3 research outputs found
Control Behavior Integrity for Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber-physical control systems, such as industrial control systems (ICS), are
increasingly targeted by cyberattacks. Such attacks can potentially cause
tremendous damage, affect critical infrastructure or even jeopardize human life
when the system does not behave as intended. Cyberattacks, however, are not new
and decades of security research have developed plenty of solutions to thwart
them. Unfortunately, many of these solutions cannot be easily applied to
safety-critical cyber-physical systems. Further, the attack surface of ICS is
quite different from what can be commonly assumed in classical IT systems.
We present Scadman, a system with the goal to preserve the Control Behavior
Integrity (CBI) of distributed cyber-physical systems. By observing the
system-wide behavior, the correctness of individual controllers in the system
can be verified. This allows Scadman to detect a wide range of attacks against
controllers, like programmable logic controller (PLCs), including malware
attacks, code-reuse and data-only attacks. We implemented and evaluated Scadman
based on a real-world water treatment testbed for research and training on ICS
security. Our results show that we can detect a wide range of
attacks--including attacks that have previously been undetectable by typical
state estimation techniques--while causing no false-positive warning for
nominal threshold values.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figure