New PPP-Based Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation and Policy Implications

New estimates by Arvind Subramanian for the undervaluation of the Chinese currency based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach find that the renminbi is undervalued by approximately 30 percent rather than the 12 percent widely reported. Subramanian applies new insights about the way PPP data are compiled, uses new data that have become available, and corrects existing estimates for the biases in the data in order to attain a more accurate estimation of China's currency undervaluation. Corrective action must be taken not primarily to help China but to prevent its currency undervaluation from harming the rest of the world. The real victims of China's currency policies, argues Subramanian, are other emerging-market and developing countries because they compete more closely with China. It is crucial that the subject be broached delicately and with humility and that a multilateral approach be taken with China, most likely by going through the World Trade Organization.

New estimates of U.S. currency abroad, the domestic money supply and the unreported Economy

New Estimates of U.S. Currency Abroad, the Domestic Money Supply and the Unreported Economy Edgar L. Feige * Abstract Despite financial innovations that have created important new substitutes for cash usage, per capita holdings of U.S. currency amount to $2950. Yet American households and businesses admit to holding only 15 percent of the currency stock, leaving the whereabouts of 85 percent unknown. Some fraction of this unaccounted for currency is held abroad (the dollarization hypothesis) and some is held domestically undeclared, as a store of value and a medium of exchange for transactions involving the production and distribution of illegal goods and services, and for transactions earning income that is not reported to the IRS (the unreported economy hypothesis). We find that the percentage of U.S. currency currently held overseas is between 30-37 percent rather than the widely cited figure of 65 percent. This finding is based on the official Federal Reserve/Bureau of Economic Analysis data which is a proxy measure of the New York Federal Reserve’s (NYB) “confidential” data on wholesale currency shipments abroad. We recommend that the NYB data be aggregated so as to circumvent confidentiality concerns, and be made readily available to all researchers in order to shed greater light on the questions of how much U.S. currency is abroad and on the particular location of overseas U.S. dollars. The newly revised official estimates of overseas currency holdings are employed to determine the Federal Reserve’s seigniorage earnings from 1964-2010, which have provided a$287 billion windfall for U.S. taxpayers. Overseas currency stock data are also used to derive estimates of the domestically held stock of currency as well as narrow and broad measures of domestic monetary aggregates. These domestic monetary aggregates are believed to be better predictors of future economic activity than traditional monetary aggregates and are tested to determine their ability to predict fluctuations in real output and prices. Domestic cash holdings are finally used to estimate the size of the U.S. unreported economy as measured by the amount of income that is not properly reported to the IRS. By 2010, we estimate that legal and illegal source unreported income” is $1.9 -$2.4 trillion, implying a “tax gap” in the range of $400-$550 billion. Currently, we estimate that 18-23 percent of total reportable income is not properly reported to the IRS.Overseas currency; currency abroad; underground economy; unreported economy; domestic money supply; tax gap; tax evasion; cash payments; monetary aggregates

Construction of an estimated domestic monetary base using new estimates of foreign holdings of U.S. currency

This paper presents a new method to estimate the amount of U.S. currency held abroad. The method exploits the fact the Federal Reserve System is the major processor of currency for depository institutions. The method exploits differentials across denominations in the ratios of shipments to receipts of currency at Federal Reserve cash offices in New York City and nationwide. The method permits us to construct a new monthly time series on the domestic monetary base, M1 and M2. The method has several advantages over previous methods, including an earlier starting date (1965) and the ability to be updated easily each month from Federal Reserve currency processing data. Relative to previous studies, our estimates suggest larger currency exports during the 1970s and early 1980s, and a sharp slowing of exports since 1995. ; This paper has been replaced with working paper 2000-002, "The Domestic Adjusted Monetary Base".Money ; Dollar, American

Has the Euro affected the choice of invoicing currency?

We present a new approach to study empirically the effect of the introduction of the euro on the pattern of currency invoicing. Our approach uses a compositional multinomial logit model, in which currency choice is explained by both currency-specific and country-specific determinants. We use unique quarterly panel data on the invoicing of Norwegian imports from OECD countries for the 1996-2006 period. We find that eurozone countries have substantially increased their share of home currency invoicing after the introduction of the euro, whereas the home currency share of non-eurozone countries fell slightly. In addition, the euro as a vehicle currency has overtaken the role of the US dollar in Norwegian imports. The substantial rise in producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries is primarily caused by a drop in inflation volatility and can only to a small extent be explained by an unobserved euro effect. JEL Classification: F33, F41, F42, E31, C25.Euro, invoicing currency, exchange rate risk, inflation volatility, vehicle currencies, compositional multinomial logit.

Has the Euro Affected the Choice of Invoicing Currency?

