48 research outputs found
An Approach for Mitigating Denial of Service Attack
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are the most common types of cyber-attack on the internet and are rapidly increasing. Denial of service/distributed denial of service attack is an explicit attempt to make a machine or a network resource unavailable to its intended users. Attackers interrupt/suspend services of the host connected to internet temporarily or indefinitely.It involves saturating the target machine with external communication requests such that it cannot either respond to legitimate traffic or responds so slowly as to be rendered effectively unavailable. Two general form of Dos attacks are - those attacks that crashes services (computer attack) and those that flood services (network attack). Flooding DDoS attacks produce adverse effects for critical infrastructure availability, integrity and confidentiality. Current defense approaches cannot efficiently detect and filter out the attack traffic in real time. Based on the assumption that the attacker flows are very aggressive than the legitimate users the proposed work provides sufficient bandwidth to genuine users during flooding DDoS attack.The aim of the project is to implement an approach for mitigating DDoS based on “The Interface Based Rate Limiting (IBRL) algorithm”, used to mitigate the identified DDoS attacks. The implementation is carried out on a simulation tool Omnett++ installed on linux machine. The results are the plots that show that there is considerable increase in the two important and significant measures, response time and packet drop metrics for legitimate users even under DoS and DDoS attacks
A composable approach to design of newer techniques for large-scale denial-of-service attack attribution
Since its early days, the Internet has witnessed not only a phenomenal growth, but also a large number of security attacks, and in recent years, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have emerged as one of the top threats. The stateless and destination-oriented Internet routing combined with the ability to harness a large number of compromised machines and the relative ease and low costs of launching such attacks has made this a hard problem to address. Additionally, the myriad requirements of scalability, incremental deployment, adequate user privacy protections, and appropriate economic incentives has further complicated the design of DDoS defense mechanisms. While the many research proposals to date have focussed differently on prevention, mitigation, or traceback of DDoS attacks, the lack of a comprehensive approach satisfying the different design criteria for successful attack attribution is indeed disturbing.
Our first contribution here has been the design of a composable data model that has helped us represent the various dimensions of the attack attribution problem, particularly the performance attributes of accuracy, effectiveness, speed and overhead, as orthogonal and mutually independent design considerations. We have then designed custom optimizations along each of these dimensions, and have further integrated them into a single composite model, to provide strong performance guarantees. Thus, the proposed model has given us a single framework that can not only address the individual shortcomings of the various known attack attribution techniques, but also provide a more wholesome counter-measure against DDoS attacks.
Our second contribution here has been a concrete implementation based on the proposed composable data model, having adopted a graph-theoretic approach to identify and subsequently stitch together individual edge fragments in the Internet graph to reveal the true routing path of any network data packet. The proposed approach has been analyzed through theoretical and experimental evaluation across multiple metrics, including scalability, incremental deployment, speed and efficiency of the distributed algorithm, and finally the total overhead associated with its deployment. We have thereby shown that it is realistically feasible to provide strong performance and scalability guarantees for Internet-wide attack attribution.
Our third contribution here has further advanced the state of the art by directly identifying individual path fragments in the Internet graph, having adopted a distributed divide-and-conquer approach employing simple recurrence relations as individual building blocks. A detailed analysis of the proposed approach on real-life Internet topologies with respect to network storage and traffic overhead, has provided a more realistic characterization. Thus, not only does the proposed approach lend well for simplified operations at scale but can also provide robust network-wide performance and security guarantees for Internet-wide attack attribution.
Our final contribution here has introduced the notion of anonymity in the overall attack attribution process to significantly broaden its scope. The highly invasive nature of wide-spread data gathering for network traceback continues to violate one of the key principles of Internet use today - the ability to stay anonymous and operate freely without retribution. In this regard, we have successfully reconciled these mutually divergent requirements to make it not only economically feasible and politically viable but also socially acceptable.
This work opens up several directions for future research - analysis of existing attack attribution techniques to identify further scope for improvements, incorporation of newer attributes into the design framework of the composable data model abstraction, and finally design of newer attack attribution techniques that comprehensively integrate the various attack prevention, mitigation and traceback techniques in an efficient manner
A Novel Mechanism for Detection of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
The increasing popularity of web-based applications has led to several
critical services being provided over the Internet. This has made it imperative
to monitor the network traffic so as to prevent malicious attackers from
depleting the resources of the network and denying services to legitimate
users. This paper has presented a mechanism for protecting a web-server against
a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Incoming traffic to the server
is continuously monitored and any abnormal rise in the inbound traffic is
immediately detected. The detection algorithm is based on a statistical
analysis of the inbound traffic on the server and a robust hypothesis testing
framework. While the detection process is on, the sessions from the legitimate
sources are not disrupted and the load on the server is restored to the normal
level by blocking the traffic from the attacking sources. To cater to different
scenarios, the detection algorithm has various modules with varying level of
computational and memory overheads for their execution. While the approximate
modules are fast in detection and involve less overhead, they have lower
detection accuracy. The accurate modules involve complex detection logic and
hence involve more overhead for their execution, but they have very high
detection accuracy. Simulations carried out on the proposed mechanism have
produced results that demonstrate effectiveness of the scheme.Comment: 11 pages, 5 tables. In Proceedings of the First International
Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology (CCSIT 2011).
