Nominal Contracting and Price Flexibility in Product Markets

The search for microeconomic foundations of non-Walrasian outcomes in labor and product markets has spawned many studies of contracting. This paper emphasizes the role of contracts for market equilibrium -- for many raw materials and basic industrial commodities -- in which long-term contractual arrangements and spot markets coexist. Our principal goals are two -- (i) to explain the existence of contracts and the equilibrium fraction of trades carried out under contract, and (ii) to consider the impact of demand and supply shocks on spot prices when market trades also take place through long-term contracts. We find that the relative importance of contracting depends on, inter alia, the variance of the spot price and the sources of underlying fluctuations. Consistent with the findings of previous macroeconomic studies, we find that contracting and price rigidity are more likely the more important demand shocks are relative to supply shocks. We adapt our static model of contract price and quantity determination to discuss the adjustment of contract prices. Finally, we discuss three important applications of our multiple-price modeling structure -- to (i) analyses of the effects of changes in vertical market structure on market equilibrium in commodity markets (with specific reference to petroleum and copper), (ii) models of the optimal degree of contract indexation,and (iii) aggregate studies of "sticky prices" in macroeconomics.

Smallholder Participation in Agricultural Value Chains: Comparative Evidence from Three Continents

Supermarkets, specialized wholesalers, and processors and agro-exporters’ agricultural value chains have begun to transform the marketing channels into which smallholder farmers sell produce in low-income economies. We develop a conceptual framework through which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity-processing firm. We then conduct an empirical meta-analysis of agricultural value chains in five countries across three continents (Ghana, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua). We document patterns of participation, the welfare gains associated with participation, reasons for non-participation, the significant extent of contract non-compliance, and the considerable dynamism of these value chains, as farmers and firms enter and exit frequently.

Long-term vs. Short-term Contracts; A European perspective on natural gas

This paper analyses the economics of long-term gas contracts under changing institutional conditions, mainly gas sector liberalisation. The paper is motivated by the increasingly tense debate in continental Europe, UK and the US on the security of long-term gas supply. We discuss the main issues regarding long-term contracts, i.e. the changing role of the flexibility clause, the effect of abandoning the destination clause, and the strategic behaviour of producers between long-term sales and spot-sales. The literature suggests consumers and producers benefit from risk hedging through long-term contracts. Furthermore long-term contracts may reduce exercise of market power. This was argued to benefit consumers at the ‘expense’ of producers’ profits. Our analysis shows if the long-run demand elasticity is significantly lower than the short-run elasticity, both strategic producers and consumers benefit from lower prices and larger market volume. Some policy implications of the findings are also discussed

FARM-AGRIBUSINESS LINKAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA: EMPOWERING DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES THROUGH LINKS WITH AGRIBUSINESS

Agribusiness, Community/Rural/Urban Development,

Diversification and stabilization in a resource-exporting country

The costs and benefits of export diversification in an old non-oil commodity exporting country are the subject matter of the following analysis. In chapter 2 the causal nexus from commodity price fluctuations to domestic disturbances is developed from well-established macro- and microeconomic theory-. As both structural change and multiple distortions are central to the argument, the analysis is promising only in a quantitative multisectoral general equilibrium framework applied to some appropriate country. The case of copper-exporting Chile will be studied here. The country model is described in chapter 3 and documented in the appendix. The model experiments used for determining the costs and benefits are also designed in chapter 3. The results are presented and discussed in chapter 4 and conclusions are drawn in chapter 5.

Stochastic Viability of Second Generation Biofuel Chains: Micro-economic Spatial Modeling in France

Within an overall project to assess the ability of the agricultural sector to contribute to bioenergy production, we set out here to examine the economic and technological viability of a bioenergy facility in an uncertain economic context, using the stochastic viability approach. We consider two viability constraints: the facility demand for lignocellulosic feedstock has to be satisfied each year and the associated supply cost has to be lower than de profitability threshold of the facility. We assess the viability probability of various supplying strategies consisting in contracting a given share of the feedstock demand with perennial dedicated crops at the initial time and then in making up each year with annual dedicated crops or wood. The demand constraints and agricultural prices scenarios over the time horizon are introduced in an agricultural and forest biomass supply model, which in turns determines the supply cost per MWh and computes the viability probabilities of the various contract strategies. A sensibility analysis to agricultural prices at initial time is performed. Results show that when they are around or under the median (of the 1993–2007 prices), the strategy consisting in contracting 100% of the feedstock supply with perennial dedicated crops is the best one.Biofuel, Biomass production, Spatial economics, Stochastic viability, Monte Carlo simulation, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

ESTABLISHING PEANUT PURCHASING CONTRACT TERMS WITH UNCERTAIN MARKET PRICES AND INPUT SUPPLIES

Demand and Price Analysis,

Smallholder Participation in Agricultural Value Chains: Comparative Evidence from Three Continents

Supermarkets, specialized wholesalers, and processors and agro-exporters’ agricultural value chains have begun to transform the marketing channels into which smallholder farmers sell produce in low-income economies. We develop a conceptual framework through which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity-processing firm. We then conduct an empirical meta-analysis of agricultural value chains in five countries across three continents (Ghana, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua). We document patterns of participation, the welfare gains associated with participation, reasons for non-participation, the significant extent of contract non-compliance, and the considerable dynamism of these value chains, as farmers and firms enter and exit frequently.Agricultural Value Chains, Contract Farming, Africa, Asia, Latin America

Optimal monetary policy and the sacrifice ratio

Monetary policy - United States ; Econometric models

Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA

Three years after the controversial change of the British market design from compulsory Pool with capacity payments to decentralised energy-only New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) market framework, we compare the two designs in terms of investment incentives. We review the biases of the Pool capacity payments design, the drought of investment following the introduction of NETA, and the reaction of the market during the first “stress-test” of NETA during the winter 2003. In an energy-only market such as NETA, it is essential that price signals are right and the system operator has a crucial role in contracting ahead for reserve. We recommend that NETA adopt a single marginal imbalance price as dual imbalance pricing distorts price signals in times of scarcity. The lack of long-term contracting that causes hedging and financing difficulties for power projects can becompensated by vertical and horizontal reintegration at a cost of increased market power