The long and winding path to private financing and regulation of toll roads

Road transport has long been the dominant form of transport for freight and passenger movement throughout the world. Because most road projects require investments with long amortization periods and because many projects do not generate enough demand to become self-financing through some type of user fee or toll, the road sector remains in the hands of the public sector to a much greater extent than other transport activities. But governments throughout the world, including those of many poor African and South Asian countries, are commercializing their operations to cut costs, improve user orientation, and increase sector-specific revenue. There seems to be demand for toll roads in specific settings, but the problems met by many of this"first generation"of road concessions-from Mexico to Thailand-have given toll projects a bad reputation. Many mistakes were made, and tolling is obviously not the best solution for every road. Most of the alternatives aim at improving efficiency (lowering costs). But there are many ways of getting the private sector involved in toll roads, thus reducing public sector financing requirements for the sector. Understanding the context in which toll roads are viable is essential both for their initial success and for effective long-run regulation. The authors provide a broad overview of issues at stake from the viewpoint of both privatization teams and regulators responsible for supervising contractual commitments of private operators and the government, to each other and to users.Urban Services to the Poor,Roads&Highways,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Roads&Highways,Toll Roads,Urban Transport,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Airports and Air Services

Legal structure and management of terminals: Focus on commercial issues and privatization

Most ports globally remain under public control, yet globalization and international logistic chains exercise pressure towards the dilution of the public control. This text presents briefly the institutional framework of ports and focuses on the operational and financial triggers to dilute public control. Then the key issues related to the market and the society are analyzed. This chapter concludes with a section on the bid process and the primal points discussed, negotiated and agreed in a concession procedure. --Port Management,Terminal Management,Privatization

Collaborative Engagement Approaches For Delivering Sustainable Infrastructure Projects In The AEC Sector: A Review

The public sector has traditionally financed and operated infrastructure projects using resources from taxes and various levies (e.g. fuel taxes, road user charges). However, the rapid increase in human population growth coupled with extended globalisation complexities and associated social/political/economic challenges have placed new demands on the purveyors and operators of infrastructure projects. The importance of delivering quality infrastructure has been underlined by the United Nations declaration of the Millennium Development Goals; as has the provision of ‘adequate’ basic structures and facilities necessary for the well-being of urban populations in developing countries. Thus, in an effort to finance developing countries’ infrastructure needs, most countries have adopted some form of public-private collaboration strategy. This paper critically reviews these collaborative engagement approaches, identifies and highlights 10 critical themes that need to be appropriately captured and aligned to existing business models in order to successfully deliver sustainable infrastructure projects. Research findings show that infrastructure services can be delivered in many ways, and through various routes. For example, a purely public approach can cause problems such as slow and ineffective decision-making, inefficient organisational and institutional augmentation, and lack of competition and inefficiency (collectively known as government failure). On the other hand, adopting a purely private approach can cause problems such as inequalities in the distribution of infrastructure services (known as market failure). Thus, to overcome both government and market failures, a collaborative approach is advocated which incorporates the strengths of both of these polarised positions

Dynamic modelling of demand risk in PPP infrastructure projects : “The case of toll roads”

Infrastructure is the main driver of prosperity and economic development. To fill the gap between increasing demand for infrastructure and supply, the role of the private financing has become increasingly critical. Concession contracts in which the investment cost is recovered via payments from the end users are the most dominant among all PPP types. Although this mechanism has been seen as an efficient way to achieve infrastructure projects in terms of realising the project on time and to budget, the demand risk faced in the operation stage has heavily limited this efficiency. Evidence has shown that shortfall in demand can seriously jeopardize the scheme’s viability. Demand is dependent on a range of interrelated, dynamic factors such as economic conditions, willingness to pay and tariff for using the facility. In addition, uncertainty is an inherent aspect of most demand-underlying factors which makes demand estimation subject to high level of uncertainty. However, this uncertainty is largely ignored by modellers and planners and single demand estimate is often used when evaluating the facility. Given the threat to the project success resulting from potential variation between predicted and actual demand, it is believed that a demand risk assessment model is essential. This research is therefore devoted to developing a system dynamics model to assess demand risk by capturing the factors affecting demand and their relationships and simulating their change over time. A system dynamics based conceptual model was developed for mapping factors affecting demand for service provided by a typical PPP concession project. The model has five Causal Loop Diagrams (CLDs) which include: socio-economic, public satisfaction, willingness to pay, competition and level of fee. Based on the developed conceptual model, a quantitative simulation model for assessing traffic demand in toll road projects was developed. This model has six sub-models which are: socio-economic, public satisfaction, willingness to pay, competition, toll and expansion factors sub-models. With the use of case study of M6 toll roads (UK), it was demonstrated the potential application of SD as a tool for the assessment of demand risk in toll roads. Univariate and multivariate sensitivity analysis, as well as risk analysis using Monte Carlo approach, were conducted using the developed SD model. Univariate sensitivity analysis helps identify the significance of the demand underlying factors when they change individually. Toll was identified as the most critical factor affecting toll traffic demand followed by congestion on the alternative un-tolled facility. Multivariate sensitivity analysis showed how demand changes when several factors change. Four scenarios were developed to show the impact of change in conditions and policies on the level of traffic. Monte Carlo simulation, on the other hand, provided level of demand with a range of confidence intervals. Providing such estimates of the expected value and the confidence level offers useful information throughout their ranges and creates overall risk profiles by providing the probability of achieving a specific result. The main contribution of the research is in the development of a system dynamics model as a tool for assessing demand in PPP projects and informing decision making, which is new to the area of demand risk modelling

