137 research outputs found
New Records in Collision Attacks on RIPEMD-160 and SHA-256
RIPEMD-160 and SHA-256 are two hash functions used to generate the bitcoin address. In particular, RIPEMD-160 is an ISO/IEC standard and SHA-256 has been widely used in the world. Due to their complex designs, the progress to find (semi-free-start) collisions for the two hash functions is slow. Recently at EUROCRYPT 2023, Liu et al. presented the first collision attack on 36 steps of RIPEMD-160 and the first MILP-based method to find collision-generating signed differential characteristics. We continue this line of research and implement the MILP-based method with a SAT/SMT-based method. Furthermore, we observe that the collision attack on RIPEMD-160 can be improved to 40 steps with different message differences. We have practically found a colliding message pair for 40-step RIPEMD-160 in 16 hours with 115 threads. Moreover, we also report the first semi-free-start (SFS) colliding message pair for 39-step SHA-256, which can be found in about 3 hours with 120 threads. These results update the best (SFS) collision attacks on RIPEMD-160 and SHA-256. Especially, we have made some progress on SHA-256 since the last update on (SFS) collision attacks on it at EUROCRYPT 2013, where the first practical SFS collision attack on 38-step SHA-256 was found
Design implementation and analysis of a dynamic cryptography algorithm with applications
Cryptographers need to provide the world with a new encryption standard. DES, the major encryption algorithm for the past fifteen years, is nearing the end of its useful life. Its 56-bit key size is vulnerable to a brute-force attack on powerful microprocessors and recent advances in linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis indicate that DES is vulnerable to other attacks as well. A more recent attack called XSL, proposes a new attack against AES and Serpent. The attack depends much more critically on the complexity of the nonlinear components than on the number of rounds. Ciphers with small S-boxes and simple structures are particularly vulnerable. Serpent has small S-boxes and a simple structure. AES has larger S-boxes, but a very simple algebraic description. If the attack is proven to be correct, cryptographers predict it to break AES with a 2; 80 complexity, over the coming years; Many of the other unbroken algorithms---Khufu, REDOC II, and IDEA---are protected by patents. RC2 is broken. The U.S. government has declassified the Skipjack algorithm in the Clipper and Capstone chips
Collisions and Semi-Free-Start Collisions for Round-Reduced RIPEMD-160
In this paper, we propose an improved cryptanalysis of the double-branch hash function RIPEMD-160 standardized by ISO/IEC. Firstly, we show how to theoretically calculate the step differential probability of RIPEMD-160, which was stated as an open problem by Mendel at ASIACRYPT 2013. Secondly, based on the method proposed by Mendel to automatically find a differential path of RIPEMD-160, we construct a 30-step differential path where the left branch is sparse and the right branch is controlled as sparse as possible. To ensure the message modification techniques can be applied to RIPEMD-160, some extra bit conditions should be pre-deduced and well controlled. These extra bit conditions are used to ensure that the modular difference can be correctly propagated. This way, we can find a collision of 30-step RIPEMD-160 with complexity . This is the first collision attack on round-reduced RIPEMD-160. Moreover, by a different choice of the message words to merge two branches and adding some conditions to the starting point, the semi-free-start collision attack on the first 36-step RIPEMD-160 from ASIACRYPT 2013 can be improved. However, the previous way to pre-compute the equation costs too much. To overcome this obstacle, we are inspired by Daum\u27s . work on MD5 and describe a method to reduce the time complexity and memory complexity to pre-compute that equation. Combining all these techniques, the time complexity of the semi-free-start collision attack on the first 36-step RIPEMD-160 can be reduced by a factor of to
Analysis and Design Security Primitives Based on Chaotic Systems for eCommerce
Security is considered the most important requirement for the success of electronic commerce, which is built based on the security of hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators. Chaotic systems and security algorithms have similar properties including sensitivity to any change or changes in the initial parameters, unpredictability, deterministic nature and random-like behaviour. Several security algorithms based on chaotic systems have been proposed; unfortunately some of them were found to be insecure and/or slow.
In view of this, designing new secure and fast security algorithms based on chaotic systems which guarantee integrity, authentication and confidentiality is essential for electronic commerce development. In this thesis, we comprehensively explore the analysis and design of security primitives based on chaotic systems for electronic commerce: hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators. Novel hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators based on chaotic systems for electronic commerce are proposed. The securities of the proposed algorithms are analyzed based on some well-know statistical tests in this filed. In addition, a new one-dimensional triangle-chaotic map (TCM) with perfect chaotic behaviour is presented.