Springer CCIS Series Vol 133, Advanced Computing, Part 3, pp. 247-257,
Bangalore, 2011, Indi
A Robust Mechanism for Defending Distributed Denial OF Service Attacks on Web Servers
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have emerged as a popular means
of causing mass targeted service disruptions, often for extended periods of
time. The relative ease and low costs of launching such attacks, supplemented
by the current inadequate sate of any viable defense mechanism, have made them
one of the top threats to the Internet community today. Since the increasing
popularity of web-based applications has led to several critical services being
provided over the Internet, it is imperative to monitor the network traffic so
as to prevent malicious attackers from depleting the resources of the network
and denying services to legitimate users. This paper first presents a brief
discussion on some of the important types of DDoS attacks that currently exist
and some existing mechanisms to combat these attacks. It then points out the
major drawbacks of the currently existing defense mechanisms and proposes a new
mechanism for protecting a web-server against a DDoS attack. In the proposed
mechanism, incoming traffic to the server is continuously monitored and any
abnormal rise in the inbound traffic is immediately detected. The detection
algorithm is based on a statistical analysis of the inbound traffic on the
server and a robust hypothesis testing framework. Simulations carried out on
the proposed mechanism have produced results that demonstrate effectiveness of
the proposed defense mechanism against DDoS attacks.Comment: 18 pages, 3 figures, 5 table
Intrusion detection routers: Design, implementation and evaluation using an experimental testbed
In this paper, we present the design, the implementation details, and the evaluation results of an intrusion detection and defense system for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. The evaluation is conducted using an experimental testbed. The system, known as intrusion detection router (IDR), is deployed on network routers to perform online detection on any DDoS attack event, and then react with defense mechanisms to mitigate the attack. The testbed is built up by a cluster of sufficient number of Linux machines to mimic a portion of the Internet. Using the testbed, we conduct real experiments to evaluate the IDR system and demonstrate that IDR is effective in protecting the network from various DDoS attacks. © 2006 IEEE.published_or_final_versio
Deployable filtering architectures against large denial-of-service attacks
Denial-of-Service attacks continue to grow in size and frequency despite serious underreporting.
While several research solutions have been proposed over the years, they have had
important deployment hurdles that have prevented them from seeing any significant level of
deployment on the Internet. Commercial solutions exist, but they are costly and generally are
not meant to scale to Internet-wide levels.
In this thesis we present three filtering architectures against large Denial-of-Service attacks.
Their emphasis is in providing an effective solution against such attacks while using
simple mechanisms in order to overcome the deployment hurdles faced by other solutions.
While these are well-suited to being implemented in fast routing hardware, in the early stages
of deployment this is unlikely to be the case. Because of this, we implemented them on low-cost
off-the-shelf hardware and evaluated their performance on a network testbed. The results are
very encouraging: this setup allows us to forward traffic on a single PC at rates of millions of
packets per second even for minimum-sized packets, while at the same time processing as many
as one million filters; this gives us confidence that the architecture as a whole could combat even
the large botnets currently being reported. Better yet, we show that this single-PC performance
scales well with the number of CPU cores and network interfaces, which is promising for our
solutions if we consider the current trend in processor design.
In addition to using simple mechanisms, we discuss how the architectures provide clear
incentives for ISPs that adopt them early, both at the destination as well as at the sources of
attacks. The hope is that these will be sufficient to achieve some level of initial deployment.
The larger goal is to have an architectural solution against large DoS deployed in place before
even more harmful attacks take place; this thesis is hopefully a step in that direction
A Double Horizon Defense Design for Robust Regulation of Malicious Traffic
Deploying defense mechanisms in routers holds promises for protecting infrastructure resources such as link bandwidth or router buffers against network Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. However, in spite of their efficacy against bruteforce flooding attacks, existing router-based defenses often perform poorly when confronted to more sophisticated attack strategies. This paper presents the design and evaluation of a system aimed at identifying and containing a broad range of malicious traffic patterns. Its main feature is a double time horizon architecture, designed for effective regulation of attacking traffic at both short and long time scales. The short horizon component responds quickly to transient traffic surges that deviate significantly from regular (TCP) traffic, i.e., attackers that generate sporadic short bursts. Conversely, the long horizon mechanism enforces strict conformance with normal TCP behavior, but does so by considering traffic over longer time periods, and is therefore aimed at attackers that attempt to capture a significant amount of link bandwidth. The performance of the proposed system was tested extensively. Our findings suggest that the implementation cost of the system is reasonable, and that it is indeed efficient against various types of attacks while remaining transparent to normal TCP users