Device-to-device communications: a performance analysis in the context of social comparison-based relaying

Device-to-device (D2D) communications are recognized as a key enabler of future cellular networks which will help to drive improvements in spectral efficiency and assist with the offload of network traffic. Among the transmission modes of D2D communications are single-hop and relay assisted multi-hop transmission. Relay-assisted D2D communications will be essential when there is an extended distance between the source and destination or when the transmit power of D2D user equipments (UEs) is constrained below a certain level. Although a number of works on relay-assisted D2D communications have been presented in the literature, most of those assume that relay nodes cooperate unequivocally. In reality, this cannot be assumed since there is little incentive to cooperate without a guarantee of future reciprocal behavior. Cooperation is a social behavior that depends on various factors, such as peer comparison, incentives, the cost to the donor and the benefit to the recipient. To incorporate the social behavior of D2D relay nodes, we consider the decision to relay using the donation game based on social comparison and characterize the probability of cooperation in an evolutionary context. We then apply this within a stochastic geometric framework to evaluate the outage probability and transmission capacity of relay assisted D2D communications. Through numerical evaluations, we investigate the performance gap between the ideal case of 100% cooperation and practical scenarios with a lower cooperation probability. It shows that practical scenarios achieve lower transmission capacity and higher outage probability than idealistic network views which assume full cooperation. After a sufficient number of generations, however, the cooperation probability follows the natural rules of evolution and the transmission performance of practical scenarios approach that of the full cooperation case, indicating that all D2D relay nodes adopt the same dominant cooperative strategy based on social comparison, without the need for enforcement by an external authority

ISCoDe: A framework for interest similarity-based community detection in social networks

Abstract—This paper proposes a framework for node clus-tering in computerized social networks according to common interests. Communities in such networks are mainly formed by user selection, which may be based on various factors such as acquaintance, social status, educational background. However, such selection may result in groups that have a low degree of similarity. The proposed framework could improve the effective-ness of these social networks by constructing clusters of nodes with higher interest similarity, and thus maximize the benefit that users extract from their participation. The framework is based on methods for detecting communities over weighted graphs, where graph edge weights are defined based on measures of similarity between nodes ’ interests in certain thematic areas. The capacity of these measures to enhance the sensitivity and resolution of community detection is evaluated with concrete benchmark scenarios over synthetic networks. We also use the framework to assess the level of common interests among sample users of a popular online social application. Our results confirm that clusters formed by user selection have low degrees of similarity; our framework could, hence, be valuable in forming communities with higher coherence of interests. I

A dominant social comparison heuristic unites alternative mechanisms for the evolution of indirect reciprocity

Cooperation is a fundamental human trait but our understanding of how it functions remains incomplete. Indirect reciprocity is a particular case in point, where one-shot donations are made to unrelated beneficiaries without any guarantee of payback. Existing insights are largely from two independent perspectives: i) individual-level cognitive behaviour in decision making, and ii) identification of conditions that favour evolution of cooperation. We identify a fundamental connection between these two areas by examining social comparison as a means through which indirect reciprocity can evolve. Social comparison is well established as an inherent human disposition through which humans navigate the social world by self-referential evaluation of others. Donating to those that are at least as reputable as oneself emerges as a dominant heuristic, which represents aspirational homophily. This heuristic is found to be implicitly present in the current knowledge of conditions that favour indirect reciprocity. The effective social norms for updating reputation are also observed to support this heuristic. We hypothesise that the cognitive challenge associated with social comparison has contributed to cerebral expansion and the disproportionate human brain size, consistent with the social complexity hypothesis. The findings have relevance for the evolution of autonomous systems that are characterised by one-shot interactions

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

Centralized networks inevitably exhibit single points of failure that malicious actors regularly target. Decentralized networks are more resilient if numerous participants contribute to the network’s functionality. Most decentralized networks employ incentive mechanisms to coordinate the participation and cooperation of peers and thereby ensure the functionality and security of the network. This article systematically reviews incentive mechanisms for decentralized networks and networked systems by covering 165 prior literature reviews and 178 primary research papers published between 1993 and October 2022. Of the considered sources, we analyze 11 literature reviews and 105 primary research papers in detail by categorizing and comparing the distinctive properties of the presented incentive mechanisms. The reviewed incentive mechanisms establish fairness and reward participation and cooperative behavior. We review work that substitutes central authority through independent and subjective mechanisms run in isolation at each participating peer and work that applies multiparty computation. We use monetary, reputation, and service rewards as categories to differentiate the implementations and evaluate each incentive mechanism’s data management, attack resistance, and contribution model. Further, we highlight research gaps and deficiencies in reproducibility and comparability. Finally, we summarize our assessments and provide recommendations to apply incentive mechanisms to decentralized networks that share computational resources

Cooperation through self-similar social networks

We address the problem of cooperation in decentralized systems, specifically looking at interactions between independent pairs of peers where mutual exchange of resources (e.g., updating or sharing content) is required. In the absence of any enforcement mechanism or protocol, there is no incentive for one party to directly reciprocate during a transaction with another. Consequently, for such decentralized systems to function, protocols for self-organization need to explicitly promote cooperation in a manner where adherence to the protocol is incentivized. In this article we introduce a new generic model to achieve this. The model is based on peers repeatedly interacting to build up and maintain a dynamic social network of others that they can trust based on similarity of cooperation. This mechanism effectively incentivizes unselfish behavior, where peers with higher levels of cooperation gain higher payoff. We examine the model's behavior and robustness in detail. This includes the effect of peers self-adapting their cooperation level in response to maximizing their payoff, representing a Nash-equilibrium of the system. The study shows that the formation of a social network based on reflexive cooperation levels can be a highly effective and robust incentive mechanism for autonomous decentralized systems