We have compared the proposed chaos-based hash functions, block cipher and pseudorandom number generator with well-know algorithms. The comparison results show that the proposed algorithms are better than some other existing algorithms. Several analyses and computer simulations are performed on the proposed algorithms to verify their characteristics, confirming that these proposed algorithms satisfy the characteristics and conditions of security algorithms. The proposed algorithms in this thesis are high-potential for adoption in e-commerce applications and protocols
Preimage Attack on MD4 Hash Function as a Problem of Parallel Sat-Based Cryptanalysis
In this paper we study the inversion problem of MD4 cryptographic hash function developed by R. Rivest in 1990. By MD4-k we denote a truncated variant of MD4 hash function in which k represents a number of steps used to calculate a hash value (the full version of MD4 function corresponds to MD4-48). H. Dobbertin has showed that MD4-32 hash function is not one-way, namely, it can be inverted for the given image of a random input. He suggested to add special conditions to the equations that describe the computation of concrete steps (chaining variables) of the considered hash function. These additional conditions allowed to solve the inversion problem of MD4-32 within a reasonable time by solving corresponding system of equations. The main result of the present paper is an automatic derivation of “Dobbertin’s conditions” using parallel SAT solving algorithms. We also managed to solve several inversion problems of functions of the kind MD4-k (for k from 31 up to 39 inclusive). Our method significantly outperforms previously existing approaches to solving these problems
Enhancing the Security Level of SHA-1 by Replacing the MD Paradigm
Cryptographic hash functions are important cryptographic techniques and are used widely in many cryptographic applications and protocols. All the MD4 design based hash functions such as MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 are built on Merkle-Damgard iterative method. Recent differential and generic attacks against these popular hash functions have shown weaknesses of both specific hash functions and their underlying Merkle-Damgard construction. In this paper we propose a hash function which follows design principle of SHA-1 and is based on dither construction. Its compression function takes three inputs and generates a single output of 160-bit length. An extra input to a compression function is generated through a fast pseudo-random function. Dither construction shows strong resistance against major generic and other cryptanalytic attacks. The security of proposed hash function against generic attacks, differential attack, birthday attack and statistical attack was analyzed in detail. It is exhaustedly compared with SHA-1 because hash functions from SHA-2 and SHA-3 are of higher bit length and known to be more secure than SHA-1. It is shown that the proposed hash function has high sensitivity to an input message and is secure against different cryptanalytic attacks
Analysis of RIPEMD-160: New Collision Attacks and Finding Characteristics with MILP
The hash function RIPEMD-160 is an ISO/IEC standard and is being used to generate the bitcoin address together with SHA-256. Despite the fact that many hash functions in the MD-SHA hash family have been broken, RIPEMD-160 remains secure and the best collision attack could only reach up to 34 out of 80 rounds, which was published at CRYPTO 2019. In this paper, we propose a new collision attack on RIPEMD-160 that can reach up to 36 rounds with time complexity . This new attack is facilitated by a new strategy to choose the message differences and new techniques to simultaneously handle the differential conditions on both branches. Moreover, different from all the previous work on RIPEMD-160, we utilize a MILP-based method to search for differential characteristics, where we construct a model to accurately describe the signed difference transitions through its round function. As far as we know, this is the first model targeting the signed difference transitions for the MD-SHA hash family. Indeed, we are more motivated to design this model by the fact that many automatic tools to search for such differential characteristics are not publicly available and implementing them from scratch is too time-consuming and difficult. Hence, we expect that this can be an alternative easy tool for future research, which only requires to write down some simple linear inequalities
Automating Collision Attacks on RIPEMD-160
As an ISO/IEC standard, the hash function RIPEMD-160 has been used to generate the Bitcoin address with SHA-256. However, due to the complex double-branch structure of RIPEMD-160, the best collision attack only reaches 36 out of 80 steps of RIPEMD-160, and the best semi-free-start (SFS) collision attack only reaches 40 steps. To improve the 36-step collision attack proposed at EUROCRYPT 2023, we explored the possibility of using different message differences to increase the number of attacked steps, and we finally identified one choice allowing a 40-step collision attack. To find the corresponding 40-step differential characteristic, we re-implement the MILP-based method to search for signed differential characteristics with SAT/SMT. As a result, we can find a colliding message pair for 40-step RIPEMD-160 in practical time, which significantly improves the best collision attack on RIPEMD-160. For the best SFS collision attack published at ToSC 2019, we observe that the bottleneck is the probability of the right-branch differential characteristics as they are fully uncontrolled in the message modification. To address this issue, we utilize our SAT/SMT-based tool to search for high-probability differential characteristics for the right branch. Consequently, we can mount successful SFS collision attacks on 41, 42 and 43 steps of RIPEMD-160, thus significantly improving the SFS collision attacks. In addition, we also searched for a 44-step differential characteristic, but the differential probability is too low to allow a meaningful SFS collision attack
New Records in Collision Attacks on SHA-2
The SHA-2 family including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, SHA-512/224 and SHA512/256 is a U.S. federal standard pub-
lished by NIST. Especially, there is no doubt that SHA-256 is one of the
most important hash functions used in real-world applications. Due to
its complex design compared with SHA-1, there is almost no progress
in collision attacks on SHA-2 after ASIACRYPT 2015. In this work, we
retake this challenge and aim to significantly improve collision attacks
on the SHA-2 family. First, we observe from many existing attacks on
SHA-2 that the current advanced tool to search for SHA-2 characteristics
has reached the bottleneck. Specifically, longer differential characteristics
could not be found, and this causes that the collision attack could not
reach more steps. To address this issue, we adopt Liu et al.’s MILP-based
method and implement it with SAT/SMT for SHA-2, where we also add
more techniques to detect contradictions in SHA-2 characteristics. This
answers an open problem left in Liu et al.’s paper to apply the technique
to SHA-2. With this SAT/SMT-based tool, we search for SHA-2 charac-
teristics by controlling its sparsity in a dedicated way. As a result, we
successfully find the first practical semi-free-start (SFS) colliding message
pair for 39-step SHA-256, improving the best 38-step SFS collision attack
published at EUROCRYPT 2013. In addition, we also report the first
practical free-start (FS) collision attack on 40-step SHA-224, while the
previously best theoretic 40-step attack has time complexity 2110. More-
over, for the first time, we can mount practical and theoretic collision
attacks on 28-step and 31-step SHA-512, respectively, which improve the
best collision attack only reaching 27 steps of SHA-512 at ASIACRYPT
2015. In a word, with new techniques to find SHA-2 characteristics, we
have made some notable progress in the analysis of SHA-2 after the major
achievements made at EUROCRYPT 2013 and ASIACRYPT 2015
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