Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. \ud To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed. \u

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed

A coordination mechanism with fair cost allocation for divergent multi-echelon inventory systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in divergent multiechelon inventory systems under periodic review and decentralized control. All the installations track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon replenishment policies that minimize their individual inventory costs. In general these policies do not coincide with the optimal policies of the system under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control.\ud To remove this cost inefficiency, a simple coordination mechanism is presented that is initiated by the most downstream installations. The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for increased costs and provides it with additional side payments. We show that this mechanism coordinates the system; the global optimal policy of the system is the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, the mechanism results in a fair allocation of the costs; all installations enjoy cost savings

An enhanced approximation mathematical model inventorying items in a multi-echelon system under a continuous review policy with probabilistic demand and lead-time

An inventory system attempts to balance between overstock and understock to reduce the total cost and achieve customer demand in a timely manner. The inventory system is like a hidden entity in a supply chain, where a large complete network synchronizes a series of interrelated processes for a manufacturer, in order to transform raw materials into final products and distribute them to customers. The optimality of inventory and allocation policies in a supply chain for a cement industry is still unknown for many types of multi-echelon inventory systems. In multi-echelon networks, complexity exists when the inventory issues appear in multiple tiers and whose performances are significantly affected by the demand and lead-time. Hence, the objective of this research is to develop an enhanced approximation mathematical model in a multi-echelon inventory system under a continuous review policy subject to probabilistic demand and lead-time. The probability distribution function of demand during lead-time is established by developing a new Simulation Model of Demand During Lead-Time (SMDDL) using simulation procedures. The model is able to forecast future demand and demand during lead-time. The obtained demand during lead-time is used to develop a Serial Multi-echelon Inventory (SMEI) model by deriving the inventory cost function to compute performance measures of the cement inventory system. Based on the performance measures, a modified distribution multi-echelon inventory (DMEI) model with the First Come First Serve (FCFS) rule (DMEI-FCFS) is derived to determine the best expected waiting time and expected number of retailers in the system based on a mean arrival rate and a mean service rate. This research established five new distribution functions for the demand during lead-time. The distribution functions improve the performance measures, which contribute in reducing the expected waiting time in the system. Overall, the approximation model provides accurate time span to overcome shortage of cement inventory, which in turn fulfil customer satisfaction

The effects of win-win conditions on revenue-sharing contracts

This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in distribution chains in the presence of win-win conditions. Revenue-sharing contracts are a mechanism to coordinate the firms in a distribution chain. Under these contracts the retailer shares its revenue with the supplier in exchange for a lower wholesale price. The win-win conditions are natural conditions requiring that the profit of any firm may not decrease after implementing the revenue-sharing contract. If these conditions are not met, that is, if at least one firm is confronted with decreased profits, the firms will not agree upon signing the contract and the revenue-sharing contract will not be implemented. We show that the win-win conditions result in a smaller range of contracts being offered by the supplier. More important, in case of multiple competing retailers there may be no revenue-sharing contract satisfying these conditions. Hence, in the presence of win-win conditions revenue-sharing contracts are not suitable for distribution chains with a supplier and multiple competing retailers. For these chains we present a simple alternative coordination mechanism that coordinates the chain and satisfies all win-win conditions. \u

On returns and network configuration in supply chain dynamics

This research focuses on how two common modeling assumptions in the Bullwhip Effect (BWE) literature (i.e., assuming the return of the excess of goods and assuming a serial network) may distort the results obtained. We perform a robust design of experiments where the return condition (return vs. no return) and the configuration of the Supply Chain Network (SCN) (serial vs. divergent) are systematically analyzed. We find an important interaction between these assumptions: the impact of returns on the BWE strongly depends on the SCN configuration. This study highlights the importance of accurately modeling SCNs to properly assess SCNs managers.Junta de Andalucía P08-TEP-0363

Modelling an End to End Supply Chain system Using Simulation

Within the current uncertain environment industries are predominantly faced with various challenges resulting in greater need for skilled management and adequate technique as well as tools to manage Supply Chains (SC) efficiently. Derived from this observation is the need to develop a generic/reusable modelling framework that would allow firms to analyse their operational performance over time (Mackulak and Lawrence 1998, Beamon and Chen 2001, Petrovic 2001, Lau et al. 2008, Khilwani et al. 2011, Cigollini et al. 2014). However for this to be effectively managed the simulation modelling efforts should be directed towards identifying the scope of the SC and the key processes performed between players. Purpose: The research attempts to analyse trends in the field of supply chain modelling using simulation and provide directions for future research by reviewing existing Operations Research/Operations Management (OR/OM) literature. Structural and operational complexities as well as different business processes within various industries are often limiting factors during modelling efforts. Successively, this calls for the end to end (E2E) SC modelling framework where the generic processes, related policies and techniques could be captured and supported by the powerful capabilities of simulation. Research Approach: Following Mitroff’s (1974) scientific inquiry model and Sargent (2011) this research will adopt simulation methodology and focus on systematic literature review in order to establish generic OR processes and differentiate them from those which are specific to certain industries. The aim of the research is provide a clear and informed overview of the existing literature in the area of supply chain simulation. Therefore through a profound examination of the selected studies a conceptual model will be design based on the selection of the most commonly used SC Processes and simulation techniques used within those processes. The description of individual elements that make up SC processes (Hermann and Pundoor 2006) will be defined using building blocks, which are also known as Process Categories. Findings and Originality: This paper presents an E2E SC simulation conceptual model realised through means of systematic literature review. Practitioners have adopted the term E2E SC while this is not extensively featured within academic literature. The existing SC studies lack generality in regards to capturing the entire SC within one methodological framework, which this study aims to address. Research Impact: A systematic review of the supply chain and simulation literature takes an integrated and holistic assessment of an E2E SC, from market-demand scenarios through order management and planning processes, and on to manufacturing and physical distribution. Thus by providing significant advances in understanding of the theory, methods used and applicability of supply chain simulation, this paper will further develop a body of knowledge within this subject area. Practical Impact: The paper will empower practitioners’ knowledge and understanding of the supply chain processes characteristics that can be modelled using simulation. Moreover it will facilitate a selection of specific data required for the simulation in accordance to the individual needs of the industry