An Analysis of Reported Dangerous Incidents, Exposures, and Near Misses amongst Army Soldiers

Occupational health and safety incidents occurring in the military context are of great concern to personnel and commanders. Incidents such as “dangerous incidents”, “exposures”, and “near misses” (as distinct from injuries, illnesses, and fatalities) indicate serious health and safety risks faced by military personnel, even if they do not cause immediate harm. These risks may give rise to harm in the future, if not adequately addressed, and in some cases the incidents may cause latent harm. The purpose of this study was to ascertain the rates and patterns of incidents of these types reported by full time (ARA) and part time (ARES) Australian Army personnel. A retrospective cohort study was performed using self-reported incident data from the Workplace Health, Safety, Compensation and Reporting (WHSCAR) database over a two-year period. Data were analysed descriptively. Of 3791 such incidents, 3636 (96 percent) occurred in ARA and 155 (4 percent) in ARES personnel, somewhat consistent with the proportions of total army person-years served in each (ARA 93 percent; ARES 7 percent). In ARA, 84 percent of these incident types were exposures, 14 percent near misses, and 2 percent dangerous incidents. In ARES, 55 percent of incidents were exposures, 38 percent near misses, and 7 percent dangerous incidents. Soldiers at the rank of ‘private’ experienced the highest rates of these incident types, in both ARA and ARES. Driving gave rise to more near misses than any other activity, in both populations. Exposures to chemicals and sounds were more common in the ARA than ARES. The ARES reported higher proportions of vehicle near misses and multiple mechanism dangerous incidents than the ARA. The findings of this study can usefully inform development of risk mitigation strategies for dangerous incidents, exposures, and near misses in army personnel

Security governance and the private military industry in Europe and North America

Even before Iraq the growing use of private military contractors has been widely discussed in the academic and public literature. However, the reasons for this proliferation of private military companies and its implications are frequently generalized due to a lack of suitable theoretical approaches for the analysis of private means of violence in contemporary security. As a consequence, this article contends, the analysis of the growth of the private military industry typically conflates two separate developments: the failure of some developing states to provide for their national security and the privatisation of military services in industrialized nations in Europe and North America. This article focuses on the latter and argues that the concept of security governance can be used as a theoretical framework for understanding the distinct development, problems and solutions for the governance of the private military industry in developed countries.The United States Institute of Peace and the German Academic Exchange Service

Security: Collective good or commodity?

This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final published article is available from the link below. Copyright @ 2008 Sage.The state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in Europe and North America has been central to the development of security as a collective good. Not only has it institutionalized the state as the prime national and international security provider, it has helped to reduce the threat from other actors by either prohibiting or limiting their use of violence. The recent growth of the private security industry appears to undermine this view. Not only are private security firms proliferating at the national level; private military companies are also taking over an increasing range of military functions in both national defence and international interventions. This article seeks to provide an examination of the theoretical and practical implications of the shift from states to markets in the provision of security. Specifically, it discusses how the conceptualization of security as a commodity rather than a collective good affects the meaning and implementation of security in Western democracies.ESR

A Profile of Knee Injuries Suffered by Australian Army Reserve Soldiers

Despite having to perform the same occupational tasks as full-time soldiers, part-time soldiers may have lower levels of physical conditioning and report higher rates of injury per unit exposure to active service. The purpose of this study was to profile the leading body site of injury occurring in part-time soldiers to inform injury prevention strategies. Injury data from the Australian Army Reserve (ARES) spanning a two-year period were obtained from the Department of Defence Workplace Health, Safety, Compensation and Reporting database pertaining to locations, nature, mechanisms, and the activity being performed at the time of injury. Among the 1434 injuries reported by ARES personnel, the knee was the most common injury site (n = 228, 16%). Soft tissue injury due to trauma or unknown causes was the most common nature of knee injury (n = 177, 78%). Combat training was the most common activity being performed when soft tissue injuries occurred at the knee (n = 73, 42%), with physical training the second most common (n = 51, 30%), due to muscular stress (n = 36, 71%) and falls (n = 8, 16%). Targeted intrinsic and extrinsic approaches to injury minimization strategies for soft tissue knee injuries during combat and physical training should be designed

Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms.

The article contributes to the debate about the emergence of a European strategic culture to underpin a European Security and Defence Policy. Noting both conceptual and empirical weaknesses in the literature, the article disaggregates the concept of strategic culture and focuses on four types of norms concerning the means and ends for the use of force. The study argues that national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought and that they have been subject to three types of learning pressures since 1989: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialization, and mediatized crisis learning. The combined effect of these mechanisms would be a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms prevalent in current EU countries. If the outlined hypotheses can be substantiated by further research the implications for ESDP are positive, especially if the EU acts cautiously in those cases which involve norms that are not yet sufficiently shared across countries

Mapping of southern security and justice civil society organisations and networks

The purpose of this mapping study is to provide the UK Department for International Development (DFID) with a quantitative and qualitative snapshot of security and justice civil society organisations (CSOs) and networks working in and across the countries investigated. CSO engagement on issues of security and justice is inherently difficult in many countries due to the nature of their governing regimes (such as where the state has authoritarian tendencies or where military regimes preside). In some cases the political space for CSOs to engage in issues of security and justice is being increasingly suppressed. Consequently, the success of donor support for security and justice CSOs often depends to a great extent on the political will of respective governments to enable CSOs to work freely. Furthermore, donors who wish to support security and justice CSOs need to take account of the extent to which donor interactions with government security and justice structures may influence the extent and quality of donor interaction with CSOs. In many countries, an understanding of security and justice as conceptualised and defined by donors is lacking amongst civil society – and an understanding of these issues as conceptualised by civil society is often lacking among donors and governments. This scenario even holds true in those countries where civil society as a whole is otherwise vibrant. Consequently, there is a need to increase the basic level of understanding on security and justice matters (both within CSOs and governments), to broaden the strategic community (those working in think tanks or engaged in policy analysis), and to support the development of research capacity and expertise in security and justice areas. Joined up approaches to security and justice work are rare in almost all contexts and common/collaborative/networking fora do not exist. Recommendations were made in almost all sub-regions stating that donor approaches should encourage collaboration at the outset between security and justice CSOs and devise schemes that reward or encourage joined up working