Corruption and bicameral reforms

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives

Unicameralismo y percepción de la corrupción: el caso de Perú

The article explores the influence of unicameralism on the perception of corruption in Peru, tentatively highlighting a positive relationship between these two variables while posing different questions for future research.El artículo explora la influencia del unicameralismo en la percepción de la corrupción en Perú, destacando de manera provisional una relación positiva entre estas dos variables mientras expone diferentes interrogantes al respecto para futuras investigaciones