2,980 research outputs found
Tough Love
In this paper I examine Bernard Williamsâ claim that an appealing conception of love can come into conflict with impartial morality. First, I explain how Williamsâ claim can survive one strategy to head off the possibility of conflict. I then examine J.D.Vellemanâs Kantian conception of love as another possible way to reject Williamsâ claim. I argue, however, that Vellemanâs attempt to transcend loveâs partiality in his account of love produces an unappealing and unconvincing ideal. This is made particularly clear, I suggest, by the analysis that Velleman is forced to give of the kind of case that generated Williamsâ observations in the first place. Thus Vellemanâs account should be rejecte
Descartes and the Possibility of Enlightened Freedom
This paper offers a novel interpretation of Descartes's conception of freedom that resolves an important tension at the heart of his view. It does so by appealing to the important but overlooked distinction between possessing a power, exercising a power, and being in a position to exercise a power
The False Promise of Thought Experimentation in Moral and Political Philosophy
Prof. MiĆĄÄeviÄ has long been an ardent defender of the use of thought experiments in philosophy, foremost metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. Recently he has, in his typically sophisticated manner, extended his general account of philosophical thought-experimenting to the domain of normative politics. Not only can the history of political philosophy be better understood and appreciated, according to MiĆĄÄeviÄ, when seen as a more or less continuous, yet covert, practice of thought-experimenting, the very progress of the discipline may crucially depend on finding the right balance between the constraints of (biological, psychological, economic, political, and so on) reality and political-moral ideals when we set to design our basic political notions and institutions.
I have much less confidence in this project than prof. MiĆĄÄeviÄ does. As a subspecies of moral TE, political TE share all their problems plus exhibit some of their own. In the paper, I present and discuss two types of evidence that threaten to undermine political philosophersâ trust in thought-experiments and the ethical/political intuitions elicited by them: (i) the dismal past record of thought-experimentation in moral and political philosophy; and (ii) the variety, prevalence, and stubbornness, of bias in ordinary social/political judgment
Indirect Compatibilism
In this thesis, I will defend a new kind of compatibilist account of free action, indirect conscious control compatibilism (or indirect compatibilism for short), and argue that some of our actions are free according to it. My argument has three components, and involves the development of a brand new tool for experimental philosophy, and the use of cognitive neuroscience. The first component of the argument shows that compatibilism (of some kind) is a conceptual truth. Contrary to the current orthodoxy in the free will literature, which is that our concept of free will is an incompatibilist concept - a concept according to which we have free will only if determinism is false - I will show that our concept of free will is in fact a compatibilist concept - a concept according to which we can have free will even if determinism is true - and I do so using a new experimental philosophy methodology inspired by two-dimensional semantics.
Of course, even if our concept of free will is a compatibilist concept, this does not mean that there are any free actions in the world: the current empirical evidence from the brain sciences appears to show that there might be no, or very few, free actions in the world, even on many compatibilist understandings of what it would take for there to be free will. The second component of the argument addresses this concern by extending our understanding of compatibilism. Agents act freely either when their actions are caused by compatibilistically acceptable psychological processes, or are indirectly caused by those same processes. Hence the name of my account: indirect compatibilism.
The final component of the argument defends my new account against some interesting objections and provides evidence from cognitive neuroscience that some of our actions count as free by the lights of indirect compatibilism
Cognitions and emotions - testing the tenets of Fairness Theory
In this study, we test the tenets put forth by Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). Fairness Theory argues that perceptions of unfairness are formulated through a cognitive process that evaluates an event in terms of the presence or absence of injury or harm, the commission or omission of discretionary conduct on the part of the entity responsible for the injury or harm, and whether or not an ethical or moral standard was violated by such conduct (termed âWould,â âCould,â and âShould,â respectively). In this paper, we examine the role each of these elements plays in the assessment of fairness. Across two laboratory studies we show that a combination of harm and moral infraction shows the strongest effects on both first- and third-party justice perceptions, anger, and subsequent behaviors, whereas perceived discretion (âCouldâ) has little effect. Results are interpreted in light of recent research in moral psychology
Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy
First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the emerging field of âexperimental philosophy,â in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersonsâ intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophyâindependently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to actively engage with the material and paves the way for more fruitful and impassioned classroom discussion. We offer some suggestions for how to use surveys in the classroom and provide an appendix that contains some examples of scenarios teachers could use in their courses
Ethics and Epistemic Hopelessness
This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up this stance, I argue, depends on the choices that one faces (or is likely to face). I close the paper by arguing against the view that there are standing moral reasons against regarding others as epistemically hopeless
Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian Essay
In this paper, I give a Kantian answer to the question whether and why it would be inappropriate to blame people suffering from mental disorders that fall within the schizophrenia spectrum. I answer this question by reconstructing Kantâs account of mental disorder, in particular his explanation of psychotic symptoms. Kant explains these symptoms in terms of various types of cognitive impairment. I show that this explanation is plausible and discuss Kantâs claim that the unifying feature of the symptoms is the patientâs inability to enter into an exchange of reasons with others. After developing a Kantian Quality of Will Thesis, I analyze some real life cases. Firstly, I argue that delusional patients who are unable to enter into an exchange of epistemic reasons are exempted from doxastic rather than moral responsibility. They are part of the moral community and exonerated from moral blame only if their actions do not express a lack of good will. Secondly, I argue that disorganized patients who are unable to form intentions and to make plans are exempted from moral responsibility because they do not satisfy the conditions for agency
Moral Luck
The problem of moral luck arises because of an apparent conflict between the luck that humans face, the pervasiveness of moral considerations in our lives, and the idea that moral responsibility requires a level of control that luck robs them of. The claim is that we cannot be governed by luck and be morally responsible. The notions of luck and moral responsibility are developed, and several solutions to the problem of moral luck are discussed and rejected. Finally, a solution is offered that dissolves the problem. In particular, the luck that affects an agent\u27s moral standing comes from the choices that are presented to her from given character traits. This variety of moral luck is found to be genuine and yet to not conflict with a principle that moral responsibility requires control. The agent has control over what choices she makes from her palette of live options, no matter if the range of options is given to her without her choice. So while she lacks complete control, she has the right kind of control for moral responsibility. Hence, there is moral luck, but no problem of moral luck
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