3,202 research outputs found
Securing The Root: A Proposal For Distributing Signing Authority
Management of the Domain Name System (DNS) root zone file is a uniquely global policy problem. For the Internet to connect everyone, the root must be coordinated and compatible. While authority over the legacy root zone file has been contentious and divisive at times, everyone agrees that the Internet should be made more secure. A newly standardized protocol, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), would make the Internet's infrastructure more secure. In order to fully implement DNSSEC, the procedures for managing the DNS root must be revised. Therein lies an opportunity. In revising the root zone management procedures, we can develop a new solution that diminishes the impact of the legacy monopoly held by the U.S. government and avoids another contentious debate over unilateral U.S. control. In this paper we describe the outlines of a new system for the management of a DNSSEC-enabled root. Our proposal distributes authority over securing the root, unlike another recently suggested method, while avoiding the risks and pitfalls of an intergovernmental power sharing scheme
Managing community membership information in a small-world grid
As the Grid matures the problem of resource discovery across communities,
where resources now include computational services, is becoming more
critical. The number of resources available on a world-wide grid is set to grow
exponentially in much the same way as the number of static web pages on
the WWW. We observe that the world-wide resource discovery problem can
be modelled as a slowly evolving very-large sparse-matrix where individual
matrix elements represent nodes’ knowledge of one another. Blocks in the
matrix arise where nodes offer more than one service. Blocking effects also
arise in the identification of sub-communities in the Grid. The linear algebra
community has long been aware of suitable representations of large, sparse
matrices. However, matrices the size of the world-wide grid potentially number
in the billions, making dense solutions completely intractable. Distributed
nodes will not necessarily have the storage capacity to store the addresses of
any significant percentage of the available resources. We discuss ways of modelling
this problem in the regime of a slowly changing service base including
phenomena such as percolating networks and small-world network effects
Regional Address Registries, Governance and Internet Freedom
Regional Internet Address Registries (RIRs) are private, nonprofit and transnational governance entities that evolved organically with the growth of the Internet to manage and coordinate Internet Protocol addresses. The RIR's management of Internet address resources is becoming more contentious and more central to global debates over Internet governance. This is happening because of two transformational problems: 1) the depletion of the IPv4 address space; and 2) the attempt to introduce more security into the Internet routing system. We call these problems "transformational" because they raise the stakes of the RIR's policy decisions, make RIR processes more formal and institutionalized, and have the potential to create new, more centralized control mechanisms over Internet service providers and users. A danger in this transition is that the higher stakes and centralized control mechanisms become magnets for political contention, just as ICANN's control of the DNS root did. In order to avoid a repeat of the problems of ICANN, we need to think carefully about the relationship between RIRs, governments, and Internet freedom. In particular, we need to shield RIRs from interference by national governments, and strengthen and institutionalize their status as neutral technical coordinators with limited influence over other areas of Internet governance
An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the BrowserID SSO System
The web constitutes a complex infrastructure and as demonstrated by numerous
attacks, rigorous analysis of standards and web applications is indispensable.
Inspired by successful prior work, in particular the work by Akhawe et al. as
well as Bansal et al., in this work we propose a formal model for the web
infrastructure. While unlike prior works, which aim at automatic analysis, our
model so far is not directly amenable to automation, it is much more
comprehensive and accurate with respect to the standards and specifications. As
such, it can serve as a solid basis for the analysis of a broad range of
standards and applications.
As a case study and another important contribution of our work, we use our
model to carry out the first rigorous analysis of the BrowserID system (a.k.a.
Mozilla Persona), a recently developed complex real-world single sign-on system
that employs technologies such as AJAX, cross-document messaging, and HTML5 web
storage. Our analysis revealed a number of very critical flaws that could not
have been captured in prior models. We propose fixes for the flaws, formally
state relevant security properties, and prove that the fixed system in a
setting with a so-called secondary identity provider satisfies these security
properties in our model. The fixes for the most critical flaws have already
been adopted by Mozilla and our findings have been rewarded by the Mozilla
Security Bug Bounty Program.Comment: An abridged version appears in S&P 201
Keeping Authorities "Honest or Bust" with Decentralized Witness Cosigning
The secret keys of critical network authorities - such as time, name,
certificate, and software update services - represent high-value targets for
hackers, criminals, and spy agencies wishing to use these keys secretly to
compromise other hosts. To protect authorities and their clients proactively
from undetected exploits and misuse, we introduce CoSi, a scalable witness
cosigning protocol ensuring that every authoritative statement is validated and
publicly logged by a diverse group of witnesses before any client will accept
it. A statement S collectively signed by W witnesses assures clients that S has
been seen, and not immediately found erroneous, by those W observers. Even if S
is compromised in a fashion not readily detectable by the witnesses, CoSi still
guarantees S's exposure to public scrutiny, forcing secrecy-minded attackers to
risk that the compromise will soon be detected by one of the W witnesses.
Because clients can verify collective signatures efficiently without
communication, CoSi protects clients' privacy, and offers the first
transparency mechanism effective against persistent man-in-the-middle attackers
who control a victim's Internet access, the authority's secret key, and several
witnesses' secret keys. CoSi builds on existing cryptographic multisignature
methods, scaling them to support thousands of witnesses via signature
aggregation over efficient communication trees. A working prototype
demonstrates CoSi in the context of timestamping and logging authorities,
enabling groups of over 8,000 distributed witnesses to cosign authoritative
statements in under two seconds.Comment: 20 pages, 7 figure
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences
In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks,
highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are
performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control
(C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by
attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked
parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side
of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection
and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted
security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in
current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages.
Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor
BILETA Response to Review of the Computer Misuse Act 1990
© Crown copyright 2023.Given its expertise in Information Technology Law, the British and Irish Law Education Technology Association (BILETA) welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the UK Parliament Science and Technology Committee inquiry about Governance of artificial intelligence (AI). BILETA was formed in April 1986 to promote, develop, and communicate high-quality research and knowledge on technology law and policy to organisations, governments, professionals, students, and the public. BILETA also promotes the use of and research into technology at all stages of education
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