Demand risk in the Portuguese SCUTS and the 2010 renegotiation

The aim of this thesis is to study the demand risk of those SCUTS highways that were renegotiated in 2010 and 2011, in which the demand risk was fully passed to the public sector. Is the State carrying now riskier highways, regarding the demand risk, comparing to the private benchmark – Brisa? The 2010 renegotiation is also analysed to study if the initial demand forecast errors of those 3 SCUTS renegotiated were corrected, adjusted to the historical data available and counted with the negative effect of the introduction of tolls. This article, using the model proposed, compares the demand risk of the ex-­‐SCUTS highways with the private benchmark highways chosen. The renegotiation of 2010 is analysed through the study of the previous forecast errors and the historical pattern of traffic. The study concludes that besides the ex-­‐SCUTS, in a first analysis, do not show a significantly higher demand risk, the 2010 renegotiation with the introduction of tolls highlighted some questions about the usefulness of those highways, given the huge fall in the volume of traffic. It is also showed that the renegotiation ignored the historical pattern of traffic, the forecast errors already known and the negative effect of tolls, and projected future traffics very optimistically, completely misappropriated, leading to a great burden to the State. The conclusions are limited by the short data and because of the comparison between highways without tolls (ex-­‐SCUTS) with the benchmark highways (that always had tolls)

The review of PPP toll roads in the US and the simulation of the Chicago Skyway

As the traffic demand increases at a faster rate than the upgrade and maintenance of transportation facilities through the traditional public financing methods in the United States, the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is becoming an important supplement to the public transportation infrastructure investment. There are already several existing PPP toll road projects in the United States that provide examples of practical experiences and lessons for launching future PPP toll road projects. Additionally, research in the past three decades has made significant progress in relevant research fields about PPP toll roads, for instance, toll regulation, private revenue restriction, and risk allocation. However, it is still difficult to apply these academic models and research results into practical projects. Therefore, one of the objectives of this thesis is to point out the gap between the analytical research results and practical needs, through reviewing systemically the current PPP toll road projects in the United States and the theoretical research. Potential research interests to focus on how to narrow those gaps between the theoretical research and practical projects’ needs by improving the models or releasing the assumptions, to make the analytical research results helpful to those decision-makers when facing a new PPP toll road project. In addition, the paper simulates the Chicago Skyway, which is the first long-term leased toll road in the U.S., in order to predict the future travel and welfare impacts caused by the PPP toll road. Moreover, a “non-compete” clause experiment is designed and the codes of programming is done in this paper. Future studies can use the experiment and programming to test the effects of the “non-compete” clause to PPP toll roads

Modeling of Optimal Concession Contract between Port Authority and Terminal Operators using Channel Coordination Model

