Leader-follower Game in VMI System with Limited Production Capacity Considering Wholesale and Retail Prices

VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a widely used cooperative inventory policy in supply chains in which each enterprise has its autonomy in pricing. This paper discusses a leader-follower Stackelberg game in a VMI supply chain where the manufacturer, as a leader, produces a single product with a limited production capacity and delivers it at a wholesale price to multiple different retailers, as the followers, who then sell the product in dispersed and independent markets at retail prices. An algorithm is then developed to determine the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and market related parameters on the profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. Through the numerical example, our research demonstrates that: (a) the market related parameters have significant influence on the manufacturer’ and its retailers’ profits; (b) a retailer’s profit may not be necessarily lowered when it is charged with a higher inventory cost by the manufacturer; (c) the equilibrium of the Stackelberg equilibrium benefits the manufacturer.Stackelberg Game;Supply Chain;Vendor Managed Inventory

Multi-product budget-constrained acquistion and pricing with uncertain demand and supplier quantity discounts

We consider the joint acquisition and pricing problem where the retailer sells multiple products with uncertain demands and the suppliers provide all unit quantity discounts.The problem is to determine the optimal acquisition quantities and selling prices so as to maximize the retailer’s expected profit, subject to a budget constraint. This is the first extension to consider supplier discounts in the constrained multi-product newsvendor pricing problem. We establish a mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) model to formulate the problem, and developaLagrangian based solution approach.Computational results for the test problems involving up to thousand products are reported, which show that the Lagrangian based approach can obtain high-quality solutions in a very short time

Leader-follower Game in VMI System with Limited Production Capacity Considering Wholesale and Retail Prices

VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a widely used cooperative inventory policy in supply chains in which each enterprise has its autonomy in pricing. This paper discusses a leader-follower Stackelberg game in a VMI supply chain where the manufacturer, as a leader, produces a single product with a limited production capacity and delivers it at a wholesale price to multiple different retailers, as the followers, who then sell the product in dispersed and independent markets at retail prices. An algorithm is then developed to determine the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and market related parameters on the profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. Through the numerical example, our research demonstrates that: (a) the market related parameters have significant influence on the manufacturer’ and its retailers’ profits; (b) a retailer’s profit ma