411 research outputs found
Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities
Consider a gambler and a prophet who observe a sequence of independent,
non-negative numbers. The gambler sees the numbers one-by-one whereas the
prophet sees the entire sequence at once. The goal of both is to decide on
fractions of each number they want to keep so as to maximize the weighted
fractional sum of the numbers chosen.
The classic result of Krengel and Sucheston (1977-78) asserts that if both
the gambler and the prophet can pick one number, then the gambler can do at
least half as well as the prophet. Recently, Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) have
generalized this result to settings where the numbers that can be chosen are
subject to a matroid constraint.
In this note we go one step further and show that the bound carries over to
settings where the fractions that can be chosen are subject to a polymatroid
constraint. This bound is tight as it is already tight for the simple setting
where the gambler and the prophet can pick only one number. An interesting
application of our result is in mechanism design, where it leads to improved
results for various problems
Online Contention Resolution Schemes
We introduce a new rounding technique designed for online optimization
problems, which is related to contention resolution schemes, a technique
initially introduced in the context of submodular function maximization. Our
rounding technique, which we call online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs),
is applicable to many online selection problems, including Bayesian online
selection, oblivious posted pricing mechanisms, and stochastic probing models.
It allows for handling a wide set of constraints, and shares many strong
properties of offline contention resolution schemes. In particular, OCRSs for
different constraint families can be combined to obtain an OCRS for their
intersection. Moreover, we can approximately maximize submodular functions in
the online settings we consider.
We, thus, get a broadly applicable framework for several online selection
problems, which improves on previous approaches in terms of the types of
constraints that can be handled, the objective functions that can be dealt
with, and the assumptions on the strength of the adversary. Furthermore, we
resolve two open problems from the literature; namely, we present the first
constant-factor constrained oblivious posted price mechanism for matroid
constraints, and the first constant-factor algorithm for weighted stochastic
probing with deadlines.Comment: 33 pages. To appear in SODA 201
Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information
In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler observes a sequence of
stochastic rewards and must decide, for each reward ,
whether to keep it and stop the game or to forfeit the reward forever and
reveal the next value . The gambler's goal is to obtain a constant
fraction of the expected reward that the optimal offline algorithm would get.
Recently, prophet inequalities have been generalized to settings where the
gambler can choose items, and, more generally, where he can choose any
independent set in a matroid. However, all the existing algorithms require the
gambler to know the distribution from which the rewards are
drawn.
The assumption that the gambler knows the distribution from which
are drawn is very strong. Instead, we work with the much simpler
assumption that the gambler only knows a few samples from this distribution. We
construct the first single-sample prophet inequalities for many settings of
interest, whose guarantees all match the best possible asymptotically,
\emph{even with full knowledge of the distribution}. Specifically, we provide a
novel single-sample algorithm when the gambler can choose any elements
whose analysis is based on random walks with limited correlation. In addition,
we provide a black-box method for converting specific types of solutions to the
related \emph{secretary problem} to single-sample prophet inequalities, and
apply it to several existing algorithms. Finally, we provide a constant-sample
prophet inequality for constant-degree bipartite matchings.
We apply these results to design the first posted-price and multi-dimensional
auction mechanisms with limited information in settings with asymmetric
bidders
Streaming Algorithms for Submodular Function Maximization
We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative submodular set function
subject to a -matchoid
constraint in the single-pass streaming setting. Previous work in this context
has considered streaming algorithms for modular functions and monotone
submodular functions. The main result is for submodular functions that are {\em
non-monotone}. We describe deterministic and randomized algorithms that obtain
a -approximation using -space, where is
an upper bound on the cardinality of the desired set. The model assumes value
oracle access to and membership oracles for the matroids defining the
-matchoid constraint.Comment: 29 pages, 7 figures, extended abstract to appear in ICALP 201
Matroid prophet inequalities and Bayesian mechanism design
Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-44).Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent observation. The famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the distribution of each random variable can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a "prophet" who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. We generalize this result to the setting in which the gambler and the prophet are allowed to make more than one selection, subject to a matroid constraint. We show that the gambler can still achieve at least half as much reward as the prophet; this result is the best possible, since it is known that the ratio cannot be improved even in the original prophet inequality, which corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids. Generalizing the result still further, we show that under an intersection of p matroid constraints, the prophet's reward exceeds the gambler's by a factor of at most 0(p), and this factor is also tight. Beyond their interest as theorems about pure online algoritms or optimal stopping rules, these results also have applications to mechanism design. Our results imply improved bounds on the ability of sequential posted-price mechanisms to approximate optimal mechanisms in both single-parameter and multi-parameter Bayesian settings. In particular, our results imply the first efficiently computable constant-factor approximations to the Bayesian optimal revenue in certain multi-parameter settings. This work was done in collaboration with Robert Kleinberg.by S. Matthew Weinberg.S.M
Order Selection Problems in Hiring Pipelines
Motivated by hiring pipelines, we study two order selection problems in which
applicants for a finite set of positions must be interviewed or made offers
sequentially. There is a finite time budget for interviewing or making offers,
and a stochastic realization after each decision, leading to
computationally-challenging problems. In the first problem we study sequential
interviewing, and show that a computationally-tractable, non-adaptive policy
that must make offers immediately after interviewing is approximately optimal,
assuming offerees always accept their offers. In the second problem, we assume
that applicants have already been interviewed but only accept offers with some
probability; we develop a computationally-tractable policy that makes offers
for the different positions in parallel, which is approximately optimal even
relative to a policy that does not need to make parallel offers. Our two
results both generalize and improve the guarantees in the work of Purohit et
al. on hiring algorithms, from 1/2 and 1/4 to approximation factors that are at
least 1-1/e
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