세계 해운 시장의 급격한 변화는 항만 산업에 큰 영향을 미친다. PA (항만공사)와 TOC (터미널 운영 회사)는 경쟁 우위를 확보하기 위하여 지금까지 항만 시설과 장비에 많은 투자를 해왔다. TOC는 경쟁사 및 해운 회사로부터의 요구 사항에 따라 수익성을 제고하기 위해 노력한다. 같은 상황에서 PA도 경쟁력을 찾고 있다. 시장의 불확실성과 기술적 변화는 PA와 TOC가 협력하여 더 나은 재정 상태를 요구하고 있다. PA와 TOC간에는계약을 통해 여러 방식으로 운영된다. 세계의 60-70%가 운영중인 임대 기능 모델에 따르면, PA는 항만의 토지 및 인프라를 소유∙관리하며, TOC는 터미널 운영을 담당한다. PA와 TOC는 계약을 통해 고정 요금제 내지 단가 요금제 등의 여부를 결정한다. 세계 항만 임대 시스템을 비교해 볼 때, 절대적인 고정된 계약 방식이 없다고 한다. 아시아의 대부분 지역에서는 고정 요금제를 이용하고, 유럽 지역에서는 고정 요금제와 단가 요금제가 혼합된 계약을 이용한다. 그동안 세계 항만 임대 시스템에 간한 연구는 많지 않았다. 특히 구체적 수치를 제공하지 않거나 비실용적 연구가 많았다. 한편, 이전 연구에서는TOC보다 PA 관점에서의 이익 극대화를 도모하는 데 중점을 두었다. 만약 PA가 처리량을 늘림으로써 이익을 극대화하고자 할 때, 고정 임대 계약이 더 유리한 선택이다. 이 연구는 공공기관과 민간 단체 상호간의 이익 극대화의 방식으로 연결하는 방법에 중점을 두고 있다. PA가 TOC에게 제안하는 4 가지 유형의 계약 방식은 비조정, 조정, Cournot 및 Collusion 모델로 비교하고, 동시에 각 계약 방식에 대해 모듈 수행과 수치 분석을 통해 모델을 비교한다. 연구 결과는 향후 항만 임대 계약을 수립하는 데 중요한 영향을 미칠 것이다. 비교 수치 분석을 관찰하면 다음과 같은 주요 결과를 얻을 수 있다. 결과에 따르면, 고정 계약과 단가 계약을 합친 조건이 각각의 고정 및 단가 계약제 보다 더 높다는 것을 알 수 있다. PA가 TOC의 이익과 위험을 다루는 만큼 TOC가 처리량을 증가시킬 수 있으며, 이것은 PA와 TOC 간의 총이익을 극대화 할 수 있다. 따라서PA가 조정 없는 계약을 제공하는 것보다 조정된 계약을 제공 할 때 더 많은 이익을 낼 수 있다. 그리고 PA와 TOC의 통합 이익은 각각의 이익보다 더 높다. PA와TOC의 통합 이익을 통해서 PA는 TOC에게 적절한 계약 방식을 제공하고 상호간의 이익 극대화를 도모할 수 있다. PA가 이익을 늘리려고 시도 할 때마다 수익과 수요 위험을 공유함으로써 TOC와의 관계를 유지해야한다. PA는TOC와의 협조로 어떤 계약방식을 선택하더라도 이익을 창출할 수 있다.|Rapid changes in the global maritime market have a major impact on the port industry. PA (Port Authority) and TOC (Terminal Operating Company) have invested heavily in port facilities and equipment so far to secure competitive advantage. TOC strives to improve profitability in accordance with requirements from competitors and shipping companies. In the same situation, PA is also looking for its own profitability. Market uncertainty and technological changes require PA and TOC to achieve better financial conditions in cooperation. The ports are operated in different contracts. According to the landlord function model which is operated by 60-70% of the world, the PA owns and manages the land and infrastructure of the port, and the TOC is responsible for terminal operations. The PA and TOC will decide whether to use a fixed fee or a unit fee through the contract. There is no absolute contract method in the port leasing system. Most regions in Asia prefer to use the fixed fee, while European countries prefer to use a mix of fixed fee and unit fee. There have been few studies on the port leasing system. In particular, most of them did not provide specific calculations or were impractical. On the other hand, previous studies have focused on maximizing profits from the perspective of PA rather than TOC. This research focuses on how to connect to the method of maximizing profit between public and private entities. The four types of contracts proposed by the PA to the TOC are compared with the uncoordination, coordination, Cournot and Collusion models, and at the same time, model comparisons and numerical analysis are performed for each contract method. The results of the study will have a significant impact on establishing future port lease contracts. Observing the comparative numerical analysis, the following main results are obtained. According to the results, it can be seen that the two-part tariff is higher than the each of fixed and unit contracts. As the PA shares with the profits and risks in cooperation with the TOC, the TOC can increase throughput, which can maximize the total benefit between PA and TOC. Thus, the PA can make more profits when it comes to providing a contract that is coordination contract provide more than uncoordination contract. And the joint profit of PA and TOC is higher than the respective total profits. Through the joint profit of PA and TOC, the PA can provide the TOC with the appropriate contractual condition and maximize their joint profits. The PA, in cooperation with the TOC, is able to generate profits no matter what contract type it chooses.Table of Contents LIST OF TABLES III LIST OF FIGURES III ABSTRACT IV 초록 VI CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1. BACKGROUND 1 2. AIM AND OBJECTIVES 6 3. SIGNIFICANCE 9 4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 10 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 11 1. PORT ECONOMICS 11 1. PORT GOVERNANCE 11 2. CONTRACTS: LEASEHOLD AND CONCESSION 16 3. PRICING MECHANISM 18 2. CONCESSION CONTRACT SCHEMES 21 1. FIXED-FEE CONTRACT 21 2. UNIT-FEE CONTRACT 22 3. TWO-PART TARIFF CONTRACT 22 4. FOREIGN AND KOREAN PORT CONTRACT SCHEMES 22 3. RISK SHARING CHARACTERISTICS 26 1. RISKS TYPES IN CONCESSION CONTRACTS 27 2. RISK ALLOCATION BETWEEN PA AND TOC 28 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 30 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 30 1. BERTRAND MODEL 31 2. COURNOT MODEL 32 3. STACKELBERG MODEL 33 4. COLLUSION MODEL 34 2. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 38 1. TERMINAL OPERATORS’ OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS UNDER THREE SCHEMES 41 2. PORT AUTHORITY’S OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS UNDER FOUR SCHEMES 45 3. COURNOT COORDINATION 55 4. COLLUSION COORDINATION 59 5. COMPARING THE ASSUMPTION MODELS 64 3. COORDINATION THROUGH SHARING THE RISK AND REVENUE 72 1. ASSUMPTION 72 2. SHARING THE JOINT PROFIT 73 3. SHARING THE MARKET UNCERTAINTY 73 4. SHARING THE MARKET RISK 74 CHAPTER 4. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 75 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 81 1. SUMMARY 81 2. IMPLICATIONS 83 3. LIMITATION 84 4. FURTHER STUDIES 85 REFERENCE 86Docto

