Loss of control defence-Fit for purpose?

This article examines the case law on the loss of control defence and considers whether the interpretation of the defence has been too conservative so that the defence is barely available as a defence to murder

Evolutionarily stable defence and signalling of that defence

We examine the evolution and maintenance of defence and conspicuousness in prey species using a game theoretic model. In contrast to previous works, predators can raise as well as lower their attack probabilities as a consequence of encountering moderately defended prey. Our model predicts four distinct possibilities for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) featuring maximum crypsis. Namely that such a solution can exist with (1) zero toxicity, (2) a non-zero but non-aversive level of toxicity, (3) a high, aversive level of toxicity or (4) that no such maximally cryptic solution exists. Maximally cryptic prey may still invest in toxins, because of the increased chance of surviving an attack (should they be discovered) that comes from having toxins. The toxin load of maximally cryptic prey may be sufficiently strong that the predators will find them aversive, and seek to avoid similar looking prey in future. However, this aversiveness does not always necessarily trigger aposematic signalling, and highly toxic prey can still be maximally cryptic, because the increased initial rate of attack from becoming more conspicuous is not necessarily always compensated for by increased avoidance of aversive prey by predators. In other circumstances, the optimal toxin load may be insufficient to generate aversion but still be non-zero (because it increases survival), and in yet other circumstances, it is optimal to make no investment in toxins at all. The model also predicts ESSs where the prey are highly defended and aversive and where this defence is advertised at a cost of increased conspicuousness to predators. In many circumstances there is an infinite array of these aposematic ESSs, where the precise appearance is unimportant as long as it is highly visible and shared by all members of the population. Yet another class of solutions is possible where there is strong between-individual variation in appearance between conspicuous, poorly defended prey

UK defence news, 1920-1938 : estimates based on contemporary sources

This paper employs the concept of ‘defence news’ proposed by Ramey (2009) to develop a time series of shocks to UK defence spending in the interwar period at a quarterly frequency. ‘Defence news’ is the present value of changes to defence spending plans. Information on this is taken from contemporary sources, in particular, The Economist. The estimates in this paper can be used as an input to assessing the size of the fiscal multiplier in interwar Britain as in Crafts and Mills (2012)

How to Generate Security Cameras: Towards Defence Generation for Socio-Technical Systems

Recently security researchers have started to look into automated generation of attack trees from socio-technical system models. The obvious next step in this trend of automated risk analysis is automating the selection of security controls to treat the detected threats. However, the existing socio-technical models are too abstract to represent all security controls recommended by practitioners and standards. In this paper we propose an attack-defence model, consisting of a set of attack-defence bundles, to be generated and maintained with the socio-technical model. The attack-defence bundles can be used to synthesise attack-defence trees directly from the model to offer basic attack-defence analysis, but also they can be used to select and maintain the security controls that cannot be handled by the model itself.Comment: GraMSec 2015, 16 page

One Defence: one direction? The First Principles Review of Defence

Overview: The recently released report of the First Principles Review of Defence, Creating One Defence, is set to reshape the Defence enterprise over the next few years. This ASPI special report explains the review’s recommendations and analyses the consequences for Defence. It provides three perspectives on the forthcoming reforms: Peter Jennings, ‘One Defence–root causes, risks and values’; Andrew Davies, ‘The capability development life cycle’; Mark Thomson, ‘One Defence in two parts’

Preparing for the Bomb: The Development of Civil Defence Policy in Canada, 1948–1963

During the period 1948 to 1963 civil defence in Canada developed in a number of stages that reflected changes in technology, weaponry and scientific discovery. The first stage of development, roughly between 1948 and 1952, witnessed only minor developments. Civil defence followed the Second World War practice, with a focus on air raid shelters and, if possible, evacuation. In the years 1952 to 1954 as the possibility of a nuclear attack became more real as a result of the Soviet development of intercontinental bombers, civil defence officials moved towards a policy of mass evacuation of target areas and the rescue of survivors. The detonation of a hydrogen bomb and the discovery of radioactive fallout in 1954 led to yet another change in civil defence plans. Civil defence officials became more convinced that mass evacuation of target areas was the answer, however, fallout shelters were also recommended for those areas outside the target area likely to be blanketed with radioactive debris. In the late 1950s and into the early 1960s civil defence again had to be redefined as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were developed and evacuation was no longer possible as nuclear attack could occur virtually without warning

Full spectrum defence: re-thinking the fundamentals of Australian defence strategy

This report argues that successive Australian governments have failed to define an effective national defence strategy. Executive summary Australia’s inability to clearly and succinctly define its defence strategy is a perennial failing that will have serious policy and operational consequences if not addressed. Australia’s recent defence white papers are part of the problem: they lack coherence, their messaging is poor, and many of their underlying assumptions and planning practices are questionable. The forthcoming defence white paper provides the first real opportunity for the Abbott government to carry out a much-needed reset of Australia’s defence and military strategies. In place of a maritime strategy, Australia needs to adopt a “full spectrum” approach to defence that can provide protection against military threats from outer space and cyber space, as well as the conventional domains of land, sea and air. Full spectrum defence must be underpinned by deeper and broader regional defence partnerships and by a risk assessment process that encourages critical thinking about strategy and the future capabilities of the Australian Defence Force

Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Pakistan

This paper explores the impacts of defence expenditures on economic growth and other major economic variables in the Pakistan economy over the period 1972-1995. The results of Granger-causality tests show that there is bi-directional feedback between the defence burden and GDP growth. We test four different single equation models that are widely used in the defence literature. In these frameworks we generally find the defence burden to be negatively related to GDP growth. Finally, we specify a three-equation model which explains GDP growth, average propensity to save, and the defence ratio. In single equation estimations of the savings ratio and the defence burden, we uncover some interesting relationships. The savings ratio is affected positively by the defence ratio, and negatively by the inflation rate. The Pakistani defence burden is impacted negatively by the Indian defence burden and positively by the government budget. When all three equations are estimated as a system to account for feedback and covariance between these equations, these effects are diminished and go down in statistical significance.

The defence industry in Scotland

“The defence industry is vital to Scotland”1 The above quote from the recent House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee report concerns the volume of economic activity that the defence industry supports in Scotland. We examine this issue