A Stochastic based Physical Layer Security in Cognitive Radio Networks: Cognitive Relay to Fusion Center

© 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are found to be, without difficulty wide-open to external malicious threats. Secure communication is an important prerequisite for forthcoming fifth-generation (5G) systems, and CRs are not exempt. A framework for developing the accomplishable benefits of physical layer security (PLS) in an amplify-andforward cooperative spectrum sensing (AF-CSS) in a cognitive radio network (CRN) using a stochastic geometry is proposed. In the CRN the spectrum sensing data from secondary users (SU) are collected by a fusion center (FC) with the assistance of access points (AP) as cognitive relays, and when malicious eavesdropping SU are listening. In this paper we focus on the secure transmission of active APs relaying their spectrum sensing data to the FC. Closed expressions for the average secrecy rate are presented. Analytical formulations and results substantiate our analysis and demonstrate that multiple antennas at the APs is capable of improving the security of an AF-CSSCRN. The obtained numerical results also show that increasing the number of FCs, leads to an increase in the secrecy rate between the AP and its correlated FC

Game theory-based resource allocation for secure WPCN multiantenna multicasting systems

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where multiple power beacons (PBs) supply power to a transmitter in order to establish a reliable communication link with multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter has to harvest radio frequency (RF) energy from multiple PBs due to the shortage of embedded power supply before establishing its secure com- munication. We exploit a novel and practical scenario that the PBs and the transmitter may belong to different operators and a hierarchical energy interaction between the PBs and the transmitter is considered. Specifically, the monetary incentives are required for the PBs to assist the transmitter for secure communications. This leads to the formulation of a Stackelberg game for the secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where the transmitter and the PB are modelled as leader and follower, respectively, each maximizing their own utility function. The closed-form Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game is then derived where we study various scenarios of eavesdroppers and legitimate users that can have impact on the optimality of the derived solutions. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed schemes

Power Allocation and Cooperative Diversity in Two-Way Non-Regenerative Cognitive Radio Networks

In this paper, we investigate the performance of a dual-hop block fading cognitive radio network with underlay spectrum sharing over independent but not necessarily identically distributed (i.n.i.d.) Nakagami-$m$ fading channels. The primary network consists of a source and a destination. Depending on whether the secondary network which consists of two source nodes have a single relay for cooperation or multiple relays thereby employs opportunistic relay selection for cooperation and whether the two source nodes suffer from the primary users' (PU) interference, two cases are considered in this paper, which are referred to as Scenario (a) and Scenario (b), respectively. For the considered underlay spectrum sharing, the transmit power constraint of the proposed system is adjusted by interference limit on the primary network and the interference imposed by primary user (PU). The developed new analysis obtains new analytical results for the outage capacity (OC) and average symbol error probability (ASEP). In particular, for Scenario (a), tight lower bounds on the OC and ASEP of the secondary network are derived in closed-form. In addition, a closed from expression for the end-to-end OC of Scenario (a) is achieved. With regards to Scenario (b), a tight lower bound on the OC of the secondary network is derived in closed-form. All analytical results are corroborated using Monte Carlo simulation method

Game theory-based resource allocation for secure WPCN multiantenna multicasting systems

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where multiple power beacons (PBs) supply power to a transmitter in order to establish a reliable communication link with multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter has to harvest radio frequency (RF) energy from multiple PBs due to the shortage of embedded power supply before establishing its secure com- munication. We exploit a novel and practical scenario that the PBs and the transmitter may belong to different operators and a hierarchical energy interaction between the PBs and the transmitter is considered. Specifically, the monetary incentives are required for the PBs to assist the transmitter for secure communications. This leads to the formulation of a Stackelberg game for the secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where the transmitter and the PB are modelled as leader and follower, respectively, each maximizing their own utility function. The closed-form Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game is then derived where we study various scenarios of eavesdroppers and legitimate users that can have impact on the optimality of the derived solutions. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed schemes