A risk based approach to enhancing public-private partnership (PPP) projects in Nigeria

This thesis investigated the sources of the problems with Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects in Nigeria. The reason for this enquiry is as a result of the multitude of problems threatening the collapse of most of the concluded projects. Therefore, against the backdrop that proper risk management is the most critical success factor for PPPs, the thesis evaluated how risks have been allocated and mitigated in the projects concluded thus far in Nigeria. This is premised on the basic assumption that if risks are better managed, that it would result in enhanced projects.Having determined that political risk, demand risk and stakeholder opposition risk were the most prominent risk factors affecting PPPs in Nigeria, three case studies were used to evaluate how these risks have been handled. The projects are the 26 ports concessions, the Murtala Muhammed Airport terminal 2 (MMA2) BOT project and the Lekki toll road concession. It is believed that the lessons learnt from these studies will provide a tool for policy reforms leading to more successful projects. Also, by adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the thesis ensures that its findings and recommendations may easily be generalised across other projects, economic sectors, and disciplines and even to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, since these countries share the same socio-economic conditions with Nigeria

Public and private roles in road infrastructure: an exploration of market failure, public instruments and government failure

Starting with a 'greenfield' situation, we discuss reasons for market failure in road infrastructure provision. We show why it may not be optimal from a welfare perspective to leave road provision fully to the market and government intervention in this sector can improve welfare. Government intervention comes in different forms, such as financial intervention (taxation, subsidies), regulation (price, quality, environmental), and public provision of roads or road services. The analysis of the literature regarding government instruments allows us to establish a correspondence between different forms of market failure and instruments. Several case studies of particular road infrastructure projects are included to illustrate the use of government instruments.

Agent-Based Models of Highway Investment Processes: Forecasting Future Networks under Public and Private Ownership Regimes

The present highway funding system, especially fuel taxes, may become a less reliable revenue source in the future, while the transportation public agencies do not have sufficient financial resources needed to meet the increasing traffic demand. In the last two decades there has been increasing interest in utilizing private sector to develop, finance and operate new and existing roadways in the United States. While transportation privatization projects have shown signs of success, it is not always clear how to measure the true benefits associated with these projects for all stakeholders, including the public sector, the private sector and the public. "Win-win" privatization agreements are tricky to make due to conflicting nature of the various stakeholders involved. Therefore, there is a huge need to study the welfare impacts of various road privatization arrangements for the society as a whole, and the financial implications for private investors and public road authorities. In order to address these needs, first, an empirical analysis is performed to study the investment decision processes of public transportation agencies. Second, the agent-based decision-making model is developed to consider transportation investment processes at different levels of government which forecasts future transportation networks and their performance under both existing and alternative transportation planning processes. Third, various highway privatization schemes currently practiced in the U.S. are identified and an agent-based model for analyzing regulatory policies on private-sector transportation investments is developed. Fourth, the above mentioned models are demonstrated on the networks with grid and beltway topologies to study the impacts of topology configuration on the privatization arrangements. Based on the simulation results of developed models, a number of insights are provided about impacts of ownership structures on the socio-economic performance in transportation systems and transportation network changes over time. The proposed models and the approach can be used in long-run prediction of economic performance intended for describing a general methodology for transportation planning on large networks. Therefore, this research is expected to contribute significantly to the understanding and selecting proper road privatization programs on public networks