Credit default swaps and systemic risk

We present a network model for investigating the impact on systemic risk of central clearing of over the counter (OTC) credit default swaps (CDS). We model contingent cash flows resulting from CDS and other OTC derivatives by a multi-layered network with a core-periphery structure, which is flexible enough to reproduce the gross and net exposures as well as the heterogeneity of market shares of participating institutions. We analyze illiquidity cascades resulting from liquidity shocks and show that the contagion of illiquidity takes place along a sub-network constituted by links identified as ’critical receivables’. A key role is played by the long intermediation chains inherent to the structure of the OTC network, which may turn into chains of critical receivables. We calibrate our model to data representing net and gross OTC exposures of large dealer banks and use this model to investigate the impact of central clearing on network stability. We find that, when interest rate swaps are cleared, central clearing of credit default swaps through a well-capitalized CCP can reduce the probability and the magnitude of a systemic illiquidity spiral by reducing the length of the chains of critical receivables within the financial network. These benefits are reduced, however, if some large intermediaries are not included as clearing members

Credit default swaps and financial stability

Credit default swaps (CDSs), initially intended as instruments for hedging and managing credit risk, have been pinpointed during the recent crisis as being detrimental to financial stability. We argue that the impact of credit default swap markets on financial stability crucially depends on clearing mechanisms and capital and liquidity requirements for large protection sellers. In particular, the culprits are not so much speculative or “naked” credit default swaps but inadequate risk management and supervision of protection sellers. When protection sellers are inadequately capitalised, OTC (over-the-counter) CDS markets may act as channels for contagion and systemic risk. On the other hand, a CDS market where all major dealers participate in a central clearing facility with adequate reserves can actually contribute to mitigating systemic risk. In the latter case, a key element is the risk management of the central counterparties, for which we outline some recommendations.

Credit Default Swaps: Frequently Asked Questions

Credit default swaps are contracts that provide protection against default by third parties, similar to insurance. These financial derivatives are used by banks and other financial institutions to manage risk. The rapid growth of the derivatives market, the potential for widespread credit defaults (such as defaults for subprime mortgages), and operational problems in the over-the-counter (OTC) market where credit default swaps are traded, have led some policymakers to inquire if credit default swaps are a danger to the financial system and the economy. This report defines credit default swaps, explains their use by banks for risk management, and discusses the potential for systemic risk

Credit default swaps networks and systemic risk

Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads should reflect default risk of the underlying corporate debt. Actually, it has been recognized that CDS spread time series did not anticipate but only followed the increasing risk of default before the financial crisis. In principle, the network of correlations among CDS spread time series could at least display some form of structural change to be used as an early warning of systemic risk. Here we study a set of 176 CDS time series of financial institutions from 2002 to 2011. Networks are constructed in various ways, some of which display structural change at the onset of the credit crisis of 2008, but never before. By taking these networks as a proxy of interdependencies among financial institutions, we run stress-test based on Group DebtRank. Systemic risk before 2008 increases only when incorporating a macroeconomic indicator reflecting the potential losses of financial assets associated with house prices in the US. This approach indicates a promising way to detect systemic instabilities

Derivatives and Credit Contagion in Interconnected Networks

The importance of adequately modeling credit risk has once again been highlighted in the recent financial crisis. Defaults tend to cluster around times of economic stress due to poor macro-economic conditions, {\em but also} by directly triggering each other through contagion. Although credit default swaps have radically altered the dynamics of contagion for more than a decade, models quantifying their impact on systemic risk are still missing. Here, we examine contagion through credit default swaps in a stylized economic network of corporates and financial institutions. We analyse such a system using a stochastic setting, which allows us to exploit limit theorems to exactly solve the contagion dynamics for the entire system. Our analysis shows that, by creating additional contagion channels, CDS can actually lead to greater instability of the entire network in times of economic stress. This is particularly pronounced when CDS are used by banks to expand their loan books (arguing that CDS would offload the additional risks from their balance sheets). Thus, even with complete hedging through CDS, a significant loan book expansion can lead to considerably enhanced probabilities for the occurrence of very large losses and very high default rates in the system. Our approach adds a new dimension to research on credit contagion, and could feed into a rational underpinning of an improved regulatory framework for credit derivatives.Comment: 26 pages, 7 multi-part figure

Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk In Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks

Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks’ assets has led to the idea of “too interconnected to fail” resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel II credit risk transfer and synthetic securitization framework, there is little evidence that the CDS market predicated on a system of offsets to minimize final settlement can provide the credit risk mitigation sought by banks for reference assets in the case of a significant credit event. The large negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS financial network from the demise of a big CDS seller undermines the justification in Basel II that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontinued.Credit Default Swaps; Financial Networks; Systemic Risk; Agent BasedCredit Default Swaps, Financial Networks, Systemic Risk, Agent Based Models, Complex Systems, Stress Testing

Systemic risk measures: the simpler the better.

We compute six different sets of systemic risk measures for a sample of the 20 biggest European and 13 biggest US banks from January 2004 to November 2009. The six measures are based on i) Principal components of the bank’s Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), ii) Interbank interest rate spreads, iii) Structural credit risk models, iv) Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) indexes and their tranches, v) Multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads and vi) Co-Risk measures. We then rank the measures using three different criteria: i) Causality tests, ii) Price discovery tests and iii) their correlation with an index of systemic events. For the European and US markets, the best indicators are the first Principal Component of the single-name CDSs and the LIBOR-OIS or LIBOR-TBILL spreads, respectively, whereas the least reliable indicators are the Co-Risk measures and the systemic spreads extracted from the CDO indexes and their tranches.Systemic risk; CDS; Libor spreads; CoVaR;

Credit derivatives, macro risks, and systemic risks

This paper explores some bigger-picture risks associated with credit derivatives. Drawing a distinction between the market's perception of credit and "real credit" as reflected in the formal definition of a credit event, the author examines the well-documented macro drivers of credit generally. ; The author next enumerates frequently cited concerns with credit derivatives: the exceedingly large notional trade in credit default swaps relative to outstanding debt, the increasing involvement of hedge funds in these products, and operational concerns that have surfaced in the past year or two. ; The paper then considers the possibilities of associated systemic risk, looking at the issues of modeling and proper hedging, risk management, and valuation of new and sometimes complex credit derivative instruments. ; Despite the inherent risks involved in credit derivatives, the market for these instruments continues to grow rapidly as people find them practical and beneficial for hedging risk, generating income, and distributing credit risk among a broader institutional base. Evolving market practices and safeguards should help establish a more efficient, transparent marketplace. Whether credit risk is best allocated outside of the traditional financial intermediaries remains an open question.Credit derivatives ; Risk

Systemic risk measures: the simpler the better

We compute six different sets of systemic risk measures for a sample of the 20 biggest European and 13 biggest US banks from January 2004 to November 2009. The six measures are based on i) Principal components of the bank’s Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), ii) Interbank interest rate spreads, iii) Structural credit risk models, iv) Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) indexes and their tranches, v) Multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads and vi) Co-Risk measures. We then rank the measures using three different criteria: i) Causality tests, ii) Price discovery tests and iii) their correlation with an index of systemic events. For the European and US markets, the best indicators are the first Principal Component of the single-name CDSs and the LIBOR-OIS or LIBOR-TBILL spreads, respectively, whereas the least reliable indicators are the Co-Risk measures and the systemic spreads extracted from the CDO indexes and their tranches