaching for democracy. These included amplification of the voices of historically marginalized people, recognition that those in power must work to meet the needs of those without power, recognition of the advantages of diversity even at the potential expense of efficiency, and collaboration in order to teach for democracy

Sociophysics: A review of Galam models

We review a series of models of sociophysics introduced by Galam and Galam et al in the last 25 years. The models are divided in five different classes, which deal respectively with democratic voting in bottom up hierarchical systems, decision making, fragmentation versus coalitions, terrorism and opinion dynamics. For each class the connexion to the original physical model and technics are outlined underlining both the similarities and the differences. Emphasis is put on the numerous novel and counterintuitive results obtained with respect to the associated social and political framework. Using these models several major real political events were successfully predicted including the victory of the French extreme right party in the 2000 first round of French presidential elections, the voting at fifty - fifty in several democratic countries (Germany, Italy, Mexico), and the victory of the no to the 2005 French referendum on the European constitution. The perspectives and the challenges to make sociophysics a predictive solid field of science are discussed.Comment: 17 pages, 20 figure

Communitarian perspectives on social enterprise

Concepts of social enterprise have been debated repeatedly, and continue to cause confusion. In this paper, a meta-theoretical framework is developed through discussion of individualist and communitarian philosophy. Philosophers from both traditions build social theories that emphasise either consensus (a unitarist outlook) or diversity (a pluralist outlook). The various discourses in corporate governance reflect these assumptions and create four distinct approaches that impact on the relationship between capital and labour. In rejecting the traditional discourse of private enterprise, social enterprises have adopted other approaches to tackle social exclusion, each derived from different underlying beliefs about the purpose of enterprise and the nature of governance. The theoretical framework offers a way to understand the diversity found within the sector, including the newly constituted Community Interest Company (CIC).</p

Lenin’s Lens: The Occupy Movement, an Infantile Disorder?

This paper offers a theoretical critique of the Occupy movement by drawing on V.I. Lenin’s work, Left-wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder (LWC). This work emphasizes the importance of recognizing political power within institutionalized political systems, for example, trade unions and parliamentary democracy. We bring the ideas contained in this work to bear on the Occupy movement by drawing on 20 activist accounts from two UK Occupy camps to argue that the Occupy movement was an earlier phase of a developing political challenge to neoliberalism. In this respect, Occupy was an immature politics unlikely to lead to social change. However, recent research suggests that the creation of a new wave of ‘movement parties’ (della Porta et al., 2017) are a more organized and politically mature response to neoliberal austerity, which to some extent grew out of the mass movement assemblies like the Occupy movement. By applying Lenin’s ideas to analyse the main political practices of Occupy, this paper argues that a Leninist viewpoint could offer some practical improvements towards the political strategy of new movements by being part of a coalition of activists and trade unionists, with the ultimate aim of working within parliamentary democracy

Budgetary processes: a political economy perspective

The response to macro shocks, given the electoral structure, built in perverse incentives that influenced India's development process. The chapter selectively surveys political economic theory, Indian and other country experience to bring out the systemic incentives that affect political behaviour, government budgets, and expenditure. Conceptual categories developed are found useful in interpreting Indian experience. Overtime, conflicts between groups were handled in a way that lowered incentives for expansion of the cake, and led to a short-term focus. Price controls bred inefficiencies, especially after the oil shocks. But there are leverage points for change. Well-coordinated macro policy, including infrastructure spending, with some restraints on political-bureaucratic choices, could create incentives for rapid growth. The latter eases political adjustments. It makes longer-term sustainable re-distribution feasible, and raises returns to choices that improve human capital.perverse political incentives, macro shocks, price controls, political bureaucratic choices

Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia

In this paper, we evaluate the institutional and legal structure of the Colombian government. In particular, we want to assess how a system of institutional checks and balances can be structured to promote the rule of law, preserve property rights, and stimulate economic growth. The 1991 Constitution indeed makes commendable commitments to these objectives. Yet, due to its institutional structure, Colombia is governed in a manner that is both unchecked and unbalanced. The Colombian Constitution is an enormously long document that attempts to reassure all parties that the future will be to their liking. For example, Article 58, which permits uncompensated expropriation for reasons of “equity”, might be a substantial deterrent to investment. The nation’s long run economic health may be seriously impaired if peace is bought at the price of widespread concessions with regard to either the process of decision-making about the economy or to the specific content of future government economic policies. One may buy transitory tranquility, which may not translate in to lasting peace, at the price of long-term instability and turmoil. We make recommendations for institutional reform, which aim to mitigate clientelist and populist trends in Colombian politics. To enhance policymaking by reducing the scope for gridlock, we propose measures such as long-term appointments and ballot accountability that eliminate distortions to the voting incentives of both judges and lawmakers. Also, procedures are set forth to limit undue deliberations by the judiciary and to induce institutional status-quo bias. While we support constitutional provisions for the stability of a political process endowed with representativeness, we reject constitutional provisions that attempt to entrench one particular policy outcome. Stationary policy is likely to be both suboptimal and unsustainable in a stochastic and dynamic environment