The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case Study in Tank/Infantry Doctrine and Practice

On the morning of 8 July 1944, soldiers of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (9 CIB) left their startlines near the Norman village of Vieux Cairon heading for Buron and Gruchy; two villages nearly 2,000 yards across open ground to the south. Their advance was part of Operation “Charnwood,” British I Corps’ final assault on Caen. By the end of the day most objectives were secured, and on 9 July Caen north of the Orne River and Canal was captured. General Dempsey, General Officer Commanding (GOC) British 2nd Army expressed his satisfaction, saying that the operations of 8 and 9 July were “well and cleanly carried out.” Troops of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (3 CID) and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade (2 CAB) shared in the victory no less than the British divisions that took part. “Charnwood” stands apart from other Canadian operations in Normandy because it was the only operation of its type undertaken by 3 CID and 2 CAB as complete formations. After “Charnwood” II Canadian Corps became operational, and the scale, tempo and expectations of operations altered considerably. The capture of Caen, therefore, affords insights into tactical doctrine that are obscured by later large-scale operations with more ambitious objectives. In particular, in this operation the Canadian armour and infantry defeated the Germans by employing tanks as direct-fire closesupport weapons. In fact, such intimate support had not been a part of Canadian tank/infantry doctrine since the introduction of the Sherman tank in 1943. Instead, since the fall of 1943 armoured units were told specifically to work to the enemy’s flanks and support by fire, not by participating in the close infantry battle. The fighting on 8 July indicates that in this instance at least, Canadian troops won in spite of the prevailing doctrine and not because of it

The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic: What Went Wrong?

On 20–21 July 1944 the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade was engaged in combat operations on Verrières Ridge south of Caen. Enemy resistance was stronger than expected and teh Canadian attack was met by strong German counterattacks supported by armour. During the course of the battle, two units, the Essex Scottish Regiment and the South Saskatchewan Regiment were driven back. In the aftermath of the battle the Essex Scottish Regiment and their commanding officer were criticized for their poor performance. This article examines the battle in an attempt to understand who was to blame. Lieutenant–Colonel B.J.S. MacDonald, the commanding officer of the Essex Scots, was fired for his role in the battle, but this article posits that Brigadier Hugh A. Young bears the greater share of responsibility for the operation’s failure

Fire Plan: The Canadian Army’s Fire Support System in Normandy

Consigned initially to a decentralized and limited tactical role, the fire support organizations of British and Canadian armies experienced exponential growth during the initial stages of World War II. By D-Day, fire support had become a critical enabler of Anglo-Canadian combat operations and artillery units were numerous, networked, and efficient. Facilitating successful tactical manoeuvre was the goal of the fire support system. This article will explore the ‘ways’ and ‘means’ of that system – the people, procedures, resources, and organizations that combined to produce the devastating battle-winning fire support that contributed to tactical success

The Fog of War: Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First Canadian Army in Northwest Europe

Smoke screens have been employed in sea and land warfare for many centuries for a variety of purposes. They have been used to conceal troop movements, to deceive the enemy as to combat strengths, point of attack, and preparations for offensive operations. During the Second World War all armies made use of smoke screns in their operations to a greater or lesser extent. Canada was no exception and was considered to be extremely innovative in the use of smoke equipment in ways for which it was not designed. The First Canadian Army first employed large-scale non-artillery-projected smoke screens during the campaign in Northwest Europe. For the first time, at least in the history of Canadian operations, units of trained specialists worked to lay down smoke screens in the field

Fifth Brigade at Verrieres Ridge

The Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived in France on 16 July 1944 during the worst days of the battle of Normandy. The Allies had expected heavy losses on the D-Day beaches and then, once through the Atlantic Wall, lighter casualties in a war of rapid movement. The opposite had happened. The coastal defences had been quickly breached, but then there were only slow movement and horrendous casualties. In one month more than 40,000 U.S. troops were killed, wounded or missing, while almost 38,000 British and Canadian troops shared the same fate. The Allied air forces enjoyed total air superiority over the battlefield, but in June alone the cost was 6,200 aircrew. Soldiers on both sides were beginning to say that it was 1914–1918 all over again—a static battle of attrition with gains measured in yards and thousands of dead