We present a new approach to study empirically the effect of the introduction of the euro on currency invoicing. Our approach uses a compositional multinomial logit model, in which currency choice depends on the characteristics of both the currency and the country. We use unique quarterly panel data of Norwegian imports from OECD countries for the 1996{2006 period. One of the key findings is that the eurozone countries in trade with Norway have substantially increased their share of home currency invoicing after the introduction of the euro. In addition, the euro as a vehicle currency has overtaken the role of the US dollar in Norwegian imports. The econometric analysis shows a significant effect of euro introduction above and beyond the determinants of currency invoicing (i.e., ination rate, ination volatility, foreign exchange market size, and product composition). However, the rise in producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries is primarily caused by a drop in ination volatility.euro;invoicing currency;exchange rate risk;ination;ination risk;vehicle currencies;compositional multinomial logit

Has the Euro Affected the Choice of Invoicing Currency?

We present a new approach to study empirically the effect of the introduction of the euro on currency invoicing. Our approach uses a compositional multinomial logit model, in which currency choice depends on the characteristics of both the currency and the country. We use unique quarterly panel data of Norwegian imports from OECD countries for the 1996-2006 period. One of the key findings is that the eurozone countries in trade with Norway have substantially increased their share of home currency invoicing after the introduction of the euro. In addition, the euro as a vehicle currency has overtaken the role of the US dollar in Norwegian imports. The econometric analysis shows a significant effect of euro introduction above and beyond the determinants of currency invoicing (i.e., inflation rate, inflation volatility, foreign exchange market size, and product composition). However, the rise in producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries is primarily caused by a drop in inflation volatility.euro, invoicing currency, exchange rate risk, inflation, inflation risk, vehicle currencies, compositional multinomial logit

Financial Crises, 1880-1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt

What is the role of foreign currency debt in precipitating financial crises? In this paper we assemble data for nearly 30 countries between 1880 and 1913 and examine debt crises, currency crises, banking crises and twin crises. We pay special attention to the role of foreign currency and gold clause debt, currency mismatches and debt intolerance. We find fairly robust evidence that more foreign currency debt leads to a higher chance of having a debt crisis or a banking crisis. However, a key finding is that countries with noticeably different backgrounds, and strong institutions such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the US deftly managed their exposure to hard currency debt, generally avoided having too many crises and never had severe financial meltdowns. Moreover, a strong reserve position matched up to hard currency liabilities seems to be correlated with a lower likelihood of a debt crisis, currency crisis or a banking crisis. This strengthens the evidence for the hypothesis that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. We also see that countries with previous default histories seem prone to debt crises even at seemingly low debt to revenue ratios. Finally we discuss the robustness of these results to local idiosyncrasies and the implications from this representative historical sample.

Financial Crises, 1880-1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt

What is the role of foreign currency debt in precipitating financial crises? In this paper we assemble data for nearly 30 countries between 1880 and 1913 and examine debt crises, currency crises, banking crises and twin crises. We pay special attention to the role of foreign currency and gold clause debt, currency mismatches and debt intolerance. We find fairly robust evidence that more foreign currency debt leads to a higher chance of having a debt crisis or a banking crisis. However, a key finding is that countries with noticeably different backgrounds, and strong institutions such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the US deftly managed their exposure to hard currency debt, generally avoided having too many crises and never had severe financial meltdowns. Moreover, a strong reserve position matched up to hard currency liabilities seems to be correlated with a lower likelihood of a debt crisis, currency crisis or a banking crisis. This strengthens the evidence for the hypothesis that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. We also see that countries with previous default histories seem prone to debt crises even at seemingly low debt to revenue ratios. Finally we discuss the robustness of these results to local idiosyncrasies and the implications from this representative historical sample.

Technological change and the demand for currency: An analysis with household data

Advances in transaction technology allow agents to economize on the cost of cash management. We argue that accounting for the impact of new transaction technologies on currency holding behaviour is important to obtain theoretically consistent estimates of the demand for money. We modify a standard inventory model to study the effect of withdrawal technology on the demand for currency. An empirical specification for households’ demand schedule is suggested, in which both the level of currency holdings and the interest rate elasticity of demand depend on the withdrawal technology available to agents (e.g. ATM card ownership or a high/low density of bank branches, ATMs). The theoretical implications are tested using a unique panel of Italian household data (on currency holdings, deposit interest rates, consumption, development of banking services, etc.) for the period 1989-2004.money demand, inventory models, technological change

Who drove the boom in euro-denominated bond issues?

We make use of micro-level data for over 45,000 private bonds issued by over 5000 firms from 22 countries in 1990-2006 to analyze the impact that the launch of the EMU had on the currency denomination of the bond issues. To our knowledge, ours is the first systematic analysis of issue at the micro level. The use of the micro data allows us to distinguish between the response to the advent of the euro by new and seasoned bond issuers, and to condition on other issue characteristics. We find that the impact on new issuers is larger than on seasoned issuers and that most of the increase in the euro-denominated bond issuance was along the "extensive" margin. Insofar as new entrants to the bond market will define the overall currency composition in the long run, these results imply that aggregate studies might be underestimating the euro effect. We also find that to a large extent the increase in euro issuance was "at the expense" of U.S. dollar issuance, suggesting that the euro competes with the U.S. dollar as a currency of choice for international financial transactions.Bond market ; Euro