The folic acid antagonists and their use is the treatment of acute leukemia

Thesis (M.D.)--Boston Universit

Reputation and Influence in Charitable Giving: An Experiment

Abstract Previous experimental and observational work suggests that people act more generously when they are observed and observe others in social settings. But the explanation for this is unclear. An individual may want to send a signal of her generosity in order to improve her own reputation. Alternately (or additionally) she may value the public good or charity itself and, believing that contribution levels are strategic complements, give more in order to influence others to give more. We perform the first series of laboratory experiments that can separately estimate the impact of these two social effects, and test whether realized influence is consistent with the desire to influence, and whether either of these are consistent with anticipated influence. We find that �leaders� are influential only when their identities are revealed along with their donations, and female leaders are more influential then males. Identified leader�s predictions suggest that are aware of their influence. They respond to this by giving more than either the control group or the unidentified leaders. We find mixed evidence for �reputation-seeking.�

Spartan Daily, November 21, 1990

Volume 95, Issue 57https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/8056/thumbnail.jp

Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering

This Essay formulates a positive model that predicts when commercial parties will employ private ordering to enforce their agreements. The typical enforcement mechanism associated with private ordering is the reputation mechanism, in which a merchant community punishes parties in breach of contract by denying them future business. The growing private ordering literature argues that these private enforcement mechanisms can be superior to the traditional, less efficient enforcement measures provided by public courts. However, previous comparisons between public and private contractual enforcement have presented a misleading dichotomy by failing to consider a third enforcement mechanim: the vertically integrated firm. This Essay develops a model that comprehensively addresses three distinct types of enforcement mechanisms--firms, courts, and reputation-based private ordering. The model rests on a synthesis of transaction cost economics, which compares the efficiencies of firms versus markets, and the private ordering literature, which compares the efficiencies of public courts versus private ordering. It hypothesizes that private ordering will arise when agreements present enforcement difficulties, high-powered market incentives are important, and the costs of entry barriers are low. The Essay then conducts an illustrative test by comparing the model\u27s predictions to documented instances of private ordering

Spartan Daily, April 22, 1970

Volume 57, Issue 105https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/5327/thumbnail.jp

The BG News March 20, 1991

The BGSU campus student newspaper March 20, 1991. Volume 73 - Issue 105https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/bg-news/6199/thumbnail.jp

Am (March 4, 1955)

News While it is Newshttps://digitalcommons.bard.edu/am/1002/thumbnail.jp

Spartan Daily, November 18, 1988

Volume 91, Issue 55https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/7781/thumbnail.jp